

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Politics:
1986 and Beyond
Is the South the Key?

Ben Stein
Tells
All About
"Miami Vice"

Public Opinion

✓

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Republican Prospects: Southern Comfort

Realignment may be an uncertain and premature interpretation of the 1984 election in most of the United States. In the South, however, last year's results were just another milestone in a historic change in party preference that began some time ago. In three of the past four presidential elections, the South was more Republican than the country as a whole. Last year, Ronald Reagan and George Bush exceeded their national share of the popular vote in every one of the eleven former Confederate states (our definition of the South).

A strong Republican showing at the top of the ticket has been a familiar southern story for a generation. As long ago as 1960, when the two parties evenly split the national popular vote, Richard Nixon won fully 46 percent of votes cast in the South. In those days, Republican appeal went no further down the ticket; the GOP took just seven southern House seats in 1960 and was shut out of the Senate altogether until John Tower succeeded Lyndon Johnson in 1961. Now, 10 of the region's 22 senators are Republicans, as are 42 of 116 representatives. The GOP holds 36 percent of all southern House seats, compared to 44 percent elsewhere. At one time or another in the past twenty-five years, eight southern states have had Republican governors; two presently do. State legislatures have remained Democratic, but even there Republicans are making inroads. They gained at least four state legislative seats in each of six southern states in the 1984 elections, and in 1985 added another seven seats in Louisiana alone from state legislators who switched parties.

Realignment, Not Dealignment

How should we understand this massive and durable shift in southern voting? Are we witnessing "dealignment"—the progressive irrelevance of party as a guide to voters—or "realignment"—a change in party identification?

We preface our answer by noting the obvious, that blacks have not been part of the trend toward Republicanism. Ninety percent of southern black voters in 1984 chose Walter Mondale, and for twenty years no Republican presidential candidate has won more than 15 percent of the black vote.[1] By the same token, the Democratic advantage in party identification among southern blacks has not diminished.

Southern whites, on the other hand, have become progressively less identified with the Democratic party. This can be seen in table 1, which displays the distribution of white southerners in the seven categories of party identification derived from questions asked by the National Election Studies in every presidential election year from 1952 through 1984. The most striking change is in the proportion who initially say that they think of themselves as Democrats and then describe this identification as strong: from 38 percent in 1952 to 15 percent in 1984. The decline in "weak" Democrats (who say that they are "not very strong") is nearly as steep, from 40 to 22 percent. These two categories together included 78 percent of all southern whites in 1952 and only 37 percent in 1984.

One reading of table 1 suggests that after 1960 the Republican party gained little from the drop in Democratic identification. Between 1952 and 1960, the proportion of whites calling themselves strong or weak Republicans doubled, from 11 to 22 percent. Since then, while the number of Democratic identifiers continued to tumble, the proportion of outright Republicans also declined for awhile and, although it rose again after 1968, never exceeded 24 percent. The expanding category consists of those people who, when asked if they usually think of themselves "as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what," chose the third alternative. Some observers have taken growth in Independents as evidence of dealignment, of "a greater reluctance on the part of many voters to express any underlying party preference, and an increased willingness to leave the candidate of their professed party with little hesitancy."[2]

The flaw in this interpretation is that most of the respondents who tell an interviewer that they are Independents readily concede, when asked, that they are closer to either the Democratic or Republican party. These "leaners," about three-fifths of all those who initially call themselves Independents, are indistinguishable from outright partisans. These respondents are the "Independent Democrats" and "Independent Republicans" in table 1. (The "Pure Independents" are those who deny being closer to either party.) In 1984, every white southern Independent Republican in this survey voted for Reagan. They were just as likely as the weak Republicans to vote for Republican House candidates, and more likely to choose the Republican Senate contender. Among white southerners from 1952 through 1984, an average of 92 percent of Independent Republicans and 91 percent of weak Republicans voted for the Republican presidential candidate. The same story applies to the weak and Independent Democrats, although at a lower level of loyalty.

Table 1

PARTY IDENTIFICATION OF WHITE SOUTHERNERS
1952-1984

	Strong Dems.	Weak Dems.	Ind. Dems.	Pure Ind.	Ind. Reps.	Weak Reps.	Strong Reps.
1952	38%	40%	7%	2%	3%	7%	4%
1956	33	36	4	6	7	10	6
1960	25	35	4	12	3	10	12
1964	36	30	6	8	6	7	8
1968	20	30	11	14	12	8	5
1972	13	33	9	15	10	11	8
1976	16	30	9	16	9	14	8
1980	18	25	11	14	9	15	8
1984	15	22	9	15	15	13	11

Source: All surveys by the University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies, National Election Studies.

Inasmuch as self-professed Independents who lean toward a party are really adherents of that party rather than neutrals, they should be included with the outright partisans in tabulations of party identification. Read this way, table 1 reveals a dramatic and continuing trend from 1952 to 1984. In the earlier year, 85 percent of white southerners were Democrats, and a mere 14 percent were Republicans. Last fall, the corresponding figures were 46 percent Democrats and 39 percent Republicans. In thirty-two years, the ratio of Democrats to Republicans has gone from six-to-one to nearly even. Indeed, table 1 underestimates the trend, because it includes all white respondents, irrespective of turnout, and Republicans are more likely to vote. When this is taken into account, the full dimensions of the southern realignment are clearer. Among those whites who voted in 1984, 46 percent were Democrats, and 42 percent were Republicans.

We say "realignment" because the available evidence argues against the alternative interpretation—dealignment—that party identification has become less relevant in the South. Pure Independents, who are genuinely free of party ties, have not grown proportionately more numerous since 1968, when they accounted for 14 percent of all white southerners. The pure Independent share of all voters has been slightly smaller: 11 percent in 1984, 9 percent in 1972, and 12 percent in 1968, 1976, and 1980.

The other major indicator of dealignment is defection—identifying with one party and voting for the other party's candidates. The growth of Republican strength in the South has been accompanied by a decline in defection since 1972. In that year, fully 43 percent of all white southerners voted across party lines; most of them were Democrats who could not stand George McGovern. In the last three presidential elections, the proportion of all votes cast by defectors fell to the lowest levels in thirty years. In 1956, for example, 26 percent of all white southern voters were presidential defectors; in 1984, just 16 percent were. In short, support for Republican candidates in the South reflects party-line voting by Republicans, not defection by Democrats. Growing Republican strength and greater party loyalty go hand in hand.

Who Are Those Republicans?

The realignment of the South is a result of a black exodus, an influx of Yankee Republicans, a new generation of native-born southerners, and conversion of the older generation. These various trends have not all occurred simultaneously. Rather, they seem to have occurred (and to be occurring) in the order we listed them.

Migration. The departure of southern blacks for the North is the oldest story. According to the Census Bureau, blacks accounted for 25 percent of all southerners in 1950, compared to 20 percent in 1980. Of course, in the first part of this period, when they were proportionately more numerous, southern blacks often could not vote. This point is illustrated by table 2, which shows that in 1956, when blacks made up 19 percent of the southern respondents in the National Election Study, they accounted for only 5 percent of the voters. Black turnout in the South crept upward in the 1950s and early 1960s, and then rose dramatically after the Voting Rights Act of 1964 put an end to disenfranchisement of southern blacks. The columns for 1976 and 1980 in table 2 illustrate both this familiar tale and the gradual decline in the black proportion of the southern population. The 1984 column indicates a sharp reversal of this trend, an increase of 5 percentage points in the black share not only of voters, but also of the entire voting age population. We suspect that more of this reversal is due to sampling error than to real change. Our suspicion is heightened by the very different story told by the Current Population Survey, which is based on eighty-six times the number of respondents. This source, far more reliable for the demographic variables it measures, shows that blacks were 18 percent of the voting age population and 16 percent of all voters in 1980. With an increase of 6.3 percentage points in their turnout rate between 1980 and 1984, blacks still accounted for only 17 percent of all voters in the last election. We conclude that the black share of the southern electorate is still shrinking. This trend is not good news for the Democratic party.

More important than black emigration is the movement into the South of millions of white northerners. In 1956, whites who grew up elsewhere were 13 percent of the entire population; by 1980, their share had risen to 22 percent. As a proportion of all voters, these transplanted Yankees grew from 17 to 26 percent. Compared to whites who grew up in the South, the migrants are younger, better off financially, and better educated. As one might expect, they are more likely to vote, so they are a more important electoral force than their numbers indicate. Their concentration in metropolitan areas also heightens their political importance.

Table 2

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOUTHERN ELECTORATE
1956, 1976, 1980, 1984[a]

	1956		1976		1980		1984	
	Voters	Voting-age Citizens	Voters	Voting-age Citizens	Voters	Voting-age Citizens	Voters	Voting-age Citizens
Young native whites[b]	—	—	21%	25%	29%	32%	32%	36%
Old native whites[c]	78%	69%	37	34	29	29	30	28
Migrant whites[d]	17	13	23	20	26	22	17	14
Blacks	5	19	19	22	16	17	21	22

Note: [a] Excludes respondents for whom data are missing about either turnout in the presidential election or where they grew up.
[b] Whites who grew up in the South and reached voting age in 1961 or later.
[c] Whites who grew up in the South and reached voting age prior to 1961.
[d] Whites who grew up outside the South.

Table 3

MIGRATION STATUS OF WHITE SOUTHERN VOTERS
1956-1984

	1956	1960	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984
Natives	82%	78%	79%	80%	76%	71%	69%	79%
Migrants	18	22	21	20	24	29	31	21

The growth of migrants as a percentage of the white southern electorate is depicted in table 3. By 1980, migrants were 31 percent of all white southern voters. Table 3 also indicates (as does table 2) an apparent drastic shrinkage in the migrant population between 1980 and 1984. We have no other source of data with which to confirm or deny this astonishing finding, and so are limited to speculating that it is a blip resulting from the small subsamples with which we are working.

The most important political feature of the migrants is their identification with the Republican party (see table 4). Ever since the Eisenhower era they have been more Republican than Democratic. In much of this period, they may have been one of the largest predominantly Republican social groupings in the country. Since 1956, an average of 49 percent of the migrants have been Republicans. Until the late 1970s, their influx was the most important factor in the southern realignment. As recently as 1976, 44 percent of all white southern Republicans who voted were transplanted Yankees. In the last two elections, this proportion fell to 39 percent in 1980 and a mere 24 percent in 1984. The skewed 1984 data may exaggerate the trend, but we have no doubt that the migrants' contribution to growing southern Republicanism is less central than it once was.[1]

Table 4

REPUBLICAN PERCENTAGE OF WHITE SOUTHERN VOTERS
BY MIGRATION STATUS, 1956-1984

	1956	1960	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984
Natives	14%	15%	17%	24%	27%	29%	35%	40%
Migrants	44	52	49	39	56	56	48	48

Generational Replacement. Table 4 also demonstrates that migration is only one of the factors that produced the realignment. Whites raised in the South are increasingly Republican. The proportion of "native" voters who call themselves Republicans was fairly stable through 1964, increased sharply in 1968, crept up a few points until 1976, and then took two leaps forward in 1980 and 1984. Migrants were more than three times as likely as natives to be Republicans in 1956; in 1984, the Republican shares of natives and migrants were nearly equal.

The search for explanations of this increased native Republicanism begins with the truism that millions of southerners have died since the 1950s, and many millions more have reached voting age and political consciousness. Southerners voting in the 1950s came of age in the Jim Crow era, when the Democratic party's monopoly was an important part of blacks' political exclusion. In those days, the public—North and South alike—did not discern differences in the racial policies associated with the two parties. Irrespective of their own views, Republicans and Democrats could avoid dissatisfaction with their party's stand on civil rights.

The younger generation began to vote and pay attention to politics as the old social order fell apart. The first cracks in the edifice began at least as long ago as 1948, when a strong Democratic platform plank on civil rights caused a convention walkout and a third-party candidacy by die-hard segregationists. Every election since then has also been given milestone status by some serious observers. What date do we choose as the boundary between political eras? (The scarcity of cases in survey subsamples is a good argument for limiting the analysis to two generations.)

We believe that politically the most important events in the process of historical change occurred in 1964, when President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act into law and then faced Barry Goldwater, one of just six Republican senators who had voted against it. Goldwater's vote was among the best-known legislative actions in American history. He emphasized it during the campaign. In November, the Republican party's share of the black vote nationwide went from 25 to 5 percent, and the present sharp difference in the two parties' perceived stands on racial issues crystallized.

The effect on white southern voters was immediate. Aside from his native Arizona, all the states Goldwater carried were in the Deep South. Whatever their short-term impact, however, the events of 1964 seem not to have altered the party identifications of those whites who had been old enough to vote in 1960 or earlier. It was a different story for those whose first opportunity to vote for president came in 1964. From that year on, these "young natives" have been substantially more Republican than the "old natives." In the four election years from 1964 to 1976, about a fifth of the old natives who voted were Republicans, compared to about a third of the young natives. Both cohorts became substantially more Republican in 1984, when 45 percent of the younger generation and 35 percent of the older generation were Republicans. Trends in party identification for the two cohorts of native white voters are charted in table 5.

Table 5

REPUBLICAN PERCENTAGE OF TWO COHORTS OF NATIVE WHITE SOUTHERN VOTERS, 1960-1984

	1960	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984
Young	—	25%	50%	33%	40%	40%	45%
Old	15%	17	20	24	22	30	35

As many younger as older natives voted in 1980; by 1984, the young voters outnumbered the old. Because only 52 percent of the younger generation voted in 1984, compared to 63 percent of the older cohort, their full electoral potential has not yet been realized. The mortality of the older generation, the continuing refreshment of the younger generation, and the rising turnout of those people entering middle age all point to further increases in Republican voting power.

In table 6 we see the separate contributions that migrants and the two native generations have made to the southern realignment. Natives eligible to vote before 1964 have dwindled to just over one-third of all voters. As their numbers shrink, the Democrats among them also decline as a percentage of the white electorate; old native Democrats are now just one-fifth of white southern voters. Migrants from outside the South first became an important Republican part of the southern electorate in the fifties and sixties. Since then, Republican migrants have accounted for a slightly larger proportion of southern white voters than have Democratic migrants. Natives who began to vote after 1960 make up almost half of all white voters in the South. As their numbers have grown, so have the ranks of the Republican party. Overall, the Republican share of white southern voters increased from 20 to 42 percent between 1956 and 1984. Perhaps 8 percentage points of this increase can be attributed to migrants. The bulk of the Republicans' new strength in the South is now due to the partisan preferences of voters who have entered the electorate since 1964.

Table 6

COMPOSITION OF WHITE SOUTHERN VOTERS BY MIGRATION STATUS, COHORT, AND PARTY IDENTIFICATION 1956, 1976, 1980 AND 1984

	1956	1976	1980	1984
Young natives				
Democrats	—	13%	18%	17%
Pure Independents	—	3	2	6
Republicans	—	10	14	18
Total	—	26%	34%	41%
Old natives				
Democrats	66%	30	20	22
Pure Independents	4	6	4	3
Republicans	12	10	10	13
Total	82%	46%	34%	38%
Migrants				
Democrats	9	9	11	8
Pure Independents	1	3	5	3
Republicans	8	16	15	10
Total	18%	28%	31%	21%

Why Are They Republicans?

We cannot provide a simple answer to this question. We begin by noting that our three groups of white southerners are very different demographically. Young natives and migrants are much better educated than the older generation of natives. The younger natives are somewhat better off than the older, and the migrants are the most prosperous. They are also much more likely to hold professional or managerial jobs and to consider themselves middle or upper-middle class. The older natives are almost entirely Protestant, while a quarter of the other two groups are Catholic. Both sorts of natives are more inclined to say they have been born again.

More migrants and younger natives, especially migrants, call themselves liberals. On the other hand, migrants have slightly more conservative views on economic issues than the older natives, who in turn are a bit to the right of the younger natives. On social issues like school prayer or the proper role of women, migrants are markedly more liberal than natives; the older natives are easily the most conservative of the three groups.

The issue most commonly discussed as the cause of the southern realignment is, of course, race. Observers who do not rely on survey data usually conclude that "above all, race has been the issue that splintered the South from the Democratic coalition."[7] Most analysts of survey data have been unable to unearth much evidence that hostility toward blacks is responsible for the realignment. The 1984 National Election Study provides an opportunity for another round in this controversy.

The 1984 NES data offer no support to the proposition that racial issues were an important feature of the election for southern whites. We come to this conclusion after analyzing answers to four types of open-ended questions that allow respondents to express their political perspectives in their own words. These answers give us an indication of the topics most on the minds of the public looking at the 1984 election.

1. Asked about the most important problems facing the country, only 5 white southerners out of the 487 in the sample mentioned anything having to do with race.
2. Two cited racial topics when asked what reasons they might have for voting for or against either presidential candidate.
3. Seven whites mentioned racial issues when asked, in four separate questions, if there was anything they liked and disliked about the Democratic and Republican parties. Five of the seven gave pro-black answers as reasons for liking the Democratic party.
4. Although two-thirds said there were important differences between the two parties, not one cited a racial issue as the basis for such a distinction.

We conclude that racial issues did not dominate southern whites' views of what was at stake in the 1984 election.

In addition, the racial attitudes of the three groups fail to differ in the way that a straightforward racial explanation for southern realignment would lead us to expect. In some cases, migrants, younger natives, and older natives do not differ at all. There are no differences among the three groups on government programs to aid minorities. Moreover, compared to their more Democratic elders, the young natives are *less* likely to say that they dislike civil rights leaders and that the civil rights movement is pushing too fast. It is not simply opposition to the Democratic party's liberal position on race that is driving the younger generation to the Republican party, for natives who have entered the electorate since 1960 are more liberal on racial issues and less hostile to blacks than are those who were eligible to vote prior to 1961.

It is another question, of course, whether, *within* each of the three categories of white southerners, party identification is related to racial attitudes and racial issue preferences. Feelings toward blacks on the NES "feeling thermometer" are not much help. Young natives who are cool toward blacks are much more Republican, but are also fairly scarce. The cool old natives, not quite as scarce, are more Democratic. A seven-point scale question about government aid to minority groups is the most useful measure of racial policy opinions. (The trouble with another question about federal spending on blacks is that most white southern respondents favor no change over either cutting or increasing funds.) Table 7 charts our tabulation of the relationship between attitudes on public help for minorities and Republican identification in each of the three groups. The relationship is strongest and most consistent for the migrants. Twenty percent of those who strongly favor government aid are Republicans, compared to 63 percent of advocates of self-help. There is a similar, but weaker connection for young natives; 27 percent at the liberal end and 53 percent at the conservative end of the scale are Republicans. The line for the old natives wanders all over the graph, tending in the predicted direction, to be sure, but with zigs and zags from one pole to the other.

Table 7

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTITUDES TOWARD GOVERNMENT AID TO MINORITIES AND REPUBLICAN IDENTIFICATION, BY MIGRATION STATUS AND COHORT, 1984

Percent Republican	Government should help minorities*			Minorities should help themselves*	
Young natives	27	41	39	53	53
Old natives	29	36	26	50	41
Migrants	20	22	32	53	63

* These are the end points on a 7-point scale used in the question. We collapsed 2 categories on each end to create the 5-point scale shown here.

Attitudes on racial policy are a good predictor of party identification among the migrants, a bit less useful for the young natives, and considerably less helpful for the old natives. The explanation, we think, is that the three groups do not have the same image of where the two parties stand on racial issues. Old natives, with first-hand knowledge of a Democratic party that stood for white unity, are considerably more likely to put the Democratic party on the "self-help" side of the minority aid question, and to see the Republican party as the champion of aid to minorities. This explains the jagged line for the old-timers in table 7; many of them reconcile conservative opinions and Democratic loyalty by thinking that their party shares their views. (Of course, the southern political scene still includes plenty of prominent Boll Weevil Democrats who can justify this view of the world.) This misperception seems responsible for the weaker relationship between old natives' racial views and their party identification. Among those white southerners with conservative racial opinions who place the Democratic party to the left of the Republican party on aid to minorities, old natives are as likely as younger ones to identify with the Republican party. Perceptions of the parties' stands, then, may have something to do with keeping old natives in the Democratic column and freeing young natives and migrants to be Republicans.

The effects of racial issues overall, however, are not particularly strong. More striking are the similarities among political preferences of the three groups—excepting their partisan preferences. That two of the groups are Republican while the third remains Democratic underscores the extent to which the realignment of southern whites is a *partisan* event. Migrants to the South grew up in surroundings where identification with the Democratic party was not assumed; many are Republicans. They gave the Republican party a foothold in the South, especially in urban centers. Natives who have joined the electorate since 1964 have found a political world in which the Republican party is an acceptable alternative—acceptable enough to have converted some old natives as well. Southerners of all varieties can now justifiably believe that a Republican vote is not a wasted vote.

The Future

The South is the fastest growing part of the country and will continue to attract millions of new residents from the North. After the 1990 Census, southern states probably will gain ten congressional seats at the expense of the Northeast and Upper Midwest. There is no reason to expect that these newcomers will differ from their predecessors: young, well-educated, prosperous—and Republican. Native southerners raised in the old days of segregation and the Democratic monopoly will fade in numbers, increasingly overshadowed by their more Republican offspring. This younger generation, unrestrained by tradition from identifying with the party that most effectively voices their policy preferences, will be increasingly active. Actuarial odds and immigration alone give the southern Republican party a bright future.

Population growth and economic expansion will hasten another long-term trend that is bad news for the Democrats: the whitening of the South. Black political mobilization, often considered the Democrats' last best hope of staving off realignment, does not have the capacity to make much difference except in a few congressional districts. Southern black turnout rose 6.3 percentage points from 1980 to 1984, compared to a mere 1.6 points for whites. Yet the comparative size of the two races is such that more white than black voters were added, and the black share of all southern voters changed only marginally.

The more whites abandon the Democratic party, the more important blacks become in nominating Democratic candidates. The greater the influence of blacks in Democratic primaries, the better the chances that the winners will offend conservative white Democrats, who now have an alternative; as the Democratic party becomes less hospitable to conservative candidates, more of them will be tempted to switch parties. Democratic Representative Kent Hance lost the 1984 Texas Democratic senatorial primary by a whisker to a far more liberal contender. This year he became a Republican, explaining, "I have seen the conservative Democrats getting smaller and smaller each year, and I think a lot of conservative Democrats are going to be faced with making the same decision that I made."[8]

Every year a few such defections make the national news. What does not merit attention outside the immediate area is the inevitable consequence of party switching. Each important switcher brings along some dozens or hundreds of local supporters: district coordinators and county chairmen and fund-raisers and miscellaneous lieutenants and sergeants in his organization.

These eminent defectors and their entourages will help meet the Republican party's most pressing need in the South: appealing candidates and strong campaigns for national and state legislative seats. Even last fall, exactly half the Democrats elected to the House of Representatives from the South had no Republican opponent. The political director of the Texas Republican party said this summer, "We have twenty State House seats that we believe are winnable next year." Mark White, the Democratic governor of Texas, told the *New York Times* that "All this talk about realignment is hokum. People in this state vote for the man, not the party."[9] This is mostly whistling past the graveyard, as Governor White will discover when Republicans recruit the candidates who will help them exploit their growing southern constituency.

NOTES

[1] Unless otherwise indicated, all findings on individual political behavior are based on the biennial National Election Studies of the University of Michigan Center for Political Studies. These data were obtained from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research through the State Data Program of the University of California. We are solely responsible for analyses and interpretations.

This article builds on two earlier pieces: Wolfinger and Robert B. Arseneau, "Partisan Change in the South, 1952-1976," in Louis Maisel and Joseph Cooper, eds., *Political Parties: Development and Decay* (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1978); and Wolfinger, "Dealignment, Realignment, and Mandates in the 1984 Election," in Austin Ranney, ed., *The American Elections of 1984* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, forthcoming).

[2] Everett Carll Ladd, "As the Realignment Turns: A Drama in Many Acts," *Public Opinion*, December/January 1985, p. 6.

[3] Bruce E. Keith, et al., "The Partisan Affinities of Independent 'Learners'," *British Journal of Political Science*, forthcoming.

[4] In a recent paper John R. Petrocik argues that virtually none of the southern realignment was caused by the migrants. This conclusion results from his reliance on data for 1984 as evidence of recent developments. See his paper presented at the 1985 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, "The Post-New Deal Party Coalitions and the Election of 1984," pp. 19-21.

[5] One reason for our belief is the finding that white southerners who first could vote in the elections of 1952, 1956, or 1960 had the same party preferences as their elders. See Wolfinger and Arseneau, "Partisan Change in the South," p. 197.

[6] Angus Campbell, "Interpreting the Presidential Victory," in Milton Cummings, Jr., ed., *The National Election of 1964* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1966), pp. 267-68; and Campbell, "Civil Rights and the Vote for President," *Psychology Today*, February 1968, p. 29.

[7] Ronald Brownstein, "The Political Stakes," *National Journal*, January 12, 1985, p. 103.

[8] *The Political Report*, June 21, 1985, p. 9.

[9] Both quotes are from the *New York Times*, August 15, 1985, p. 13.

by Richard Scammon and James A. Barnes

Republican Prospects: Southern Discomfort

One year ago, Democrat Bill Bradley of New Jersey and Republican John Warner of Virginia were reelected to the Senate by landslide margins. This month, Republican Tom Kean retained the Garden State governorship by a 40 percent margin, and three Democrats, including the first black elected to a statewide executive post in the South since Reconstruction, swept the top jobs in the Old Dominion. If this is a straightforward Republican realignment, the voters don't seem to have caught on yet.

At the presidential level Republican contenders have indeed been scoring well. Since Dwight Eisenhower was first elected, the GOP has captured the White House six times compared to the Democrats' three. Moreover, no Democratic nominee from outside the South has polled 50 percent of the popular vote since Franklin Roosevelt died. But further down the fight card, Republicans are doing less well, and this is where realignments are made.

Democrats have held onto the House of Representatives, for example, for the last sixteen elections. This may be a record for a western legislative chamber. Only the Unionist Protestant domination in Northern Ireland since 1922 may be longer. When Democratic presidential nominees were buried by Republican landslides in 1972 and 1984, the Democrats maintained at least a fifty-seat majority in the House of Representatives. Even in 1972 and 1984, they won more than half the votes cast for House candidates, although their standard bearers in those years gleaned only about 40 percent of the popular vote for president. For the last three decades, split control of the White House and the House of Representatives has been the rule, not the exception. By contrast, for the sixteen elections that preceded Eisenhower's presidency, the House and the White House were almost always run by the same party.

The modern-day anomaly of split control of the House and the White House is the essential problem of realignment. More people may now identify themselves as Republicans, and more may now vote that way in presidential elections. But they have been splitting their tickets so long that divided control of the House and the White House—disalignment—may have become a permanent condition.

Those Were the Days

What the Republicans need is the kind of victory over the House and White House enjoyed by Calvin Coolidge in 1924; his presidential margin was comfortable, and he held the Democrats to 183 seats in the House of Representatives (more than half of them from the South). Ronald Reagan carried 370 congressional districts in his 49-state sweep last year, but this time it was his own party that sent only 183 members to the House. Nineteen eighty-four looks very little like 1924.

Over half (188) of the 370 congressional districts that went to Reagan elected Democrats to the House in 1984. By contrast, the 65 districts Walter Mondale carried sent only one Republican to the House—Bill Green, representing the upper East Side of Manhattan. Even in the 108 districts that gave Reagan better than two-to-one majorities, five sent Democrats to the House.

Today's disalignment is unlikely to be transformed into a 1924- or FDR-type alignment for several reasons. For one, voters relish electoral flexibility. The voters of Tulsa, for example, may reelect Democrat Jim Jones to the House and yet cast twice as many votes for Reagan as for Mondale. They may simply be taking advantage of the opportunity to choose the best from both worlds. They can select "their kind" of Democrat (in this case, an influential member of the House) to represent "their interests," and at the same time choose to cast a conservative ideological vote for the presidency. As the experience of the last thirty years (1954-1984) shows, voters are unlikely to relinquish this power. The weakening attachment to parties—dealignment—also contributes to disalignment. These two factors—flexibility and weaker partisanship, are staples of the current political era.

Southern Dilemma

Republicans are clearly aware of the obstacles that stand in the way of realignment. But they believe it is possible, and are pinning their hopes on the South (the eleven secession states of the old Confederacy) to break disalignment's hold.

In the average pre-Eisenhower southern contingent, Democrats outnumbered Republicans by 100 to 2. The Dixie congressional delegations were reliably Democratic, with the exception of a couple of seats from the Blue Ridge Mountain area of Tennessee and Virginia. Today, Republican representation from the South is at an all-time high of 43 seats. More than half of the net gain in Republican House seats (eight of the fifteen) in the last election came from the South. Industrialization, urbanization, and immigration are the often-cited demographic trends that have helped boost GOP numbers there. The influx of better-educated Yankee professionals and the political conversions of younger native southerners to the GOP have also increased the party's base.

Republicans are encouraged, too, by Census projections that foretell a gain of ten new congressional seats in the South after the 1990 redistricting. Some analysts believe that the Republicans can improve their position in the South from being simply competitive with the Democrats to parity or majority status. Although the numbers offer some encouragement to this GOP dream, serious potential barriers to that ascent exist.

The first impediment is the redistricting process itself. Simply stated, the Democrats control it. They currently hold both legislative chambers in all of the eleven southern states. They hold nine of eleven governorships, including those in Texas, Florida, Arkansas, and Georgia. (The ten new congressional districts will probably be distributed in these four states.) In addition, there are only six state legislative chambers in which Republicans control a solid third of the seats. Two of those, it should be noted, *are* in their key target states of Texas and Florida. Another hindrance is the Democrats' survival instinct. Recent history indicates that Democrats in the South know how to take care of their own. After redistricting added eight new congressional districts to the South in 1982, the Democrats captured six of them that fall. The Republicans were able to take only one of those away in 1984, so the balance remains five-to-three in favor of the Democrats.

Furthermore, because politicians often act in their own best interest, we expect that some Democratic state legislators will carefully draw congressional district lines with an eye toward running for the new seats themselves. Unless Republicans can win governorships in the critical states of Florida and Texas or—as is less likely—win control of the legislative chambers there, the GOP will benefit from redistricting only where gerrymandering cannot be effective.

Well, if redistricting is unlikely to create a realignment, what will? Often in the past, Republicans could rely on Democratic fratricide to boost their fortunes. Republicans could frequently count on Democrats to nominate candidates too liberal to appeal to the more conservative among them. Disaffected Democrats would, in turn, vote for the Republican. In Louisiana's 6th district, for example, liberal Democrat Jeff LaCaze defeated conservative Democrat John Rarick for the congressional nomination. LaCaze in turn lost to Republican Henson Moore, who has held the seat since 1975. This path, though treacherous, may be the easiest way for Republicans to pick up congressional seats.

While Democratic fratricide will be an element in the future, southern Democrats seem to recognize that they have often been their own worst enemies. They have reacted by nominating some conservatives recently. In North Carolina in 1982, for example, moderate-conservative Tim Valentine defeated the more liberal black state legislator, Mickey Michaux, in a district where 36 percent of the voting-age population is black (and presumably liberal). Valentine went on to win the open seat. That same year, conservative incumbent Bill Chappell held off a liberal challenge in his Democratic primary in the 4th district of Florida. More recently, Democrats replaced retiring conservative Sam B. Hall, Jr. in the 1st district of Texas with Jim Chapman, a courthouse Democrat who favors constitutional amendments to balance the budget and allow school prayer. There is already talk among Democrats in the Delta district of Mississippi (58 percent black) about running a conservative white Democrat to lure conservative white supporters away from incumbent Republican Webb Franklin.

A further hindrance to Republican realignment is the possibility that southern Democratic lawmakers may benefit from new leadership in the House of Representatives in the future. A House speaker like Texan Jim Wright, for example, could present a more moderate image than his predecessor Tip O'Neill, who is often characterized as an unreconstructed New Deal liberal. Compromises made by the Democratic leadership (to make programs more palatable to conservative southerners) will only compound the problems that Republicans have had in depicting Democratic congressmen as too liberal for the South.

It baffles (and frustrates) many Republicans that Democratic congressional candidates could capture seventy-three southern districts while the Democratic presidential nominee could carry only seven. The differences between the Democrats' nominating process for president and each district's nominating process for Congress helps explain it. Each district's party primary voters control the process locally. In the South, this is apt to produce nominees acceptable to the more conservative white constituency. The words: "I am a liberal" will appear in few campaign brochures of southern Democrats.

It is no more likely that the party's 1988 presidential nominee will begin his acceptance speech, "I stand before you as a conservative." For the Democratic presidential nominating rules pull the party in a liberal direction. Until 1936, two-thirds of the delegates' votes were necessary to win the nomination. Southern delegations consequently wielded enormous power over candidate selection. But the two-thirds rule has been abolished, and that, along with other changes in the nominating process has shifted the veto threat at Democratic conventions to more liberal groups. Hence Democratic presidential candidates appeal less to the broader electorate.

The national Democratic party—more liberal than many of the state Democratic parties—will probably continue to be something of a liability to southern Democrats. But this is hardly unusual. When Democratic Georgia Governor Joe Frank Harris snubbed the Mondale/Ferraro ticket, he was breaking no new ground. In 1952 Democratic governors Allen Shivers of Texas, James Byrnes of South Carolina, and Robert Kennon of Louisiana all endorsed Eisenhower over Stevenson. Today Republicans run television commercials in the South identifying the Democratic party as the party of Ted Kennedy and Walter Mondale. In 1963, Republicans called it the party of Jack Kennedy, Martin Luther King, and James Meredith. The liberalization of the national Democratic party explains a large part of the South's presidential conversion to the Republican column, but its effect is less clear at the state and congressional levels.

Southern Democrats who practice self-preservation by successfully skirting the national party's identity may be nearly impossible to dislodge. Even a televised ad campaign labeling the Democratic party as the home of liberalism failed to produce the number of reregistrations (Democratic to Republican) the Republican National Committee leaders had hoped for this spring. While this drive and the one in 1984 have produced some gains for the GOP, they are not yet of a magnitude to produce a genuine realignment.

The Black Puzzle

Blacks will certainly play a role in realigment, though in which direction remains to be seen. Migration into and out of the South has diminished the size of the potential black vote. Today blacks make up about 20 percent of the South's voting-age population. But with the exception of Tennessee, the share of the black population has declined by at least 20 percent in every southern state since 1930. This decline can either hurt or help the Democratic candidates for Congress. As long as blacks remain a loyal Democratic voting block, they will help elect Democrats to Congress. As table 1 suggests, the higher the percentage of voting-age blacks in a southern district, the more likely that district is to be Democratic. The higher the percentage of blacks in a congressional district, however, the more polarized the voting can become. In the case of Mississippi's Delta district, county and precinct returns indicate that nearly all blacks vote Democratic, and all whites vote Republican. Since only 4 out of 116 districts in the South have majority black populations, that leaves 112 opportunities for the Republicans to pick up the majority white vote. But as table 1 suggests, Republicans are a parity party in only one-third of those districts where 10 percent or less of the voting-age population is black.

Republican Prospecting

If Republicans hope to align congressional voting to presidential voting, it would be logical for them to look to those districts Reagan carried comfortably (60 percent plus), and to the spots where Democrats may be vulnerable (55 percent or less of the 1984 congressional vote). As table 2 indicates, these places are fairly evenly distributed across the country.

Table 1

PARTY DISTRIBUTION OF THE 116 SOUTHERN HOUSE SEATS BY PERCENTAGE OF VOTING-AGE BLACKS WITHIN THE CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT

Percent of black voting-age population in the district	Party	
	Republican	Democratic
10 percent or less	19	20
11 to 20 percent	14	21
21 to 30 percent	8	18
More than 30 percent	2	14

Source: Census Bureau, Congressional District Profiles.

Table 2

CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS WHERE DEMOCRATS WON WITH 55 PERCENT OR LESS OF THE VOTE AND RONALD REAGAN WON 60 PERCENT OR MORE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE

House winner	Region	Democratic vote	Republican vote
Volkmer (MO-9)	Border	53%	64%
Young (MO-2)	Border	52	70
Jones (OK-1)	Border	52	71
Howard (NJ-3)	Mid Atlantic	53	67
Downey (NY-2)	Mid Atlantic	55	66
Lundine (NY-34)	Mid Atlantic	54	68
Mrazek (NY-3)	Mid Atlantic	51	64
Edgar (PA-7)	Mid Atlantic	50	62
Kostmayer (PA-8)	Mid Atlantic	51	64
Bruce (IL-19)	Midwest	52	62
McCloskey (IN-8)	Midwest	50	60
Sharp (IN-2)	Midwest	53	68
Carr (MI-6)	Midwest	52	64
Wolpe (MI-3)	Midwest	53	63
Luken (OH-1)	Midwest	55	65
Stallings (ID-2)	Mountain	50	77
Wirth (CO-2)	Mountain	53	61
Gejdenson (CT-2)	New England	54	61
Robinson (AR-2)	South	47	60
Mica (FL-14)	South	55	61
Darden (GA-7)	South	55	73
Hefner (NC-8)	South	51	66
Neal (NC-5)	South	51	64
Lloyd (TN-3)	South	52	63
Olin (VA-6)	South	54	66

Source: Elections Research Center.

The seven southern districts that meet these criteria have less than 20 percent black populations, and five of them are in the upcountry or Piedmont regions of the South, generally hospitable territory for Republicans. The other two large groups, six states each, are in the Mid-Atlantic and Midwest regions. As the more affluent, homogeneous, and suburban political party, the Republicans may be able to succeed in the suburban and exurban districts in these areas, particularly when the Democratic incumbent retires.

Go West

If we consider the West along with the South, the long-term political trends seem to favor the Republicans. In 1992, for the first time in the history of the Republic, the clear majority in both the House of Representatives and the Electoral College will rest in the West and the South. That same year, redistricting will take effect. Republican prospects in the West are better than they are in the South; the region will gain nine new House seats if current Census projections are accurate. California will pick up three, Arizona two, and Colorado, Oregon, Utah, and Washington will each pick up one. Of the nine new seats added to the West after the 1982 reapportionment Republicans currently hold six. In the West, Republicans control either both chambers of the state legislature or the governorship in five of the six states gaining seats, giving them leverage in the redistricting process they lack in the South. Washington is the exception.

The Democrats' thirty-year biennial majority in the House of Representatives is a key factor in that party's presidential realignment hopes. The party will probably seek to moderate its national image in order to broaden its presidential appeal to the larger number of electors prepared to vote for Democratic House candidates. Democrats won 253 House seats last year, but Walter Mondale carried only 65, just 7 of which were in the South. That lack of southern support, and the party's weak performance in presidential races there since FDR, suggests that the Democrats may choose to nominate a southerner for president.

Of course, all discussion of realignment assumes that Americans know what they want, and that they want one party to govern the White House and Congress. The assumption might not be well founded. As one American historian observed, one-third of the colonials supported the revolution, one-third the king, and one-third didn't give a damn. History may be repeating itself.

Interview

(Continued from page 7)

HAMILTON: Sure.

WATTENBERG: *What about Cuomo?*

TEETER: No.

HAMILTON: Not yet, maybe by 1988. The Democrats may have to nominate somebody outside the circle this time. Dick Gephardt is outside. Bruce Babbitt is outside. Sam Nunn is. The Republicans only have people inside the circle, with the exception of Jack Kemp.

TEETER: If Babbitt, Gephardt, or Nunn gets nominated, they lose.

HAMILTON: But these guys are not like Carter.

TEETER: Carter was elected in a strange year. He was running against another candidate who had not run before and one whom the public felt they did not know well enough even though he was the incumbent president. There is an opportunity for someone like Gephardt or Babbitt to run in 1988, but neither will be elected. By finishing second, they get into the senior group for the next round. That is what I thought Jerry Brown tried to do in 1980.

WATTENBERG: *Are you saying that this circle gives you presidential credentials, but that you can be nominated without it?*

TEETER: Both parties are much more likely to nominate someone from outside this circle if they don't have much chance to win, but they will nominate a more proven commodity if they have a chance to win the general election.

WATTENBERG: *What happens if the economy is in bad shape by 1988?*

TEETER: Hart probably gets the nomination because he starts out as the front-runner. He will be best positioned to do well in New Hampshire and Iowa. But if he blows one of the first two, and let's say a Gephardt does well, then Gephardt is in the limelight. He'll take a couple of pratfalls because it is his first time out. In that scenario, Hart still comes out on top.

WATTENBERG: *Didn't Reagan break the rule that says once you start losing, you are finished? He lost five straight in 1976—then came on like gangbusters.*

TEETER: Reagan had other strengths. He was a true ideological candidate, and that provided him a base in every state. Gephardt and the others you mentioned don't have that.

WATTENBERG: *Bill, would you rather run against Bush or Kemp?*

HAMILTON: Against Bush, because he has trouble conveying the kind of leadership the country needs. If the economy is still doing well, the country might be willing to hire a city manager. In that case, Bush would be the man.

WATTENBERG: *Bob, is Kemp in your mythical circle?*

TEETER: He has one foot in it. He hasn't been through one yet. Bush's stature puts him right in the middle of the circle. The only universally known people in American politics today are Ford, Carter, Reagan, Kennedy, and Bush.

HAMILTON: That is true, but I still think you will need to have an atmosphere where the country wants a *steward*, rather than a strong leader, for Bush to be successful.

TEETER: You do not have to have that kind of atmosphere for people to think things are going well, and they want them to continue in that direction.

WATTENBERG: *If things are not going well, is it an automatic loss?*

TEETER: No. The Republicans still have an electoral advantage.

WATTENBERG: *Bill, do you agree with that?*

HAMILTON: No, not automatic—it will depend on our nominee and what he has been through.

WATTENBERG: *Well, that about wraps it up. Does either of you have anything to add?*

HAMILTON: Let us meet in 1988 to assess our predictions. Late 1988.

by Michel Brulé and Gerard Grunberg

Realignment in France?: Looking Ahead to the March Elections

François Mitterrand's election as president on May 10, 1981, was a key event in the history of French politics. By choosing a president from the political left, France joined, for the first time since the establishment of the Fifth Republic, the ranks of major democracies practicing the alternation of power between two big parties or coalitions. The victory of the left on May 10, when 52 percent of the electorate backed the Socialist candidate in the run-off, became even more decisive in the June 1981 legislative elections when 57 percent voted for parties of the left. By themselves, the Socialists got 37 percent of the vote and an absolute majority in the National Assembly.

Now, less than five years later, following a series of electoral defeats (in local elections and those for the European Parliament), the left has lost its self-confidence and faces the upcoming March elections in a severely weakened condition. "L'affaire Greenpeace" has received headlines, but it is in no way a cause of the deterioration of the government's position—a trend firmly established before the scandal. The right is preparing to return to power. What has happened?

I. The Public's Loss of Confidence in the Left

A Fifth Republic president has formidable authority, especially when he commands majority support in the National Assembly as Mitterrand does. Consequently the president's popularity ratings are a particularly significant political indicator. Mitterrand can take no comfort from this.

The three large French polling organizations, each of which regularly measures presidential popularity, have shown Mitterrand's support sliding since his election (see figure 1). Looking at the averages for each of Mitterrand's five years in power, we see just how steady the decline has been (see table 1). Since the adoption of economic austerity measures, Mitterrand's overall rat-

Figure 1

MITTERRAND RATINGS: COMPARING THE MAJOR SURVEYS

Question: Do you have complete confidence, some confidence, not very much confidence, or no confidence at all in Francois Mitterrand to resolve the problems facing France today? (SOFRES)

What is your opinion of Mr. François Mitterrand as President of the Republic? (BVA)

Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with Mr. François Mitterrand as President of the Republic? (IFOP)



Source: Surveys by *Figaro* magazine-SOFRES, latest that of October 1985, Brulé Ville Associés for *Paris-Match*, latest that of October 1985, and IFOP for *Journal du Dimanche*, latest that of September 1985.

ings have been negative. His standing thus far in 1985 is the lowest ever recorded for a Fifth Republic president.

Since 1983, the electorate's judgment of the left's performance has also been strongly negative (see table 2). And when respondents are asked to express their level of satisfaction with the way France is governed, the proportion saying they are dissatisfied has climbed each year; it reached 68 percent for the first half of 1985 (see table 3).

The data, then, paint a gloomy picture of the left's immediate electoral prospects. Whereas in 1982 and 1983 a majority said they intended to vote for a party of the left in the next legislative elections, in 1984 and 1985 parties of the right enjoy a substantial edge (see table 4). In Brulé Ville Associés (BVA) polls taken during the first six months of 1985, only 37 percent said they would vote for a party of the left in the next legislative contests, while 57 percent said they would support a party of the right. Both of the big parties of the left, the Socialists and the Communists, are similarly affected by this downward trend. Whereas Mitterrand got 27 percent of the vote in the first round of presidential elections in 1981, and the Socialist party 37 percent in the legislative elections of the same year, current polls put the Socialists' proportions at around 22 percent. The Communists had the support of about 15 to 16 percent of the electorate five years ago; now they are backed by about 10 percent of the electorate (see table 5). If the left doesn't improve its position markedly during the upcoming campaign, it will lose its majority in the National Assembly despite the changes the Socialists have made in the voting law.[1]

What accounts for the left's big decline? Two explanations suggest themselves, both supported by polling data. The first stresses a broad ideological shift of French opinion in a conservative direction. According to this theory, France is now moving in the direction other western democracies did in the late 1970s (especially the United States, Great Britain, and West Germany). This may have occurred later in France because the right held power continuously there from 1958 to 1981. Adherents of this ideological explanation see the change as encompassing a crisis of collectivist values, a


BLOOM COUNTY
by Berke Breathed
WELL. THAT'S IT. I'VE LAID HERE TWO HOURS AND I'M STILL WIDE AWAKE.
BUT LO... MY FAITHFUL LAP DOG DOESN'T SEEM TO SHARE MY PROBLEM.
Z
HEY!
WHACK!
HOW CAN YOU SLEEP KNOWING FULL WELL THERE ARE COMMUNISTS IN THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT ?!
HMMPH.
8-17

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commensurate increase in individualism, renewed confidence in the marketplace and free enterprise, loss of confidence in the traditional economic approaches of the left, demands for order and security, and insistence upon limits on immigration. If this first hypothesis is correct, the French left might be on the brink of an electoral setback that would expel it from power and thrust it into opposition for a long time to come.

The second explanation involves recurring crises that prompt alternations of power. According to this theory, voters penalize whoever happens to be in power for not fulfilling their promises, especially pledges to keep the economy sound. If this second interpretation is correct, an electoral shift in 1986 could be quickly succeeded by a loss of confidence in the right if they prove

Table 1

YEARLY AVERAGES OF MITTERRAND'S POPULAR STANDING, 1981-1985

	Favorable rating	Unfavorable rating
1981	55%	25%
1982	53	35
1983	44	44
1984	37	50
1985*	35	54

Note: *1985 represents an average of surveys taken between January and October 1985.

Source: Surveys by Brulé Ville Associés for *Paris-Match*, latest that of October 1985.

Table 2

THE PUBLIC'S BALANCE SHEET ON THE LEFT

	Positive rating	Negative rating
1982	31%	27%
1983	20	52
1984	21	63
1985	24	61

Source: Surveys by Brulé Ville Associés for *Paris-Match*, latest that of 1985.

Table 3

PERCENT DISSATISFIED WITH THE WAY FRANCE IS GOVERNED

1982	47%
1983	60
1984	68
1985*	68

Note: Yearly averages. *1985 figures represent an average of surveys taken in the first six months of 1985.

Source: Surveys by Brulé Ville Associés for *Paris-Match*, latest that of 1985.

Table 4

LEGISLATIVE VOTE INTENTIONS

	Parties of the left	Parties of the right
1982	54%	44%
1983	51	46
1984	43	53
1985*	37	57

Note: Yearly averages. *For 1985, percentage is for the first six months only.

Source: Surveys by Brulé Ville Associés for *Paris-Match*, latest that of 1985.

Table 5

LEGISLATIVE VOTING INTENTIONS

Fringe parties of the left	1.0%
Communists	10.5
Socialists	21.5
Other left parties	4.5
Ecology	5.0
R.P.R.	23.5
U.D.F.	16.5
National Front	8.0
Other right parties	9.5

Note: The R.P.R. (Rally for the Republic) is the Neo-Gaullist party. The U.D.F. (Union for French Democracy) is the coalition led by former French president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. Responses are of those who said they were certain to vote.

Source: Surveys by Brulé Ville Associés (BVA), late May, early June, and July 1985.

(Continued on page 53)

IS IT REALIGNMENT? SURVEYING THE EVIDENCE



Note: Sample size = 12,308 (eight Gallup surveys taken between January-July 1985). Respondents have been grouped into two year cohorts according to their year of birth, i.e. 1904-05.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, January-July 1985.

The patterns of group attachment to the Democratic and Republican parties provide a sociopolitical portrait of the U.S. In these pages, we show how these attachments have changed. This figure shows, for example, G.O.P. strength among the young. One way a party enlarges its base is to attract a disproportionate number of young people. If their attitudes persist, Republican realignment prospects look good. The Democrats are no longer clearly dominant (pp. 22-23) but they still have a lot of "generational capital."

Notes and questions for pages 21 and 24-31:

For page 21, Independents have been excluded from the calculation.

Questions: In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, Socialist, or Independent? (1947). In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or Independent? (all other years).

Note: "Socialists," "Other," "Don't know," and "No answer" have been calculated out. For each year, three Gallup surveys from May to July were combined. The exceptions are 1952, for which seven Gallup surveys (April to July) were used and 1985, for which eight Gallup surveys (January to July) were used.

The national party identification figures for the Gallup polls shown on pages 21-31 are:

1947	42D/35R/23I	1952	41D/33R/26I	1955	44D/32R/24I
1960	47D/31R/22I	1965	52D/24R/23I	1970	43D/29R/28I
1975	45D/21R/34I	1979	44D/23R/34I	1984	42D/28R/30I
1985	37D/34R/29I				

PARTY LINES: COMPARING

Question: Regardless of how you (voted in the last election/may vote), what do you usually consider yourself—a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?



Note: August 1-3, 1980, August 14-18, 1980 and October-November 1984 are likely voters.

Source: Surveys by ABC News/Louis Harris and Associates, 1979, 1980; Louis Harris and Associates, latest that of September 1985.

Question: Do you consider yourself a Democrat, Republican, or Independent?



Source: Surveys by Media General for the Associated Press, latest that of September 1-7, 1985.

Data for pages 22 and 23 are on pages 56 and 57.

Question: Generally speaking, do you usually consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or Independent?



Note: Sample size for May 6, 1985 = 692.

Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of November 6-10, 1985.

Question: Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, or Independent?



Note: Sample size for August 1982 = 913.

Source: Surveys by ABC News, June-November 1979, ABC News/*Washington Post*, February 1981-October 24-28, 1985.

SURVEY ORGANIZATIONS

Question: Are you a Democrat, Republican, or what?



Note: Sample size for March 29-30, 1980 = 917.

Source: Surveys by *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, latest that of September 17-19, 1985.

Question: In politics today, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or something else?



Source: Surveys by NBC News/Associated Press, January 21-23, 1981 through September 19-20, 1983. NBC News, January 22-23, 1984 through October 7-8, 1985.

Question: Regardless of how you may have voted in the past, what do you usually consider yourself—a Democrat, a Republican, some other party, or what?



Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization, latest that of September 21-25, 1985.

Question: In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or Independent?



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of July 12-15, 1985.

There have been substantial changes in the parties' regional bases over the last three decades. Perhaps the most striking change is the conversion of white southerners—once the Democratic party's strongest group—to the Republican camp.



All respondents

	1947	1952	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1979	1984	1985
Northeast										
Democratic	36%	35%	38%	41%	53%	39%	41%	42%	43%	38%
Republican	38%	37%	37%	38%	25%	32%	24%	21%	27%	32%
North Central										
Democratic	36%	35%	38%	41%	48%	39%	40%	35%	34%	32%
Republican	40%	37%	35%	34%	29%	31%	23%	26%	28%	34%
South										
Democratic	69%	62%	57%	62%	57%	50%	52%	51%	48%	42%
Republican	19%	19%	23%	20%	17%	23%	17%	19%	25%	34%
West										
Democratic	41%	38%	44%	46%	50%	44%	47%	46%	42%	36%
Republican	34%	37%	35%	31%	30%	33%	18%	27%	31%	37%

White respondents

	1947	1952	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1979	1984	1985
Northeast										
Democratic	36%	34%	38%	39%	50%	38%	38%	39%	40%	35%
Republican	38%	38%	38%	39%	26%	33%	27%	23%	28%	33%
North Central										
Democratic	35%	34%	37%	40%	43%	35%	36%	32%	29%	28%
Republican	41%	38%	35%	35%	32%	33%	25%	27%	31%	38%
South										
Democratic	71%	62%	58%	65%	54%	45%	48%	46%	43%	36%
Republican	18%	19%	21%	18%	18%	25%	19%	21%	29%	39%
West										
Democratic	40%	37%	42%	45%	47%	42%	44%	41%	38%	33%
Republican	35%	38%	37%	32%	32%	35%	19%	29%	34%	40%

In 1952, Republicans held their biggest edge over Democrats in the Northeast. The South was solidly Democratic, and the Mountain states gave the Democrats a modest edge. By 1985 this New Deal alignment had been swept away. The Mountain states are now the most Republican, with New England—so Republican from the Civil War through the mid-1950s—heavily Democratic.

All % Democratic minus % Republican	All % Republican		Whites % Republican	Whites % Democratic minus % Republican
		New England		
-7	35%	1952	35%	-7
+12	22	1985	22	+12
		Middle Atlantic		
0	37	1952	39	-4
+4	35	1985	37	-2
		East North Central		
-1	36	1952	37	-3
-4	35	1985	38	-12
		West North Central		
-3	39	1952	39	-3
-1	34	1985	35	-3
		South Atlantic		
+40	20	1952	20	+39
+7	35	1985	40	-6
		East South Central		
+39	22	1952	21	+40
+13	31	1985	35	+2
		West South Central		
+55	14	1952	14	+55
+5	34	1985	38	-1
		Mountain		
+9	35	1952	35	+9
-17	43	1985	45	-19
		Pacific		
-2	38	1952	39	-4
+4	35	1985	38	-2

Today's 18-24 year olds have come of age politically with a strong Republican president and a relatively healthy economy. In every region but the Northeast and the Pacific, they look more Republican than their counterparts in 1952. Those 65 and older have moved toward the Republicans in the South and West, toward the Democrats in the Northeast and Midwest.



The movement of blacks to the Democratic party came in two waves, in the 1930s and in the 1960s. The 1964 presidential election was critical for black Americans. Since then, Republican party support has been weak.



While blacks are not homogeneous in interests or outlook, they are solidly Democratic. Age, educational, and regional party differences are small. The diverse Hispanic population—with its different historical and cultural experiences—looks far less Democratic.



The past is present in party ID. Outside the South in our early history, Republicans became the party of older-stock Protestants, Democrats of newer-stock Catholics. These attachments remain, though slightly eroded. In 1985, northern white Protestants are nineteen points more Republican than Democratic, while northern white Catholics are eight points more Democratic than Republican.

% Democratic minus % Republican



Protestants

	1947	1952	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1979	1984	1985
Democratic	NA	41%	42%	44%	48%	39%	43%	43%	41%	36%
Republican	NA	36%	35%	36%	29%	34%	25%	28%	31%	38%

Catholics

	1947	1952	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1979	1984	1985
Democratic	NA	50%	48%	56%	67%	52%	52%	49%	45%	40%
Republican	NA	22%	26%	20%	13%	21%	13%	16%	24%	30%

Jews

	1947	1952	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1979	1984	1985
Democratic	NA	52%	58%	67%	62%	62%	58%	55%	60%	48%
Republican	NA	13%	10%	9%	8%	5%	8%	10%	13%	22%

White, northern Protestants

	1947	1952	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1979	1984	1985
Democratic	NA	30%	32%	33%	36%	31%	32%	30%	28%	26%
Republican	NA	44%	44%	46%	41%	44%	33%	37%	39%	45%

White, northern Catholics

	1947	1952	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1979	1984	1985
Democratic	NA	48%	47%	54%	66%	50%	52%	47%	43%	38%
Republican	NA	23%	28%	21%	14%	22%	15%	16%	24%	30%

White, southern Protestants

	1947	1952	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1979	1984	1985
Democratic	NA	66%	59%	64%	42%	43%	46%	45%	44%	34%
Republican	NA	17%	22%	20%	20%	27%	22%	25%	29%	41%

ATLANTA CONSTITUTION NEA
9-A
I KNEW THE DEMOCRATS WERE ON A YOUTH DRIVE... BUT THIS IS RIDICULOUS...
GO DEMO
Mothers' Morning Out
DAY-CARE CENTER

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Throughout the New Deal years, Democrats were stronger than Republicans among those of lower socioeconomic status. The relationship between upper and lower occupational groups has been constant since that time. Republicans are stronger among less skilled workers in 1985 than in 1979, but they are *much* stronger among professionals and managers.



Note: For 1960, 1965, 1970, and 1975, the occupation is that of chief wage earner, because individual respondent's occupation was not asked. For all other years, occupation is that of respondent.

Union members have been strong supporters of the Democrats for the last half century, but declines in union membership have set back Democratic fortunes. Politically, non-union workers look quite different from their union counterparts.



Today union workers are a declining portion of the labor force—they are even a diminished proportion among young people entering manual jobs, the traditional union base. Unionized manual workers are doing much better than their non-union counterparts in salaries (not shown here).

Demographic Characteristics of Manual Workers
(Union and Non-Union Households)

1952 Non-union	1952 Union		1985 Union	1985 Non-union
		By age:		
7%	8%	18-24 years old	9%	27%
23	28	25-34 years old	29	30
21	24	35-44 years old	29	17
18	20	45-54 years old	19	13
16	13	55-64 years old	13	9
15	8	65 and over	2	4
100%	101%		101 %	100 %
		By education:		
71	71	Less than high school	27	32
21	23	High school graduate	46	39
5	5	Some college	23	23
2	1	College graduate	4	6
99%	100%		100 %	100 %
		By own/rent home*		
47	47	Own	74	54
49	51	Rent	25	40
96 %	98 %		99 %	94 %
		By region:		
36	37	Northeast	28	19
29	37	North Central	32	22
20	9	South	22	41
15	17	West	18	18
100%	100%		100 %	100 %

Note: * "Other" not shown.

Union members are more Democratic than non-union workers. In 1985, the Democrats have a 21-point lead over the Republicans among unionized manual workers, but a lead of just 7 points among non-unionized manual workers. Even when income is held constant, the relationship remains. These unionized workers with incomes to $12,000-15,000 are heavily Democratic, while non-union workers split their allegiances.



The relationship between education and party ID is complex. These figures show that in 1952 Republicans had a 20-point edge over the Democrats among the college educated, while in 1985 the margin is 9 points. The Republican advantage in this group has declined at a time when the size of the group has expanded.



Less than high school graduate

	1947	1952	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1979	1984	1985
Democratic	48%	48%	50%	53%	59%	51%	53%	51%	55%	49%
Republican	34%	29%	29%	27%	19%	25%	18%	21%	19%	26%

Some college

	1947	1952	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1979	1984	1985
Democratic	34%	31%	42%	41%	41%	35%	37%	38%	37%	30%
Republican	37%	40%	32%	36%	34%	34%	22%	25%	29%	39%

High school graduate

	1947	1952	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1979	1984	1985
Democratic	40%	37%	40%	46%	51%	43%	45%	46%	43%	37%
Republican	35%	36%	34%	32%	25%	29%	21%	19%	27%	34%

College graduate

	1947	1952	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1979	1984	1985
Democratic	31%	24%	39%	30%	38%	25%	34%	34%	31%	30%
Republican	40%	44%	36%	41%	33%	38%	26%	29%	39%	39%

Party Preferences by Age/Education



By age:		High school graduates: Democratic	Republican	Independent	% Dem. minus % Rep.	College graduates: Democratic	Republican	Independent	% Dem. minus % Rep.
18-24 years old	1952	40%	25%	35%	+15	23%	41%	36%	-18
	1985	33%	39%	29%	-6	24%	41%	35%	-17
25-34 years old	1952	42%	29%	29%	+13	25%	35%	40%	-10
	1985	34%	34%	33%	0	33%	35%	32%	-2
35-44 years old	1952	37%	35%	29%	-2	27%	42%	31%	-15
	1985	41%	28%	31%	+13	31%	35%	35%	-4
45-54 years old	1952	32%	41%	28%	-9	20%	52%	28%	-32
	1985	36%	33%	31%	+3	23%	47%	30%	-24
55-64 years old	1952	30%	50%	20%	-20	18%	58%	24%	-40
	1985	41%	34%	25%	+7	34%	44%	23%	-10
65 years and over	1952	27%	57%	16%	-30	30%	47%	23%	-17
	1985	40%	38%	22%	+2	24%	52%	24%	-28

The national pattern on page 30 masks some regional variations. The Republican edge among the college educated outside the South has declined sharply since 1952, while it has expanded substantially in the South. In 1952, the college educated in the Northeast, Midwest, and West gave the GOP margins of 30 points, while those in the South were heavily Democratic.



Generational experiences and political environment affect party preference. In 1952 the Democrats' best groups were the young and middle aged, while the Republicans had large leads among most elderly voters. In 1985, Republicans are strongest among the young and very old, while Democrats have their greatest strengths among those in their fifties, sixties, and seventies.

PARTY IDENTIFICATION OF AMERICANS BY AGE
IN 1952 AND 1985

	1952			1985			% Democratic minus % Republican	
	Dem.	Rep.	Ind.	Dem.	Rep.	Ind.	1952	1985
18-21 years old	40%	25%	35%	30%	40%	30%	+15	−10
22-25 years old	42	27	31	31	35	34	+15	− 4
26-29 years old	43	26	31	31	35	33	+17	− 4
30-33 years old	45	26	29	34	31	35	+19	+ 3
34-37 years old	43	29	28	37	30	33	+14	+ 7
38-41 years old	45	30	26	38	32	30	+15	+ 6
42-45 years old	38	36	25	37	32	31	+ 2	+ 5
46-49 years old	39	36	25	37	33	30	+ 3	+ 4
50-53 years old	42	32	25	35	36	28	+10	− 1
54-57 years old	39	38	24	41	32	27	+ 1	+ 9
58-61 years old	41	37	21	42	35	23	+ 4	+ 7
62-65 years old	39	39	22	48	32	21	0	+16
66-69 years old	37	45	18	46	35	19	− 8	+11
70-73 years old	40	43	17	47	35	17	− 3	+12
74-77 years old	36	49	14	41	41	18	−13	0
78-81 years old	34	50	16	40	41	19	−16	− 1
82 years and over	31	57	12	40	42	18	−26	− 2
ALL AGES	41	33	26	37	34	29	+ 8	+ 3

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, April-July 1952 (seven surveys) and January-July 1985 (eight surveys).

OBLIGATIONS

Question: And one last question. We all know that American citizens have certain rights. For example, they have the right to free public education and to police protection, the right to attend religious services of their choice, and the right to elect public officials. I'd like to ask now about certain *obligations* that some people feel American citizens owe their country. I just want your own opinion on





Note: * = less than .5%.

OF CITIZENSHIP

these—whether you feel it is a *very* important obligation, a *somewhat* important obligation, or *not* an obligation that a citizen owes to the country. . . .



Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, February-April 1984.

Note: Sample sizes for the following demographic subgroups: Hispanics = 48, Scandinavian = 53, Italian = 67, and Eastern European/Russian = 88.

Question: And one last question. We all know that American citizens have certain rights. For example, they have the right to free public education and to police protection, the right to attend religious services of their choice, and the right to elect public officials. I'd like to ask now about certain *obligations* that some people feel American citizens owe their country. I just want your own opinion on



Note: * = less than .5%

these—whether you feel it is a *very* important obligation, a *somewhat* important obligation, or *not* an obligation that a citizen owes to the country. . . .



Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, February-April 1984.

RELIGIOUS BELIEF

Question: There are many different ways of picturing God. We'd like to know the kinds of images you are most likely to associate with God. Here is a card with sets of contrasting images. On a scale of 1-7 where would you place your image of God between the two contrasting images? (Hand Card T) The first set of contrasting images shows Mother (Judge/Friend) at 1 on the scale and Father (Lover/King) at 7. If you imagine God as a Mother you would place yourself at 1. If you imagine God as a





Note: Baptist = 9%, 21%, 71%, Methodist = 6%, 31%, 63%; Lutheran = 8%, 22%, 70%, Presbyterian = 5%, 33%, 63%, Episcopalian = 9%, 26%, 70%.

Note: Baptist = 61%, 21%, 20%; Methodist = 60%, 24%, 16%; Lutheran = 60%, 20%, 20%; Presbyterian = 58%, 32%, 10%, Episcopalian = 60%, 26%, 14%.





Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1984-1985 combined. For question about closeness to God, 1983-1985

IN AMERICA

Father, you would place yourself at 7. If you imagine God as somewhere between Mother and Father, you would place yourself at 2,3,4,5, or 6.

Question: How close do you feel to God most of the time? Would you say extremely close, somewhat close, not very close, or not close at all?





Note: Baptist = 40%, 25%, 35%; Methodist = 43%, 29%, 28%; Lutheran = 50%, 24%, 26%; Presbyterian = 47%, 32%, 21%; Episcopalian = 50%, 29%, 21%.

Note: Baptist = 89%, 12%, 0%; Methodist = 87%, 13%, 0%; Lutheran = 90%, 10%, 0%; Presbyterian = 82%, 18%, 0%; Episcopalian = 76%, 24%, 0%.





combined. Sample size for Jews = 45.
* = less than .5%

Note: Close = "Extremely close" + "Somewhat close." Not close = "Not very close" + "Not close at all."

Sample size for Jews = 94

Images of

Question: People have different images of the world and human nature. We'd like to know the kinds of images you have. Here is a card with sets of contrasting images. On a scale of 1-7 where would you place your image of the world and human nature between the two contrasting images? If you think that "Human nature is basically good," . . .[see below for other choices] you would place your-



Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, February-April, 1985.

the World

self at 1. If you think "Human nature is fundamentally perverse and corrupt" . . . [see below for other choices] you would place yourself at 7. If you think things are somewhere between these two you would place yourself at 2,3,4,5, or 6. Where would you place your image of the world on the scale for . . .?



COMPARING NOTES: CBS News/*New York Times* and Gallup on Party ID.

When we began to design the material for pages 21-31 of Opinion Roundup, we asked Kathy Frankovic of CBS News to run data comparable to the extensive collection of Gallup material we had. This was an enormous undertaking, and we are grateful for CBS's help. Particular thanks go to Kerry Connolly who ran the data for us. Gallup was also enormously helpful by making recent data sets available to us quickly.

Party identification has been changing since the beginning of 1984. Most national polls now show the Republicans virtually even with the Democrats. It is helpful to look at the findings of different organizations to see where we are today. These data sets correspond closely.

Source: Three surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, conducted from May to July; seven surveys by Gallup, conducted from January to July.

CBS NEWS/*NEW YORK TIMES*—GALLUP COMPARISONS
OF PARTY ID MEASURES, 1985

		Democratic	**Republican**
By sex:			
Male	CBS News/*NYT*	33%	32%
	Gallup	34	34
Female	CBS News/*NYT*	41%	33%
	Gallup	40	34
By education:			
Less than high school	CBS News/*NYT*	46%	28%
	Gallup	49	26
High school graduate	CBS News/*NYT*	39%	31%
	Gallup	37	34
Some college	CBS News/*NYT*	32%	36%
	Gallup	30	39
College graduate	CBS News/*NYT*	28%	39%
	Gallup	30	39
By race:			
Black	CBS News/*NYT*	70%	7%
	Gallup	73	10
By union household:			
Yes	CBS News/*NYT*	45%	23%
	Gallup	44	26
No	CBS News/*NYT*	35%	35%
	Gallup	36	36
By region:			
Northeast	CBS News/*NYT*	39%	33%
	Gallup	38	32
North Central	CBS News/*NYT*	34%	31%
	Gallup	32	34
South	CBS News/*NYT*	42%	30%
	Gallup	42	34
West	CBS News/*NYT*	34%	37%
	Gallup	36	37
By selected groups:			
Southern white Protestants	CBS News/*NYT*	34%	38%
	Gallup	34	41
Northern white Protestants	CBS News/*NYT*	26%	43%
	Gallup	26	45
Northern white Catholics	CBS News/*NYT*	39%	31%
	Gallup	38	30

by Shirley Wilkins and Thomas A. W. Miller

Working Women: How It's Working Out

Lynn and John are in their early thirties, married, and both lawyers. They are about to have their first child—and their first big marital problem.

How are they to raise their child? Which of these talented individuals will be called upon to make the greater professional sacrifice? Whose career will be at least temporarily, if not permanently, derailed in order to have a family?

The couple does have some options. Lynn is eligible for several months of maternity leave, but she worries that she will be taken off the interesting and important cases. John can take a more limited amount of paternity leave, but, frankly, it would be frowned upon. They certainly have the combined income to be able to afford a full-time nanny, but they are not anxious to entrust their child's early education to a professional—no matter how sensitive and intelligent that person may be. Day-care centers are available, but there the problem of paying an outsider to do their child-rearing is compounded by an environment that, however well managed, is in no sense a home.

In brief, Lynn and John do not want to be absentee parents—and yet both of them derive enormous personal satisfaction from their work.

This couple's problem is by no means an isolated one. Writ large, it exemplifies a growing challenge for a rapidly increasing number of American women and men: how to combine careers and families when both spouses work. Time is of the essence—and for working couples, their time is particularly pressed. How can all of the things that people want for themselves—children, a happy marriage, a job—be fit into a twenty-four hour day?

The 1985 Virginia Slims American Women's Opinion Poll, conducted by the Roper Organization, has monitored and tracked Americans' opinions on social, familial, and personal issues since 1970. The fifth in a series of polls sponsored by Virginia Slims, this one is based on a representative nationwide sample of 3,000 adult women and 1,000 adult men. The results of this year's survey suggest that changing attitudes toward women's role in society, toward marriage, and toward the essential components of a full and satisfying personal life portend major social changes in the future. The traditional organization of family life, and the very nature of work itself, may never be the same.

Once A Bread Baker, Now A Bread Winner

If one word could sum up the vast progress made by women in the past fifteen years, it would be "choice." The freedom to choose a fulfilling individual lifestyle—and, simultaneously, tolerance of others' choices—has been the essential force underlying the social transformations of this period.

And a key element in this ongoing social evolution has been, and undoubtedly will continue to be, women's move into the workplace. Over the past fifteen years, the percentage of women employed full time has doubled; combined with part-time workers, this brings the total percentage of working women to more than half (52 percent) of the adult female population.

It is not simply out of economic necessity, moreover, that this fast-rising number of women choose to work. When asked whether they would continue to work even if financially secure, an identical proportion of employed women and employed men (66 percent) reply that they would. Perhaps more to the point, for the first time ever a majority of women (51 percent) would prefer to have a job rather than stay at home and take care of a family, if that were their only choice. In 1970, six out of ten women chose home over the workplace.

In the opinion of a growing majority of women, the most personally satisfying and interesting life is one that combines marriage, a career, and children (see table 1). Particularly among younger women and better-educated ones, this preference for a full professional *and* family life is pronounced (see table 2). This result leads to two conclusions. First, as younger women mature, they may be more likely to stay in the workforce even as they attempt to raise a family. Second, as more women enroll in colleges and universities, so too will they tend to seek the best of both these worlds. It appears that the desire for a "working marriage"—in which career, marriage, and a family all contribute to a woman's personal satisfaction—is bound to spread in the future.

Table 1

Question: Now let me ask you a somewhat different question. Considering the possibilities for combining or not combining marriage, children, and a career, and assuming you had a choice, which *one* of these possibilities do you think would offer *you* the most satisfying and interesting life? (Card shown respondent)

	Women	
	1974	1985
Combining marriage, career, and children	52%	63%
Marrying, having children, but not having career	38	26
Having career and marrying, but not having children	4	4
Having career, but not marrying or having children	2	3
Marrying, but not having children or career	1	1
Don't know	3	2

Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization for Virginia Slims, latest that of March 1985.

This move of women into a traditionally male domain—the workplace—has enormous social consequences. In the first place, it is clearly linked to women's improving status in our society—and to women's increasing self-confidence as their own, ardent advocates. According to three-quarters of women and men, women's roles in society will continue to change, and larger majorities today (69 percent of women, 67 percent of men) than in 1980 think those roles *should* continue to change.

Table 2

PREFERENCES FOR MARRIAGE, CHILDREN, AND CAREER BY DEMOGRAPHIC GROUPS, 1985

	Combining marriage, career, and children	Marrying, having children, but not having career	Having career and marrying, but not having children	Having career, but not marrying or having children	Marrying, but not having children or career
All women	63%	26%	4%	3%	1%
White	63	26	5	3	1
Black	63	25	3	7	1
18-29 years	70	19	6	3	1
30-39 years	66	21	6	5	1
40-49 years	66	22	4	5	1
50 years and over	54	37	3	2	*
Non-high school graduate	53	37	3	4	1
High school graduate	63	28	3	3	*
College graduate	70	17	7	4	1

Note: * = less than .5%.
Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for Virginia Slims, March 1985.

What is more, overwhelming majorities favor efforts to improve the status of women, and for the first time ever, more women than men support such efforts (see table 3). This is indeed a dramatic shift in opinion from fifteen years ago, when a slight plurality of women *opposed* efforts to improve their status. What accounts for such a massive swing? Back in 1970, many women were undoubtedly apprehensive about the implications of a change in their status. They were fearful of the unknown and were much more comfortable with the status quo. Men, not being the object of such efforts, either could afford to be more objective or were reluctant to appear too self-interested. Now, however, women have observed what has happened to many other women as a result of these efforts and have, apparently, decided that the result is good.

In step with women's changing roles, furthermore,

Table 3

EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN WOMEN'S STATUS

Question: Do you favor or oppose most of the efforts to strengthen and change women's status in society today?

	Women		Men	
	Favor	Oppose	Favor	Oppose
1970	40%	42%	44%	39%
1972	48	36	49	36
1974	57	25	63	19
1980	64	24	64	23
1985	73	17	69	17

Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization for Virginia Slims, latest that of March 1985.

has come greater respect for women as individuals, which helps to explain why growing majorities favor efforts to improve women's status. Today, 60 percent of women and 61 percent of men believe that women are more respected now than they were ten years ago. This, too, represents quite a change from the attitudes of 1970, when only 38 percent of women and 40 percent of men thought that women were more respected compared to ten years previously. And, once again, the young and college-educated are among the most optimistic women.

Despite such growing respect for women, however, working women have encountered difficulties in the professional world. Sexual discrimination does persist, and the consensus of both women and men is that, all things considered, there are more advantages in being a man in today's world. Yet it is heartening that majorities of working women say they stand an equal chance with men in three vital areas concerning their jobs: salary, responsibility, and promotion possibilities. The major barrier that remains, according to a plurality of these women (45 percent), is being promoted to a top management position (see table 4).

Table 4

EQUAL OPPORTUNITY ON THE JOB, 1985

Question: Do you feel you stand an equal chance with the men you work with in the following areas?

	Working women say they have:			Men say working women have:		
	Equal chance	Not equal	Don't know	Equal chance	Not equal	Don't know
Salary	57%	33%	10%	48%	46%	6%
Responsibility	73	18	9	61	33	6
Promotion	53	35	12	45	49	7
Becoming an executive	38	45	17	37	54	9

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for Virginia Slims, March 1985.

Nevertheless, women with actual work experience think that things are generally better now than they were five years ago. But men do not agree. Men are *less* inclined today than they were in 1980 to think that women have equal chances in the workplace. Thus, those who are allegedly discriminated against believe that the situation is improving; those who are supposed to be doing the discriminating think it is getting worse. What explains this fascinating contradiction?

It would seem that men's attitudes toward this problem have been influenced, at least to some extent, by the increasing amount of information on sexual discrimination in general. That is, men have become more aware that there is a problem, and this is influencing their opinions about possible unfairness in the workplace. Men are now more sensitive, and perhaps even more defensive, about equal professional opportunities, even though the attitudes of working women suggest that real progress is being made.

Of course, it would be premature to declare the battle for equal economic opportunity, for completely nondiscriminatory treatment at work, over. Certain issues, such as the complex and emotional one of comparable worth, are still on the public agenda. Yet, women *have* come far in seeking and obtaining meaningful jobs for themselves. They *are* moving into occupations once considered the sole preserves of men, as Sally Ride's space flight in 1983 and Geraldine Ferraro's vice presidential nomination in 1984 symbolize. There *is* a widespread feeling today that a talented and capable woman can succeed in whatever profession she chooses.

More and more, women's professional potential is obstructed not by discrimination *in* the workplace but rather by obligations *outside* it. Women may increasingly enjoy equal opportunities at work, but, compared to men, they have relatively little time to capitalize on those opportunities. The major challenges for the future—challenges created by women's very success in moving into the workplace over the past fifteen years—concern the organization of *domestic* life. The problem is to find a new balance between work and home for both women and men—and, further down the road, perhaps to alter the structure of work in order to have a fuller and more satisfying family life.

Marriages of Mutual Responsibility

Marriage these days is enjoying something of a comeback, despite all the attention typically paid to the divorce rate in this country. Although fewer men and women today are married and living with their spouses than in 1980—in part, it must be said, because the baby boom generation is still in its marrying years and tends to marry later—other signs indicate that attitudes about marriage may be changing.

Nine out of ten women and men say, for instance, that marriage is their preferred lifestyle. Substantially fewer people today than in 1970 believe that marriage as an institution is weaker now than ten years ago.

The fact is that marriage and the nuclear family have always been, and will long continue to be, the core of American society. True, large majorities say that people can be happy without being married. And they also think that a happy marriage does not require children. Yet, there has been virtually no increase since 1972 in the number of Americans who have or plan to have no children, and the extremely high proportion (90 percent) saying that marriage is their preferred lifestyle has remained remarkably constant. Instead, these attitudes toward the role of marriage and children in personal happiness demonstrate Americans' growing tolerance of alternative lifestyles—of those minorities who choose to remain single or childless.

Yet by far the most significant change in Americans' views of marriage concerns the *kind* of marriage that people want. Today, majorities of men and women desire a marriage of shared responsibility—one in which both spouses work and divide housekeeping and child-rearing equally. Merely a decade ago, a majority of women and a plurality of men opted for a traditional marriage, in which he was the financial provider and she ran the house and took care of the children (see table 5).

Once again, enthusiasm for this new type of marriage is most pronounced among younger women and men, which suggests that it will increasingly become the norm. But more indicative of the challenges ahead, and the problems obstructing such shared-responsibility marriages, is that women have more eagerly embraced this concept than men.

The main reason for this divergence in attitudes of women and men is that, while women have moved quickly into the "male" domain of the workplace, men have been much slower to help out with "female" tasks in the home. For instance, 30 percent of married women who are employed full time assert they do nearly all of the household chores, and another 44 percent claim they do a lot but their husbands help out some. Merely 24 percent say these tasks are evenly divided between the spouses. Men with working wives tend to be more charitable toward themselves—28 percent claim that the chores are evenly divided—but even so, the imbalance is evident.

Another factor that helps to explain men's relative reluctance about the shared-responsibility marriage is that they, much more than women, derive a greater sense of their personal identity from their work. For many men, their careers are the key element defining their place in society and even their concept of self-worth. Women, however, have long relied on other sources—particularly, perhaps, their children—to establish their sense of identity, precisely because customarily they have spent so much time with kids in the home. One indication of this major difference between the sexes can be found in attitudes toward work. A majority of employed men (56 percent) consider their work to be a career, while a majority of employed women (58 percent) say their work is "just a job."

Yet what exactly do these figures mean? Is work just a stopgap measure or a kind of pastime for many women? This is hardly the appropriate conclusion, given that a majority of women consider work to be an essential ingredient of a full and satisfying life, that two-thirds of employed women would continue to work even if financially secure, that more employed women than employed men derive a great deal of personal satisfaction from their work, and that a majority of *all* women would choose a job instead of staying home. Instead, the proper conclusion would appear to be that women place a different *degree* of importance on their work—that, in the grand scheme of life, work may be somewhat less important than it is to many men.

Working Toward A More Balanced Future

It may sound rather radical to suggest that the very nature of work may change as a result of these evolving attitudes, but that may be the case—someday. If so, what will be most obviously affected?

First, a larger number of employed women will probably consider their work to be a career rather than "just a job." Already the opinions of college-educated women on this issue are identical to the beliefs of college-educated men: more than six in ten say they are pursuing a career, not working a job. The very meaning of a career, however, could well be transformed. Career paths in most professions were established when men overwhelmingly dominated them. That is no longer the case. Some better mechanism will have to be found to accommodate these career-minded women—and their aspirations for a happy family life as well.

Second, working couples will face more difficult decisions about whose career should take priority. Right now, large majorities of women and men think a wom-

Table 5

Question: In today's society, there are different lifestyles, and some that are acceptable today that weren't in the past. Regardless of what you may have done or plan to do with your life, and thinking just of what would give *you personally* the most satisfying and interesting life, which one of these different ways of life do you think would be the best as a way of life? (Card shown respondent)

	1974		1985					
	Total women	Total men	Total women	18-29 years	30-39 years	40-49 years	50 years and over	Total men
Marriage where husband and wife share responsibilities more—both work, share housekeeping and child responsibilities	46%	44%	57%	69%	65%	58%	42%	50%
Traditional marriage with husband assuming responsibility for providing for family and wife running house and taking care of children	50	48	37	24	30	34	52	43
Living with someone of opposite sex, but not marrying	3	3	2	3	1	2	1	3
Remaining single and living alone	1	1	2	1	1	4	2	3
Remaining single and living with others of the same sex	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Living in large family of people with similar interests in which some are married and some are not	1	1	1	1	1	—	1	1

Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization for Virginia Slims, latest that of March 1985.

an should quit her job if her husband is offered a very good one elsewhere; at the same time, majorities also believe that a wife should turn down a very good job offer in another city so that her husband can continue his present career. In part this can be explained by the probability that the man has a higher salary and hence is the main source of income for the family. It may simply reflect the public's acceptance of economic reality. But as the earnings of both spouses draw closer together, issues concerning career advancement will become more complex—and Americans' attitudes toward them more ambivalent.

There may also be greater pressure from such two-income families for employers to allow more flexibility in work schedules. Staggering the hours that the parents are at work or shortening the work week could help alleviate some of the problems associated with day care. Or shared jobs, half-time jobs, and other forms of part-time work may take on even greater significance in the future, allowing at least one parent to spend more time with the family.

In the same vein, the provision of day-care services by employers—and perhaps better policies on maternity and paternity leave—may eventually come to be seen as more valuable employee benefits. Employers who provide these kinds of options will be better placed to attract talented individuals from two-income households.

These general attitudes also indicate that the trend toward smaller families is firmly established and will, in all likelihood, continue. It is one thing to hold down a job while attempting to care for two children, quite another if the parents have to look after five.

And even the nature of relationships between women and men undergo some fundamental changes. Hackneyed as the cliché may be, there is power in the purse—psychological as well as economic. Among other things, men's habit of paying for things may fade, in part out of deference to the more independent status of women and in part, perhaps, out of necessity. Plus, they will undoubtedly have to help out a lot more around the home, or the couple will have to learn to tolerate a less clean, orderly environment. But offsetting this, men may get to know their children a little bit better, because they spend more time with them. In fact, children who are raised more equally by both parents may well turn out to be different in many respects from previous generations.

These are just some of the adjustments, it seems, that Americans will be making in coming years. In many respects, this will be a period of consolidation, of sorting out how best to cope with the changing responsibilities of women and men. As Walt Whitman once wrote to Ralph Waldo Emerson: "Women in these States approach the day of that organic equality with men, without which, I see, men cannot have organic equality among themselves." The poet was simply a century and a half before his time.

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

by Evans Witt

What the Republicans Have Learned about Women

Early in October 1985, the Republican National Committee sponsored the first of a series of three-day workshops across the country aimed at the working women of America. There were sessions on managing money, managing time, managing the family, Jazzercize, and—*almost incidentally*—on politics.

Why is the Republican party spending $200,000 for such meetings, which are life-style seminars in everything but name?

Because of the "gender gap."

Many thought that the gender gap had been buried along with Walter Mondale beneath the 1984 Reagan landslide. Even the addition of Geraldine Ferraro as the first woman ever on a national political ticket could not win a majority of women's votes for the Democrats, much less turn around the election.

Republican politicians and strategists have publicly belittled the impact of the gender gap, suggesting the real problem is that Democrats have a gender gap among men. After all, didn't Reagan win forty-nine states in the 1984 election even while taking 6 percentage points less of women's votes than men's?

But privately, GOP professionals have been working to analyze the party's problems with women and to craft solutions. Amid all the talk of realignment and party-switching, women remain among the groups least responsive to the GOP's appeals. And if the Republicans are to become the majority party in the nation for the next several decades, women must be a big part of that majority.

Women's Groups

The "gender gap" was the phrase popularized by feminist groups to describe the lingering troubles Republicans and President Reagan have been having with women. Beginning with the 1980 campaign, Reagan has received lower ratings and fewer votes from women than he has been winning from men. Some of that negative attitude has rubbed off on GOP candidates at the state level.

In the 1980 balloting, Reagan easily won the men's vote by a 56 percent to 36 percent margin over incumbent Jimmy Carter, the Associated Press-NBC News exit poll of voters found. But women split their votes 47-45 percent between Reagan and Carter. The differences between men's and women's voting behavior was labeled the "gender gap." Democrats sought to exploit it, while Republicans looked for ways to heal it or reduce its political impact.

As with any political strategy, there are many different ways to look at the Republicans' response to the gender gap. One can listen to the politicians on the stump and read the position papers. Or one can talk to the party professionals and the political consultants for their views. Or one can look at hour upon hour of political commercials and dissect the networks' political coverage with an eye on what campaigns *wanted* the camera to see.

One way to examine the GOP's gender gap strategy is to look at the polls that were conducted to guide the politicians' tactics. The numbers tell a fascinating story of past techniques; and they suggest what might happen next.

But political pollsters conduct their surveys for their clients, not for the public. That means their clients see the results and the public does not. Decision/Making/Information, President Reagan's main polling firm, is no exception. Dr. Richard Wirthlin, the DMI chairman who serves the White House incumbent as his personal pollster, gives an engaging portrait of what his surveys are showing. Rarely, though, does he or any other private pollster release all the raw numbers from political surveys.

But a different window into the strategies of the Reagan campaign, the Republican party, and those often supporting the GOP, has been opened. Wirthlin's firm—through a subsidiary—did a series of polls that focused on women in 1983 and 1984 for the American Medical Association Political Action Committee, one of the oldest, largest, wealthiest, and most sophisticated PACs in the nation.[1] Pete Lauer, executive director of AMPAC, said the polls were conducted to help the PAC make its decisions and to guide the candidates it supported who didn't have the time, money, or inclination to ask these questions themselves.

Neither Ronald Reagan's campaign nor the GOP had any part in the polls, but DMI's and Wirthlin's explorations of the women's vote for Reagan guided the methodology. And the survey analysis followed the same patterns of those done for the GOP.

The DMI analysis begins with the proposition that women are not a homogeneous group—a point that has been central to the GOP counterattack on the gender gap since 1981. By aggregating the results of dozens of national surveys, DMI vice president Cathy Chamberlain concluded that the most helpful guides to women's political attitudes are age, marital status, and employment outside the home. The DMI analysis combined women into eight groups based on six categories, with those under forty-five categorized as younger women and those forty-five and over categorized as older women. The category of married women included only those currently married with a living husband, with all other women identified as not married. Working women were defined as those working full time or part time outside the home.

At least part of this analysis is an extension of earlier work on the gender gap. Working women's negative attitudes toward Reagan, for example, were obvious in 1980.[2] And Marty Plissner of CBS News laid out the case for a "marriage gap" two years ago in *Public Opinion*, finding that unmarried voters tended to be more Democratic than married voters.[3] It is important to look at the women who are in each DMI subgroup, for the different pressures and experiences they have faced have shaped their political views.

- **Younger, married, working women:** This group represents 20 percent of all women. Eighteen percent of them have college or advanced degrees. They rank second in family income, with 22 percent reporting annual earnings over $40,000. Eighty-one percent have children, and 57 percent have children under twelve at home. This group gives family financial support as the primary reason for working. Only 21 percent say they work for a sense of personal achievement.

- **Younger, single, working women:** This includes 15 percent of all women. Though this subgroup ranks fifth out of eight in income, with only 6 percent making more than $40,000 a year, their prospects are bright; 20 percent of them are college graduates. Even though not currently married, a substantial 46 percent have children, and 34 percent have kids under twelve at home. Thirty-two percent of this group are separated or divorced. Twenty-five percent have professional or technical jobs, and 52 percent have white-collar jobs. Eighty-two percent say that they work from financial necessity.

- **Younger, married women who are not working:** This takes in 13 percent of all women. Young children are the predominant feature of this subgroup. Ninety-four percent have children, and 81 percent have children under twelve at home—the highest percentage of any group. They rank third in family income, and 11 percent hold college degrees. Sixty-two percent plan to enter the workforce in the near future. For six out of ten of these women, the presence of small children at home explains why they are not working. (One in ten don't work because their hubands don't want them to.) Fifty-three percent of them call themselves conservatives, and 39 percent say they are liberals.

- **Younger, single, not working women:** This group is a mere 5 percent of all women. It is concentrated between ages eighteen and thirty-four, and about half are students. About half have children, and 85 percent have only a high school education or less. Forty-five percent of them are separated, divorced, or widowed. Eighty percent plan to work, though 22 percent have no desire to work outside the home. Twenty-one percent of them earn $5,000 or less (26 percent refused to say how much they earn). They split their ideological allegiance right down the middle—41 percent liberal and 41 percent conservative.

- **Older, married, working women:** Ten percent of all women fall into this group. These women are at the top in income, with 27 percent having family incomes over $40,000. Seventeen percent are college graduates. While almost all—98 percent—have children, only 4 percent have any under age twelve still at home. Two-thirds of the group are between forty-five and fifty-five. This group also enjoys the highest professional employment level; 28 percent are in professional or technical fields, and 15 percent are in management or own their own business. Thirty-two percent of these women work for a sense of achievement. Six in ten of them are conservatives.

- **Older, single, working women:** This includes 6 percent of women. This is the least financially well-off group of working women and the second least well-off among all women, with two-thirds reporting incomes under $15,000 a year. Fourteen percent are college graduates. Forty percent of them are separated or divorced, and 44 percent of them are widowed. Thirty-two percent are employed in blue-collar fields, and most of the group report they work from financial necessity. They divide evenly ideologically—41 percent conservative and 41 percent liberal.

- **Older, married, not working women:** This describes 19 percent of all women. Three-quarters of this subgroup are fifty-five or older. Five percent are college graduates, and 38 percent did not get a high school degree. Only 4 percent have children at home under age twelve. Half describe themselves as retired and half as housewives. Forty percent have household incomes of less than $15,000 a year. Fifty-nine percent call themselves conservatives and 25 percent liberals.

- **Older, single, not working women:** Comprising 12 percent of all women, this is the least well-off subgroup, even though 10 percent are college graduates. A majority of them did not complete high school. Seventy-six percent are widowed. Most are over age sixty-five, and most (76 percent) have incomes of less than $15,000 a year. Thirty-seven percent earn less than $5,000 a year. Sixty percent say they are conservative, and only 19 percent say they are liberal.

The Effects

Separating women into eight groups for analysis makes sense only if those groups differ in their attitudes and their political behavior. And they do. Their vote for Reagan in 1984 varied by as much as 31 percentage points from group to group (see table 1).

The DMI poll said women voted for Reagan by a 57 to 43 percent margin over Walter Mondale, while men voted for the GOP incumbent by a 60 to 40 percent edge. These figures are consistent with those from the CBS News/*New York Times* exit poll of voters in 1984. That survey found men voting for Reagan by 67 to 37 percent, while women backed him 56 to 44 percent. The DMI numbers were also consistent with the CBS/*New York Times* survey in saying unmarried women split 49 percent for Reagan and 51 percent for Mondale, while married women went 60 to 40 percent for Reagan. Below is the DMI breakout of women.

Table 1
WOMEN'S 1984 VOTE FOR PRESIDENT

	Reagan	Mondale	Reagan minus Mondale
Younger, married, working women	61%	39%	+22%
Younger, not married, working	50	50	Even
Younger, married, not working	64	36	+28
Younger, not married, not working	33	66	−33
Older, married, working	55	45	+10
Older, not married, working	41	59	−18
Older, married, not working	62	38	+24
Older, not married, not working	56	44	+12

The patterns of the vote in the DMI subgroups are not easy, straight-line equations.[4] But a close examination shows the value of the analytical approach.

Perhaps the easiest way to understand the table is to start with the larger categories and work down. Married women, for example, were substantially more pro-Reagan than single women. And non-working women were more tilted in the GOP direction than were working women.

But then look how the categories interact: Women who were both single and working were two of the most pro-Mondale groups. And there were some surprises: Older married women who don't work were one of Reagan's strongest groups. But older married women who work outside the home were more evenly split.

Lest anyone believe that these margins indicate most women rejected the Ferraro candidacy—rather than the Democratic ticket of which she was part—other DMI findings supply ample evidence. Overwhelming majorities from each subgroup agreed that Ferraro showed women can compete for the nation's highest offices, and majorities agreed that the Ferraro candidacy was a victory for women.

The Republicans can take less solace from the congressional vote in 1984, which in the DMI poll pretty much followed the party registration or partisan identification of the subgroups. Women voted 55-45 for the Democratic candidates, while men voted 53-47 for the Democrats.

Table 2
WOMEN'S VOTE FOR CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES
1984

	Rep.	Dem.	Rep. minus Dem.
Younger, married, working women	48%	52%	− 4%
Younger, not married, working	45	55	−10
Younger, married, not working	50	50	Even
Younger, not married, not working	35	65	−30
Older, married, working	41	59	−18
Older, not married, working	25	75	−50
Older, married, not working	48	52	− 4
Older, not married, not working	51	49	+ 2

As with the presidential vote, this four-dimensional pattern is difficult to visualize, and it differs somewhat from the presidential vote pattern. The underlying themes, however, remain the same: Single women are more pro-Democratic than married women. Working women are less favorable to the GOP than non-working women.[5]

But here the power of partisan identification—and the lack of the pull of Reagan as the candidate—gave Democrats the margins. Among older married women who don't work, for example, the GOP could eke out only a split. And among their working counterparts, the Democrats swept by 18 percentage points.

The 1983 DMI survey tried to gauge the impact of two key feminist issues—abortion and the proposed Equal Rights Amendment—on the voting behavior of the various subgroups. While such questions may not be a reliable guide to how an individual will vote, they do provide a good indicator of the perceived importance to women of various issues in contrast to other findings.

Republicans might take heart from an earlier DMI question that found women putting the ERA at the bottom of their list of most important problems for women. But the results of the direct questioning on the ERA and abortion show the GOP has a problem with significant groups of women on the feminist issues.

On the ERA, for example, 39 percent of the young, single, working women said they would change their vote to oppose a candidate who did not support the ERA. Only 5 percent said they would change their vote to oppose a candidate who supported the ERA. Thus the pro-ERA bias among the group was 34 percentage points. In contrast, among older, married, non-working women, 14 percent would switch their votes in a pro-ERA direction, while 15 percent would switch in the anti-ERA direction.

Those two groups were also at the ends of the spectrum on the voting impact of the abortion issue. Thirty-six percent of the younger group would swing their votes in support of a candidate who backs women's right to choose an abortion, while 22 percent would go in the other direction. That's a "pro-choice" bias of 16 percentage points. But among the older, married, non-working women, 16 percent would swing their votes in the "pro-choice" direction, while 33 percent would switch to vote for the "pro-life" candidate—an anti-abortion edge of 17 percentage points.

Whatever the attitudes on those two issues, large majorities of each subgroup rated the women's movement as having a positive impact on this country and as having made them more aware of their own potential as women. In addition, the women's judgments were that the movement would have a continuing and growing impact in the future.

The DMI surveys did not ask directly about an issue that some argue is critical to understanding the differences between men's and women's attitudes—war and peace. Kathleen Frankovic of CBS News has written elsewhere that the war issue, not women's issues, best explains the gender gap in 1980.[6] Unfortunately, we cannot gauge its effect from this set of surveys.

A persuasive explanation for variations in women's political behavior among subgroups is that women's experiences and expectations vary.

More young women, for example, say they have personally faced sex discrimination than older women. The 1984 DMI survey found about a third of the younger women reporting such an experience, while only 18 percent of the older group did. Nearly two out of five younger, single, working women experienced discrimination. And working older women are more likely than non-working older women to report discrimination.

Asked whether men and women have equal opportunities in America today, the majorities in every subgroup of women said no. But more than two-thirds of those under 45 perceive discrimination, compared to just over half of those among the older group.

In addition, a somewhat finer analysis finds that the most feminist of the women are in the twenty-five to forty-five year old age bracket. These women came of age politically and professionally while the latest version of the women's movement was surging onto the political stage. Their expectations for their lives were certainly shaped by that movement in the turbulent 1960s and early 1970s.

The interaction of the burden of child-rearing and child care seems to play an important role in how these groups of women view the world. Having small children does not necessarily make one more conservative—or more liberal—but the responsibility of children interacts with the woman's personal and professional expectations to shape her political views (and almost certainly with a man's expectations as well).

Women not only say they have experienced discrimination, they also say their expectations have been shaped by that experience. Four out of ten women believe their opportunities are limited by their sex. Single women are more likely to believe this than married women, particularly those over age forty-five. About a third of the women with college or advanced degrees feel limited as well.

Discrimination and limits on their achievements are a personal, everyday experience for many women, a reality that shapes their political attitudes. And this reality rebounds against the GOP among women. Many women see the Republicans as insensitive to their concerns. By big margins in every group, the women pick the Democrats as more sensitive than the GOP, and that perception clearly translated into votes for the Democrats in 1984.

All this indicates the GOP problem with women will not just fade away and that it will probably get worse.

Younger working women are a growing part of the American scene, both socially and politically. Many do not vote now while they are getting their personal and professional lives on track, but they will become a crucial political force in the near future. As they age and settle down, these younger women will still be shaped by the memories of their early personal, professional, and political experiences—as they replace a more conservative generation of women from which Reagan and the Republicans have drawn significant support.

Thus, women are still missing from the Republicans' grand design for realignment. The GOP must find a way to attract the support of women, particularly younger working women, if that grand design is ever to become a reality.

NOTES

[1] The first DMI poll for AMPAC was conducted October 2-15, 1983 by telephone and is based on interviews with 1,482 adult women and 1,018 adult men. The second poll was conducted by telephone November 26-December 4, 1984 and interviewed 2,704 adults, including 1,414 women.

AMPAC and DMI agreed to make the results of the two surveys available although DMI would not provide the raw data. Thus, more sophisticated analyses such as multiple regression could not be performed, but the full six-book set of the polls' tabulations were provided.

[2] For example, "Ronald Reagan has a Woman Problem," Evans Witt, *Opinion Outlook*, March 9, 1981.

[3] "The Marriage Gap," Marty Plissner, *Public Opinion*, February/March 1983, p. 53.

[4] The sample of younger, single, not working women is so small that the figures are not reliable. The figures on the older, single, working women should be used with care because of small sample size.

[5] See the warning about reliability in footnote 4.

[6] "Sex and Politics–New Alignments, Old Issues," Kathleen Frankovic, *PS*, vol. 15, no. 3 (Summer 1982), pp. 439-448.

[7] For a general discussion of differences between men and women in the development of political attitudes, see Virginia Sapiro, *The Political Integration of Women: Roles, Socialization and Politics*, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1983, and more generally, Carol Gilligan, *In A Different Voice*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1982.

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(Continued from page 20)

incapable of resolving the problems of unemployment and the sluggish economy. From this perspective, the left is in trouble today not primarily for ideological reasons but because it is in power, and in power, has failed to realize the expectations its victory had aroused.

Polling data gathered by the principal French survey organizations provide elements in support of each of these two interpretations—but, as we shall see later, they more strongly support the second than the first.

II. The Value Crisis of the Left

Within a few years the French electorate has shifted on the left/right axis. For the first time since World War II, more French people place themselves on the right rather than on the left (see table 6). This movement is linked to their attitudes toward business and, more specifically, private enterprise, which has long been one of the main sources of division in French political culture.

Some observers argue that the French public is swinging toward the values of classical economic liberalism.[2] Certainly the traditional symbols of the left—socialism, planning, unions, nationalization—are losing appeal, while terms like free trade, competition, and liberalism (in the historic European sense of the term) get positive scores. The French now assign a high priority to economic modernization. They favor reducing state intervention in economic life, lowering taxes on business, and even returning to the private sector groups of companies nationalized in 1983.[3]

Demand for law and order has also risen. One expression of this is that a majority of the French want to see the death penalty reinstituted. The French also favor measures to reduce the number of foreign workers in the country.

All of these themes are primarily appeals of the right—despite some policy shifts made by the Socialists in 1982-1983. It seems undeniable that the philosophic center of gravity of the French electorate has moved

The Greenpeace Affair

A foreigner visiting Paris in late September would have been forced to conclude that the outcome of the March 1986 elections depended on the impact of the Greenpeace scandal. This was no ordinary tempest in the press, but a catastrophe with "incalculable political consequences" that was bringing about "an irresistible political unraveling" and that bore "the smell of an administrative downfall." In the eyes of the press—both left and right—a veritable earthquake rocked French politics in late July.

The public felt differently. Several polls flatly contradict the view that the scandal has thus far shifted voter sentiment. BVA surveys for *Paris-Match* saw confidence in Mitterrand's leadership barely moving from 30-32 percent from July to September. Likewise, Prime Minister Fabius's ratings moved from 40-41 percent in the same period. Twenty-one percent in a SOFRES poll for *Figaro* said the Greenpeace affair would affect their vote in the midterm election, while 69 percent said it would not.

How can we account for this? How could French opinion be so stable when the media's view of the political world shifted so markedly? For one thing, the public and the press pay vastly different amounts of attention to current political developments. François Mitterrand acknowledged the leading role the press played in unfolding the Greenpeace affair in his letter to Laurent Fabius instructing him to "proceed without delay to make changes in the personnel and, if necessary, in the organization" of the responsible agencies. "In spite of the investigation you have ordered," wrote Mitterrand "we must acknowledge that the press has been uncovering new information. . . ." Caught up in its efforts to bring to light the role actually played in the affair by the French secret service and the governmental chain of command, the French press found it difficult to step back and ask how the public at large was responding to developments.

Polls taken in mid-September by BVA and SOFRES, after defense minister Charles Hernu resigned and before Fabius went on television with the explanations, make it easier to understand why the public reacted as it did. They show clearly that, on the one hand, the French considered the decision to sink the Rainbow Warrior wholly unacceptable as a matter of principle. These polls also show that a large majority of the public thought that the government had lied about its role in the affair. On the other hand, the French view Greenpeace as an interest group with political motives that reach well beyond its professed environmental concerns. And they remain firmly behind their country's program of nuclear testing in the Pacific. These beliefs tempered the scandal's political impact.

Above all, the polls showed that the French public wanted to contain the political effects of the affair. Each survey asked respondents if they agreed or disagreed that the Greenpeace affair should *not* lead to the president's or prime minister's resignation.

Greenpeace affair should not lead to:

	BVA	*SOFRES*
Prime minister's resignation	*59%*	*60%*
President's resignation	*64*	*65*

Considering Mitterrand's persisting unpopularity, the above numbers make abundantly clear that the Greenpeace scandal has not cut very deeply. Barring new revelations and accusations that might cast Mitterrand's or Fabius's role in a more unfavorable light, the Greenpeace affair is unlikely to be a decisive factor in the March 1986 balloting, no matter what the headlines predict.

MB/GG

right. This shift in the climate of opinion may prove to be profound and durable. If the left wants to reassert itself, it will have to change its programs as well as its rhetoric. But the extent of the shift should not be overestimated. Several factors may restrict its reach.

The French are now convinced that state control is no miracle cure for economic problems and that the marketplace has impressive strengths, yet they are not necessarily ready to give up their long-time attachment to the Providential-State. Albert du Roy thus summarized data from a Louis Harris poll taken in France in May 1985 when he said flatly that the French had not become conservatives.[4] In fact, a Louis Harris poll taken in May 1985 showed the French public opposed to eliminating all price controls, opposed to transferring the major universities to private direction, against lowering estate taxes on large fortunes, and against relaxing licensing procedures and eliminating state subsidies to troubled industries. Though they are willing to concede the advantages of classical economic liberalism when it favors competition and free choice, the French remain attached to the security furnished by the Protector-State. Thus, while the statist dimension of the Socialist tradition meets with growing skepticism, even hostility, the French have by no means become unconditional partisans of the ideas of Friedrich von Hayek.

It is extremely difficult to break with a national tradition that is centuries old. The political right would be well-advised to reflect upon this before committing itself unconditionally to the conservative approach to public policy.

III. Can the Right Right Things?

The opposition will probably win next year's legislative elections. More than anything else, this victory will indicate the electorate's desire to punish the left for failing to achieve its goals and promises while in power. Various indicators show that the French are more eager for the left's departure than the right's return.

The left is unpopular now because many French citizens feel that the leftist experiment of the past five years has not been good for them personally or for the country. A majority feel that Mitterrand's election has not benefited "people like you" (see table 7). A majority fault the left for failing to handle problems involving jobs and unemployment (see table 8). Employment issues have been the number one concern of the French, and these issues were a strong point for the left during their long spell in the opposition. Now, however, the French look to the right for employment remedies. They also think that the nationalization carried out by the Mitterrand government has been more of a failure than a success: 59 percent opposed, compared to 21 percent in favor, according to a recent BVA survey.

French voters today view policies of *all* contending parties with a good bit of skepticism. Despite their dissatisfaction with the left, they do not see the right as offering promising alternatives (see table 9). Even among voters who favor one of the parties of the right, scarcely more than half believe these parties' alternatives are really promising.

With the notable exception of Raymond Barre, all of the principal opposition leaders receive negative scores on indices designed to measure confidence or its lack in their leadership. Paradoxically, the highest levels of confidence recorded for any of the six principal French leaders, apart from Barre, are for two leaders of the left, Socialist maverick Michel Rocard and Socialist Prime Minister Laurent Fabius. Gaullist leader Jacques Chirac and former president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing

Table 6

SELF-PLACEMENT ON THE LEFT-RIGHT SCALE

Extreme left	2%
Left	13
Somewhat left	15
Neither left nor right	24
Somewhat right	22
Right	13
Extreme right	2

Source: Surveys by Brulé Ville Associés for *Paris-Match*, July 1985.

Table 7

Question: For people like you, has the election of François Mitterrand been a good thing or a bad thing?

For people like you, the election of Mitterrand:	
Has been a good thing	29%
Bad thing	53
Not certain	18

Source: Survey by Brulé Ville Associés for *Paris-Match*, March 1985.

Table 8

Question: Are you confident in the government's capacity to improve the employment situation?

	Confident in the government's capacity to improve the employment situation	Not confident
June 1981	67%	20%
April 1982	49	41
January 1983	44	43
March 1984	45	53
July 1985	32	57

Source: Surveys by Brulé Ville Associés for *Paris-Match*, latest that of July 1985.

Table 9

Question: Does the opposition offer promising alternative policies?

	Opposition does offer promising alternative policies	Does not
January 1983	30%	49%
March 1984	31	47
October 1984	38	44
April 1985	33	41
June 1985	35	45

Source: Surveys by Brulé Ville Associés for *Paris-Match*, latest that of June 1985.

come in well behind. Indeed, their negative ratings approach that of François Mitterrand (see table 10).

On voting intentions for the upcoming legislative elections, combined support for the two main opposition parties (R.P.R. and U.D.F.) totals less than 50 percent. The strength of the extreme right prevents the opposition from appearing as a united majority.

The only important exception to the pattern we have been describing involves the dramatic gains in popular support achieved by Raymond Barre, who was prime minister under Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. In March 1984 Barre was a full twenty points behind Jacques Chirac as the choice of opposition voters when they were asked who would be the best opposition candidate in the next presidential election (see table 11). By the end of 1984, however, Barre had taken the lead over Chirac, rising in popularity as the latter lost ground. Today Barre is the only political leader besides Rocard who has a positive overall rating.

Because of the disagreements between Barre and the other opposition leaders, and because Barre is the head of neither of the main parties of the right, his high political standing does not automatically contribute to the opposition's credibility. Still, Barre is clearly in a good position to succeed Mitterrand as president in the next election. Considering how unpopular Barre was at the time of the 1981 election, his present strength is quite remarkable. Among other things, it indicates that the kind of volatility in voter preferences that has been noted in other advanced democracies, including the United States, is now evident in France.

IV. The Question of "Coexistence"

Not only are the French rather skeptical about political leadership in general, they are also somewhat concerned when they consider the end of the term for the National Assembly. This is so because France is likely to take a step with enormous importance for the evolution of its political institutions. Never before in the Fifth Republic have they faced a possible split between a president of one party (his term expires in 1988) and a National Assembly controlled by another faction. The French public is attached to the institutions of the Fifth Republic and wants them to continue. Given this, they dread the kind of institutional crisis that is likely to be provoked after March 1986.

Although they now favor a shift of power to the opposition in the legislature, a majority of French voters want to avoid returning to what Charles de Gaulle called the "regime of parties." In their view, the president should enjoy the backing of a parliamentary majority (see table 12). According to a BVA poll of May 1985, only 29 percent think that political coexistence is possible between a president from the left and a legislative majority from the right.

The above explains why a plurality of the French public believe that, in the event of a split between the president and a majority in the Assembly, the president should resign. According to a May 1985 BVA poll, 47 percent took this position, while only 37 percent said Mitterrand should not resign. Of course, the margin here is small and other surveys suggest that the number of people who have yet to make up their minds on this issue may be large. An IFOP poll taken in August 1985, for example, showed 37 percent favoring the president's resignation in the event of an opposition victory, 30 percent wanting him to stay on, and 28 percent unsure.

This brings us to an interesting tension in the views of many opposition voters. Because they favor a strong presidency and stability in that office, they are reluctant to see an incumbent president resign. At the same time, they are strongly opposed to Mitterrand and would like to see this incumbent out of office.

In formal constitutional terms, the present French system provides for a kind of executive bipolarism, between the president of the Republic and the prime minister—while in practice the continuing presence to date of a parliamentary majority supporting the president has given him unquestioned executive leadership. If, after the March 1986 elections, Mitterrand no longer

Table 10

CONFIDENCE IN LEADERSHIP SCORES

	Have confidence in	Don't have confidence in
Raymond Barre	50%	37%
Michel Rocard	41	39
Laurent Fabius	40	43
Jacques Chirac	34	52
Valéry Giscard d'Estaing	31	57
François Mitterrand	30	59

Source: Survey by Brulé Ville Associés for *Paris-Match*, July 1985.

Table 11

Question: Who would be the best candidate of the Opposition?

	Sept. 1984	Jan. 1985	March 1985	June 1985	Sept. 1985
Raymond Barre	23%	26%	36%	34%	31%
Jacques Chirac	22	20	14	16	15
Simone Veil	13	9	8	9	9
Valéry Giscard d'Estaing	11	13	9	11	11
Jean-Marie Le Pen	6	3	4	6	8
No answer	25	29	29	24	26

Source: Surveys by Brulé Ville Associés for *Paris-Match*, latest that of September 1985.

Table 12

Question: Is divided political authority viable?

It is indispensable that the president of the Republic have a majority that supports him	59%
It is possible for a president from the left to coexist with a majority from the right	29
Not certain	12

Source: Survey by Brulé Ville Associés for *Paris-Match*, March 1985.

has a parliamentary majority, French voters will find themselves torn: they support a system built around the ascendancy of a president chosen by universal suffrage, but their current political preferences push them toward wanting to see the (opposition party) prime minister's role enlarged.

The leaders of the opposition are themselves divided about their parties' posture on the institutional issues, should they win a clear victory next March. For his part, Raymond Barre opposes political coexistence with a president whose supporters are clearly in the minority. He thinks that a member of the opposition approached by Mitterrand about becoming the new prime minister should refuse to assume that office. In contrast, Jacques Chirac and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing think that a victorious right cannot refuse to govern in a situation where the real power of the president is considerably reduced compared to past practice.

As we have said, since the situation that now seems so likely has never before occurred, voters are uncertain about what they think should happen. In this climate, both sides—that is, Barre's on the one hand, and Chirac's and Giscard's on the other—can find responses in public opinion polls that seem to back their respective, competing positions. Opponents of coexistence can cite the view of a plurality of the French that having a president of one camp and the parliamentary majority of the other is unworkable. They can also point out that the proportion of the French who want a unified parliamentary majority of the right is growing, and that this option wins out over any other alternative.

On the other hand, defenders of coexistence can point out that the French reject the idea of a "prime minister's strike"—the refusal of anyone on the victorious right to take up the office. They can also note that French voters remain strongly attached to Fifth Republic institutions and are distressed by the idea of a continuing power struggle between a president whose term doesn't expire until 1988 and a new parliamentary majority. A large minority think that the best agreement after March 1986 would be a parliamentary majority uniting the Socialists and various groups in the present opposition. This view expresses itself in the wish to see some Socialist ministers maintained in office (see table 13).

Table 13

Question: In the event of an Opposition victory what should a member of the Opposition do when he is contacted by the president about becoming Prime Minister?

When contacted to become Prime Minister, he:	
Should accept	51%
Should refuse	23
Not certain	26

Source: Surveys by Brulé Ville Associés for *Paris-Match*, February 1985.

In the aftermath of next March's elections, France is likely to confront a very basic question about the nature of the alternation of power that is to take place: Should it be a complete shift of the sort that occurred in 1981 when the Socialists gained control of both the presidency and the Assembly? Or should it be a more limited alternation of power, reestablishing in the National Assembly the kind of coalition majority common in the Fourth Republic, or more specifically the eviction of the extreme parties—the Communists and the National Front—leaving France governed by an alliance of all groups but not the extreme?

French voters are aware that the choice before them is serious. Last spring, a full year before the legislative elections, 63 percent agreed that March 1986 would be a most important date in their nation's political life. And month after month subsequent polls taken by BVA for *Paris-Match* have shown that about a third of the French electorate has simply not made up its mind about how they want the dilemma resolved.

FOOTNOTES

[1] France has changed from an absolute majority, two-ballot system, to a proportional representation system with departmental lists

[2] Jerome Jaffre, SOFRES Opinion Publique–1984 (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1984), page 73.

[3] Ibid., page 99.

[4] L'Evenement du Jeudi, May 23-29, 1985.

Data for pages 22 and 23

	Harris			AP/ MG			CBS/ *NYT*			ABC/ *Post*			*Time*/ YSW			NBC			Roper			Gallup		
	D	R	I	D	R	I	D	R	I	D	R	I	D	R	I	D	R	I	D	R	I	D	R	I
January 1979																			50%	22%	28%			
February	44%	23%	33%																52	23	25	45%	22%	33%
March																			49	22	29			
April													51%	28%	22%									
May	40	25	35																49	24	27	45	22	33
June										45%	22%	33%							47	23	29			
July																			47	21	32			
August										44	21	35	50	27	23				52	22	26			
September																			48	23	29			
October													51	26	23									
November							42%	26%	32%	46	22	32							51	21	29			
December													50	26	24							46	22	32
January 1980							41	24	35				49	26	25				52	20	28	48	19	33
																						46	20	34
February							44	25	31										50	22	28	47	21	32
																						47	25	28
March							41	26	33				51	30	20							45	21	34
													49	28	23							45	22	32
April							43	24	33										46	23	31	45	25	30
May													53	26	21				49	24	27	47	22	31
																						48	22	30
																						47	22	31

	Harris			AP/MG			CBS/NYT			ABC/Post			Time/YSW			NBC			Roper			Gallup		
	D	R	I	D	R	I	D	R	I	D	R	I	D	R	I	D	R	I	D	R	I	D	R	I
June							44	23	33										50	23	27	49	24	27
																						46	25	29
July																			47	24	28	47	25	29
August	40	33	27				43	24	33				53	27	20				49	25	26	48	23	29
	46	29	25																			51	24	25
September							46	23	31													47	33	20
October													52	28	20				48	25	26	45	26	29
November							46	24	30										46	25	30	42	26	32
																						43	25	32
December																			44	25	31	42	27	31
January 1981							39	27	34				51	31	18	35%	29%	36%	45	25	30	42	27	32
February										36	28	36				38	27	35	45	27	28	43	25	33
																						42	29	29
March										41	26	33							44	28	28	41	28	31
April							36	28	36	43	27	31				37	28	35	43	28	29	42	29	30
																						39	29	31
May										37	25	38	53	28	19	33	29	38				42	26	33
June	41	29	29				38	27	35										45	26	29	41	27	33
																						45	29	27
																						43	29	28
July										36	27	36				33	32	35	45	28	27	37	30	33
																						40	27	33
August																37	29	34	42	27	30	42	28	30
																						40	29	31
September							38	26	36	41	26	33	52	30	19	35	30	35	46	27	27	47	26	27
October										38	26	36				34	28	38	44	26	30	43	29	29
November										40	24	35				35	28	37				45	27	28
																						43	26	31
																						42	25	33
December																36	28	36	45	25	30			
January 1982							39	23	37	39	23	39				33	26	41	46	24	30			
																35	28	37						
February										38	26	36							48	24	28	44	26	30
March							40	25	35	41	26	33	52	30	19	35	28	37	48	24	28			
April										36	24	40												
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December										36	27	36	48	32	20				43	27	29	41	26	33
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February							41	26	33	39	29	32				37	29	34	45	29	26	39	29	33
March							39	26	35							37	28	35	45	26	29	43	27	29
April							41	31	28										47	25	28	43	28	28
May										37	23	40										43	26	30
June				37%	28%	35%	40	25	35										45	27	28	40	30	29
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July										39	25	36				34	28	38	48	26	26	40	30	31
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August				37	27	37	39	27	34				50	32	18	34	27	39	46	28	27	40	33	28
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							36	31	33										45	30	24			
November				34	29	37																40	31	29
	44	32	24				33	33	33															
December							38	33	29				45	34	21				45	29	26			
January 1985							38	30	32	34	29	36							45	27	27	38	36	27
							36	32	32													36	36	28
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August																								
September				35	31	33	34	31	36	35	29	36	48	33	20									
October										34	31	35				33	35	33						

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THE BIRTH DEARTH

Depopulation in the West: Does It Hurt Us Economically? Geopolitically?

Allen Kelley, Ben Wattenberg, Karl Zinsmeister
and Ray Cline, Murray Feshbach, Edward Luttwak, Alison McIntosh, Geoffrey McNicoll, Michael Novak, Richard Perle, Michael Teitelbaum, Etienne van de Walle

Public Opinion

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THE GEOPOLITICS OF POPULATION

FERTILITY DECLINE IN THE WESTERN COMMUNITY, 1960-1983

Two articles and a symposium compliment this Opinion Roundup presentation. Ben Wattenberg and Karl Zinsmeister's article appears on page 6, Allen Kelley's on page 14. The symposium begins on page 18.



Source: United Nations, World Bank and national data compiled by Karl Zinsmeister, American Enterprise Institute.

Population Trends in the



Projected Population of the Western Community, 1985-2150

Projected population (millions)	
1985	732
1990	749
1995	764
2000	776
2010	791
2020	795
2030	785
2040	761
2050	729
2100	587
2150	484

Source: World Bank data projected at current fertility rate and assuming continued immigration to the United States at current levels.



Projected Population of the United States, 1985-2150

Projected population (millions)	
1985	238
1995	255
2005	269
2015	282
2025	290
2035	291
2045	287
2055	283
2065	279
2075	273
2085	269
2095	264
2105	259
2115	255
2125	251
2135	247
2145	243
2150	241

Source: World Bank data projected, assuming constant fertility and migration.



Projected Population of the Western Community Excluding the United States, 1985-2150

Projected population (millions)	
1985	493
1995	508
2005	517
2015	513
2025	502
2035	484
2045	458
2055	430
2065	404
2075	380
2085	356
2095	336
2105	315
2115	297
2125	280
2135	264
2145	250
2150	243

Source: World Bank data projected, assuming constant fertility.

West and the Soviet Bloc



Projected Population of the Industrial Communist World, 1985-2150

Projected population
(millions)

1985	393
1990	407
1995	419
2000	430
2010	450
2020	467
2030	482
2055	503
2080	517
2105	523
2130	524
2150	524

Source: *World Population Projections 1984*, My T. Vu, The World Bank.



Projected Population of the Soviet Union, 1985-2155

Projected population
(millions)

1985	277
1995	297
2005	313
2015	327
2025	339
2030	344
2055	361
2080	372
2105	377
2130	377
2155	378

Source: *World Population Projections 1984*, My T. Vu, The World Bank.



Projected Population of Eastern Europe, 1985-2155

Projected population
(millions)

1985	116
1995	122
2005	127
2015	132
2025	136
2030	138
2055	142
2080	145
2105	146
2130	147
2155	146

Source: *World Population Projections 1984*, My T. Vu, The World Bank.

Decline of the West?

Fraction of the Total World Population in the Western Community, 1900-2075





	Industrial Democratic World[a]	Industrial Communist World[b]	Less Developed World[b]
	(In millions)		
1985	732	393	3,660
1990	749	407	4,048
1995	764	419	4,449
2000	776	430	4,882
2010	791	450	5,752
2020	795	467	6,552
2030	785	482	7,302
2050	729	500	8,300
2100	587	521	9,450
2130	521	524	9,673
2150	484	524	9,700

Source: For 1900, Colin McEvedy and Richard Jones, *Atlas of World Population History*, for 1950 and 1985, World Bank data; for 2025 and 2075, projections using World Bank data.

Source: [a] World Bank data projected at current fertility rate and assuming continued immigration to the United States at current levels; [b] *World Population Projections 1984*, My T. Vu, The World Bank.

THE FAMILY IN AMERICA

THE INSTITUTION OF MARRIAGE

Question: Compared to ten years ago, do you think the institution of marriage is stronger, weaker, or is it about the same as it was then?



Note: Interesting differences exist among various subgroups. Those with less income, less education, blacks, and the elderly think the institution of marriage is weaker today, compared to ten years ago.

Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization for Virginia Slims, latest that of March 1985.

INGREDIENTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL MARRIAGE: A CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON

Question: (Show card) Here is a list of things which some people think make a successful marriage. Please tell me, for each one, whether you think it is very important, rather important, or not very important. . . .

Very important to a successful marriage





Source: Survey by the Gallup organization for the Council for Applied Research in the Apostolate, January-December, 1981.

SOURCES OF STRESS IN MARRIAGES TODAY

Question: There are many different sources of stress in relationships between husbands and wives. In your marriage, please rate each of the following factors in terms of whether it has caused a great deal of stress, some stress, a little stress, or no stress in your marriage . . .



Source: Survey by Gordon Black for *USA Today*, June 29-July 7, 1984.

WHOSE CAREER COMES FIRST?

Question: (I would like to ask you to tell me whether you agree or disagree with a number of statements that are sometimes made about marriage and families.) . . . It is more important for a wife to support her husband's career than it is to have a career herself.



Source: Survey by Gordon Black for *USA Today*, December 6-10, 1984.

Question: Suppose both husband and wife work and the husband is offered a very good job in another city. Assuming no children, which one of these solutions do you think they should seriously consider? (Card shown respondent)

If husband is offered a very good job in another city...



If wife is offered a very good job in another city...



Note: All categories asked are not shown.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for Virginia Slims, March 1985.

DIVORCE

Question: If a marriage isn't working out, do you favor or oppose a divorce as a solution?



Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization for Virginia Slims, latest that of March 1985.

Question: Now here are some statements about marriage, work, divorce, etc. Would you read each one and tell me whether on balance, you tend more to agree with it or disagree with it?

When a marriage has serious difficulties, divorce is an acceptable solution even where children are involved.



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 84-2), January 7-21, 1984.

Question: And how do you feel about alimony—if a divorced woman has or can earn a reasonable income, do you think she should receive alimony from her ex-husband or not?



Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization for Virginia Slims, latest that of March 1985.

Question: What is the ideal size of a family? Husband, wife, and (number) children? (1936) What do you consider is the ideal size of a family—a husband and wife and how many children? (1941, 1953) How many children do you think should be in the family of ideal size? (1945 Form T) What do you consider is the ideal size of family—a husband and wife and how many children? (1945 Form K) What do you think is the ideal number of children for a family to have? (1957-1985)

Four or more children ideal



Three



Two



One



None



Note: *Less than 0.5%

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of February 15-18, 1985

	1936	1941	1945	1953	1957	1959	1973	1978	1980	1983	1985
By sex/age:											
Men 18-39 years											
Two children	NA	35%	26%	34%	23%	21%	57%	51%	51%	55%	53%
Three children	NA	30	35	32	44	33	21	18	22	21	25
Four children or more	NA	26	37	33	25	35	11	16	16	13	11
Women 18-39 years											
Two children	NA	18	16	24	18	13	53	60	54	61	63
Three children	NA	20	23	26	36	21	22	24	20	19	18
Four children or more	NA	52	55	48	40	51	17	11	15	11	10
By education:											
Less than high school											
Two children	NA	NA	20	25	17	15	37	37	42	45	49
Three children	NA	NA	22	27	29	23	23	24	19	21	19
Four children or more	NA	NA	52	44	43	49	29	26	24	22	14
College, some college, graduate											
Two children	NA	NA	20	28	21	17	55	60	56	59	61
Three children	NA	NA	35	33	39	32	20	21	19	21	22
Four children or more	NA	NA	41	37	33	37	12	9	12	10	8
By race:											
White											
Two children	29%	28	21	27	17	16	49	51	53	55	58
Three children	29	25	27	29	35	27	24	24	20	22	20
Four children or more	29	38	47	41	38	44	17	15	15	13	10
Black											
Two children	15	34	21	26	22	16	33	35	31	44	39
Three children	7	27	30	20	29	20	15	16	24	15	27
Four children or more	66	29	38	49	38	52	36	32	27	22	20

OF CHILDREN



Source: U.S. National Center for Health Statistics.

Question: Looking ahead, do you expect to have any (more) children? If so, how many?



Note: Many demographers believe that actual births will be lower than the birth desires expressed here. Despite their plans or hopes to the contrary, many women who are currently "delaying" childbearing will eventually find themselves unable to have children either for biological or personal/social reasons. Scholars project, for instance, that between 20 and 30 percent of the women born in the 1950s will bear *no* children, far more than express the desire to remain childless.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

Question: (Complete wording not available) Almost all married couples who can, ought to have children. (Do you agree or disagree?)

Agree, almost all married couples who can, ought to have children



Note: Asked of 1,000 mothers in the Detroit metropolitan area.

Source: *The Changing American Family*, Arland Thornton and Deborah Freedman, 1983.

WORKING WOMEN: IMPACT ON FAMILY LIFE

Question: Now, if you were free to do either, would you prefer to have a job outside the home, or would you prefer to stay home and take care of a house and family?



Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization for Virginia Slims, latest that of March 1985.

WHAT WOMEN SAY ABOUT WORKING

Question: Here are some statements working women have made about the way they feel about working. (Hand respondent card) Would you read down this list and for each one tell me whether it is or would be true of you, or not?



Note: The volunteered responses "Doesn't apply" and "Don't know" are not shown.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for Virginia Slims, March 1985.

HOUSEHOLD TASKS: DIVISIONS OF LABOR

Question: How are daily household tasks handled in your house—things like preparing meals, cleaning, grocery shopping, washing dishes, etc.? Would you say you do nearly all of it, or that you do a lot of it but your husband (mate) helps some, or that it's pretty evenly divided up between the two of you, or that your husband (mate) does more of it than you do?



Note: Among men with employed wives, the responses were 24%, 42%, 28%, and 5%. Among men whose wives were not employed, the responses were 41%, 40%, 17%, and 2%.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for Virginia Slims, March 1985.

OPINION ROUNDUP

HOME LIFE

Question: In today's family where the woman is both a working woman, a wife, and a mother, which of the three do you think gets slighted the most—the job, the marriage, or the children, or don't you think any of them get slighted?



Note: Men's responses were: 5% job gets slighted, 26% marriage does, 49% children do, and 20% thought none of those got slighted when women worked.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for Virginia Slims, March 1985.

Question: I would like to ask you to tell me whether you agree or disagree with a number of statements that are sometimes made about marriage and families. . . . A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work?



Note: Sample size = 1,230.

Source: Survey by Gordon Black for *USA Today*, December 6-10, 1984.

Question: It is becoming more common these days for both married couples and single parents to work outside the home, and, in some cases, raise children at the same time. Do you think this trend toward both parents working outside the home has a generally positive, a generally negative, or no effect at all on families?



Note: Sample size = 1,006 women and 500 men.

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates for the *Ms.* Foundation for Education and Communication, March 8-20, 1984.

Question: Imagine you are married and have one or more pre-school children. How would you feel about each of the following working arrangements?



Note: For category "Husband works full-time, wife doesn't work," 9% of high school seniors said "Not at all acceptable," 18% "Somewhat acceptable," 40% "Acceptable," and 33% "Desirable." Sample size = 16,499.

Source: *Monitoring the Future*, Jerald G. Bachman, Lloyd D. Johnston, and Patrick M. O'Malley, Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1984.

Question: When you were a child, would you say that (your parents/the people who brought you up) were very strict and exercised strong parental authority over what you said and did, or not?



Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, July 20-27, 1985.

Question: Many people feel that we are going through a period of rapid social change—and that people's values are changing. For each of the statements on this card, will you tell me whether you agree strongly, agree partially, or disagree. . . . Strict, old-fashioned upbringing and discipline are still the best way to raise children.



Source: Survey by Yankelovich, Skelly and White for General Mills, late 1978.

CHILDREN: WHAT'S ACCEPTABLE, WHAT'S NOT

Question: What is acceptable behavior for a son?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for Virginia Slims, March 1985.

Question: What is acceptable behavior for a daughter?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for Virginia Slims, March 1985.

Question: People feel differently about the kinds of things they should establish strict rules about for their children. Here is a list of some of those things. (Card shown respondent) Would you read down that list and tell me which things you have strict rules about for your children who are 6 years old or younger/7 to 12/13 to 16?



Note: Adds to more than 100% due to multiple responses. 1 = 22% of the sample; 2 = 17% of the sample; 3 = 13% of the sample.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 83-6), June 4-11, 1983.

PARENTS AND TEENAGERS: MORE AGREEMENT THAN A DECADE AGO

Question: How closely do your ideas agree with your parents' ideas about:



Note: Sample size for 1975 = 15,792; 1984 = 16,499.

Source: *Monitoring the Future*, Jerald G. Bachman, Lloyd D. Johnston, and Patrick M. O'Malley, Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1975 and 1984.

ELDERLY PARENTS: FAMILY TIES

Question: I would like to ask you to tell me whether you agree or disagree with a number of statements that are sometimes made about marriage and families. . . . When elderly parents can no longer take good care of themselves, it is the best solution to have them move in with their children.



Note: Sample size = 1,230.

Source: Survey by Gordon Black for *USA Today*, December 6-10, 1984.

Question: Do you think it is better for most older Americans who cannot live alone to live in a home for the aged or with their children?



Note: Responses by education were: 33% home for the aged, 41% with their children (less than high school grad); 38%, 42% (high school grad); 32%, 46% (some college); 30%, 47% (college grad). Responses by age were: 25% home for the aged, 58% with their children (18-24 years old); 35%, 41% (35-54 years old); 44%, 30% (55-64 years old); 41%, 30% (65 and over).

Source: Survey by Media General for Associated Press, November 12-19, 1984.

Question: Would you say you see your (parent/parents) at least once a month or don't you see (them/her/him) that often?



Note: Asked of those who have one or both parents still alive and who don't live with parent(s) = 68%.

Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, February 22-26, 1985.

Question: (Do they/does she/does he) (parent/parents) live in the community where you grew up, or not? (If respondent says parents are separated or divorced, say: Then thinking only of your mother, does she live in the community where you grew up, or not?)



Note: Asked of those with one or both parents alive = 69%.

Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, February 22-26, 1985.

AIDS: THE PUBLIC REACTS

LEVELS OF KNOWLEDGE

Question: Have you heard or read about a disease called AIDS—Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome?



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of August 18, 1985.

Question: How much would you say you know about a medical condition called Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome—AIDS? Would you say that you know a great deal about it, or quite a bit, or not too much, or would you say you know hardly anything about AIDS?



Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, December 5-12, 1985.

WHO'S AT RISK

Question: Do you think AIDS affects more people today who are homosexual, or gay, or do you think it affects more people who are heterosexual, or straight?



Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, December 5-12, 1985.

Question: So far, most of the people with AIDS have been homosexual men and intravenous drug users. Do you think AIDS will spread beyond those groups who already get it so that many people in the rest of the population will get AIDS, or don't you think so?



Note: Sample size = 762.

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, September 9, 1985.

CATCHING AIDS . . .

Question: I'm going to read you a list. For each item please tell me if you think that it is or is not a way for someone to catch AIDS from someone who has it. If you are not sure, please tell me. Can you catch AIDS from . . . (ABC News/*Washington Post*) Here are some ways some people say you can get AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome). For each of them, tell me whether it is possible to get AIDS that way. Can you get AIDS by . . . (CBS News/*New York Times*) In your opinion, can people/someone catch AIDS from . . . (*Los Angeles Times*)



Note: 1 = ABC News/*Washington Post*, 2 = CBS News/*New York Times*, 3 = *Los Angeles Times*. Sample size for CBS News/*New York Times* = 762.

Source: Surveys by ABC News/*Washington Post*, September 19-23, 1985; CBS News/*New York Times*, September 9, 1985; *Los Angeles Times*, December 5-12, 1985.

AND PROTECTING THE COMMUNITY

Question: Which, if any, of the following measures would you favor in order to control the spread of AIDS? Would you favor or oppose . . .







Question: Would you . . .







Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, December 5-12, 1985.

AIDS: NOT A PUNISHMENT

Question: Do you think that people who have contracted AIDS are unfortunate victims of chance or do you think they are offenders getting what they deserve?



Note: Agree = "Agree strongly" + "Agree somewhat," Disagree = "Disagree strongly" + "Disagree somewhat."

Question: How about "AIDS is a punishment God has given homosexuals for the way they live"—do you agree with that statement? (If agree or disagree) Is that (agree/disagree) strongly or (agree/disagree) somewhat?



Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, December 5-12, 1985.

AIDS AND OPINION OF HOMOSEXUALS

Question: Would you say the AIDS epidemic has changed your opinion about homosexuals for the better, for the worse, or has it not made any difference in the way you feel?



Note: * = less than 1%.
Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, November 11-18, 1985.

REAGAN'S RATINGS AS

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as president?



Note: Points shown are the last asking in each month. Not shown on the chart are these later askings: November 11-18, 1985, 65% approve, 24% disapprove; December 6-9, 1985 63% approve, 29% disapprove; January 10-13, 1986, 64% approve, 27% disapprove.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of January 10-13, 1986.

Question: Do you feel that Governor Ronald Reagan is doing a good job, a fair job, or a poor job as Governor of California?



Source: Survey by the Field Institute, latest that of August 2-12, 1974.

GOVERNOR AND PRESIDENT



	Approve	Disapprove
1981		
Jan.	51	13
Feb.	55	18
Mar.	60	24
Apr.	67	19
May	68	21
June	58	30
July	60	28
Aug.	60	29
Sept.	52	37
Oct.	53	35
Nov.	54	37
Dec.	49	41
1982		
Jan.	47	42
Feb.	47	43
Mar.	46	45
Apr.	44	46
May	45	44
June	44	46
July	41	47
Aug.	42	46
Sept.	42	48
Oct.	42	48
Nov.	43	47
Dec.	41	50
1983		
Jan.	35	56
Feb.	40	50
Mar.	41	49
Apr.	43	46
May	46	43
June	47	44
July	44	42
Aug.	43	46
Sept.	46	37
Oct.	45	44
Nov.	53	37
Dec.	54	38
1984		
Jan.	55	37
Feb.	55	36
Mar.	54	39
Apr.	52	37
May	54	38
June	53	37
July	52	37
Aug.	54	38
Sept.	54	35
Oct.	58	33
Nov.	62	30
Dec.	59	32
1985		
Jan.	64	28
Feb.	60	31
Mar.	56	37
Apr.	52	37
May	55	37
June	58	32
July	63	28
Aug.	65	26
Sept.	60	30
Oct.	63	29



	Good job	Fair job	Poor job
1967	38%	27%	26%
	41	33	17
	37	33	25
	35	35	25
1968	31	35	28
	30	36	30
1969	42	36	15
	39	37	20
1970	38	36	21
1971	32	35	28
1972	30	36	29
1973	38	39	19
1974	35	36	23

ALL THEY NEED TO GET BY...IN BRITAIN, DENMARK AND THE UNITED STATES

Question: In your opinion should those recipients who are on public assistance receive enough assistance to enable them to afford any of the following household items—please reply with either a yes or no to each statement:

Recipients on public assistance should receive enough assistance to enable them to afford...



Source: Survey by Sindlinger for The Heritage Foundation, May 28-July 8, 1985.

Question: On these cards are a number of different items which relate to our standards of living. Please indicate by placing the cards in the appropriate box with the living standards that you feel all adults should have in Britain/Denmark today. Box A is for items you think are necessary and all adults should be able to afford and not have to do without. Box B is for items which are desirable but not necessary.

Items viewed as necessary, that all adults should be able to afford and not have to do without...



Note: *Asked only of families with children.

Source: (For Britain) Survey by Market Opinion Research International (MORI) among 1,174 people over the age of 16, at 80 sampling points throughout Great Britain, February 15-24, 1983. (For Denmark) Survey by AIM among 938 people over the age of 15, at 115 sampling points throughout Denmark, November 21-December 3, 1983.

DAN RATHER WINS THE BATTLE OF THE NETWORK NEWS STARS

BY MICHAEL ROBINSON

It's been five years since Dan Rather replaced Walter Cronkite, and those years haven't been easy for Dan. There was that unresolved and unexplained fight with a cab driver in Chicago several years ago. Then in 1983 Carl Galloway, an L.A. physician, sued him for libel on the basis of a *Sixty Minutes* piece Rather had done in 1979.

He beat the suit, but before it was over, Rather had to apologize publicly for an obscene remark he had made to a local reporter who had been covering the trial. "Unchristian" was the way Rather described his profanity.

Those years were bad, but 1985 was the worst. A group of conservatives, with Jesse Helms as their shepherd, singled out Rather as a reason for establishing "Fairness in Media," a group whose aim was to take control of CBS. Conservatives were asked to buy CBS stock so that Fairness in Media could become "Dan Rather's boss" and put a stop to his liberal reporting. Ted Turner (CNN guru) had similar goals, though he attempted to take over CBS with more conventional corporate methods.

Reading all the news about the news might lead one to expect that Rather's image might suffer. If so, it hasn't affected ratings—CBS has been the highest-rated news program in every one of the five Rather years.

And, Nielsens aside, the biggest national survey ever conducted about the national news media shows Dan, himself, is doing fine. During the past twelve months, the Times Mirror Corporation in Los Angeles and the Gallup Organization in Princeton have interviewed more than 4,300 people for their "People and the Press" survey. The results of that research will continue to pour out over the coming year, and most of them indicate that the relationship between American journalism and public opinion is fairly healthy.

But the initial findings prove that the relationship between Dan Rather and his public is especially robust—one even a popular president might envy. When Gallup asked respondents to name their "favorite journalist or newsperson," Dan Rather placed first. No one else came close.

Among those who mentioned a national newsperson (47 percent of the total), Rather was the favorite of 24 percent. Peter Jennings was a surprising second-best (12 percent) among *practicing* journalists, but the bigger surprise was Walter Cronkite, who, five years after abdicating the throne, was named by 13 percent of those mentioning a national newsperson. So Cronkite was the real number two, even in retirement. Rather got almost six times as many first-place votes as Ted Koppel, about four times as many first-place votes as Barbara Walters, nearly three times as many as Tom Brokaw, and twice as many as Peter Jennings. Had this been a primary instead of a poll, Rather would be more than the front-runner—he'd be a shoo-in.

What's more intriguing is the shape of Rather's popularity. The survey asked all the typical questions—questions about region, race, religion, Reagan, and so on. Rather's appeal works its way into every crevice and cranny of America, even into spaces where you'd least expect to find it, places where Rather's name should be Mudd.

Table 1

FAVORITE NEWSPERSON

Question: Who is your favorite journalist or newsperson?

Among the 47% who named a national journalist:	
Dan Rather	24%
Walter Cronkite	13
Peter Jennings	12
Tom Brokaw	8
Barbara Walters	7
Ted Koppel	4
All other network journalists	19
All other national journalists	12

Talk about broad-based popularity: Rather is number one among the young and the old, the rich and the poor, those who own homes and those who rent, the "informed" and "uninformed," stockholders, and the rest of us. Women like Rather more than men do, but they both rank him as their favorite. He does well in every category.

Rather does his very best among the elderly, those most interested in politics, white Protestants, midwesterners, and ruralites. There's a "down home" quality to the groups most devoted to Rather. The composition of Rather's most appreciative audience suggests that his appeal, like CBS's generally, is more Nashville than New York.

So much for sociology. What about the politics of Dan's fans? Given the recent assault against Rather by the New Right's Jesse Helms and the mercurial Right's Ted Turner, one might guess that conservative viewers would think less of "liberal" Dan than his ideo-

Table 2

Of the 24% who picked Rather:	
By sex:	
Men	21%
Women	27
By age:	
Under 30	18
30-49 years	21
50 and over	30
By Reagan approval:	
Approve	25
Disapprove	24
By party identification:	
Republican	29
Democrat	24
Independent	20
By ideology:	
Conservative	24
Liberal	24
By region:	
East	18
Midwest	28
South	26
West	22

logical compatriots would. Not so. No matter how it's broken down, the survey shows no conservative bias against Rather in the public at large. Those who approve of Reagan's presidency are substantially *more* likely to list Rather as favorite journalist. Self-described conservatives prove as positive as self-described liberals. Republicans are actually one-and-a-half times as likely as Democrats to rank Rather as number one, although the numbers are too small to make that result statistically reliable. The South is significantly more approving of Rather than the East.

Dan's Fans

Why is Rather so popular? It starts with something as simple as visibility. In journalism as well as politics, familiarity breeds appreciation, not contempt. Unless indicted or convicted, reporters and politicians can expect that the greater their visibility, the higher their favorability.

The Times Mirror study shows that among practicing journalists, Dan Rather has the second most recognizable face in the nation. Only Barbara Walters's photograph was more familiar.

Even so, only 47 percent of the nation could place Rather's face, suggesting that most press people overstate the extent to which the public watches or cares about TV news. But 47 percent was enough to put Rather ten points ahead of Ted Koppel, eleven points ahead of Mike Wallace, and twelve points ahead of Tom Brokaw in the photo-identification game. Using name recognition as a second test, Rather beat out every active network newsperson.

Among those who recognize Rather's face, his approval score is much higher —fifteen points higher on credibility, for example. Because he is most visible, he is more popular. So, in part, the public prefers Rather in the same way that today's Democrats prefer Gary Hart and today's Republicans prefer George Bush. To know is usually to like, at least a little.

Public esteem for Rather may have a second root. He is incredibly credible, and credibility means favorability. Eighty-one percent of the nation give Rather an excellent or a good grade for his believability. Only 2 percent flunk him outright. In fact, 89 percent of those expressing an opinion give him high grades for believability. On a list of eighteen famous news personalities, Rather ranks second highest in credibility, losing out only to Walter Cronkite, anchorman emeritus.

Dan Rather not only trounces his colleagues, he also wallops Ronald Reagan. The anchorman garnered 12 percentage points more "A" grades than Reagan; Rather also suffered fewer failing marks —11 percentage points fewer failures on believability. If forced to decide, I'd say that the public thinks Rather is believable because they like him, and not the other way around. But no matter which way causation is flowing, it leads to the same place—a place that Rather could easily think of as home.

I don't want to leave the impression that Rather is one of a kind. He isn't, really. The relative advantage he enjoys does not mean his competition is in trouble. Every national news personality and major news source received good marks for credibility. Rather is first in his class, but the Gallup evidence implies that the public thinks it's a classy crowd all around. The Rather image is particularly hard to tarnish, but the entire news industry seems to be running well ahead of its recent press coverage: Jesse Helms, Ted Turner, Grenada, Bitburg, the hostage crisis in Lebanon—press crises all. Yet none seems to have hurt Rather or his profession much.

Part of the explanation has to be that the public doesn't listen well to news about the press. Only 19 percent of the Times Mirror sample knew that Jesse Helms was after CBS and Dan Rather. Seventy-three percent could not tell the Gallup people which news organization William Westmoreland sued for libel. Dan Rather, CBS, and every other news outfit do better in public opinion than critics imagine because critics imagine that the American people are paying attention to press-related news. They probably aren't. In general, Americans don't care about news about the news.

In the end, nobody knows why Rather does better than his peers at pleasing the public. Maybe it's his smile; maybe it's the CBS mystique rubbing off on him; maybe it's his longer tenure in office; maybe he does a better job.

Nobody can tell what CBS would do if Rather lost some of his apparent magic. What we do know is that Dan Rather, favorite target of an organized minority and sometimes his own enemy, has been able to hold his audience and his place as number one. In that he's a lot like President "You-know-who."

Teflon Ron they call him. But Teflon coats much of American politics. Reagan and Rather both seem to have an invisible shield that helps deflect bad news and bad press. We've always known that Reagan could protect his Gallup ratings and that Rather was doing well in the Nielsens. Now we know that Teflon Dan also does quite well with his Gallup ratings too, even in the age of "Fairness in Media."

Reagan and Rather: there has to be a common denominator in there someplace, even if it isn't their philosophy. Find the common thread and you might be able to earn $1.5 million reporting the news or carry forty-nine states in the Electoral College. Maybe, if you're really smart, you could do both. ▽

"What'll it be—the Nightly News with Tom Brokaw, the Evening News with Dan Rather, World News Tonight with Peter Jennings, or, the heck with it, a Martini with a twist?"

Drawing by C. Barsotti; © 1985 *New Yorker* Magazine, Inc.

Americans and the Oil Companies: Tentative Tolerance in a Time of Plenty

by Edward Byers and Thomas B. Fitzpatrick

The energy crisis appears for the moment to have gone the way of disco music and other fleeting phenomena of the 1970s. Less than 1 percent of the American people named energy as one of the top problems facing the country in a Fall 1985 national survey, conducted by Cambridge Reports as part of its quarterly public opinion research program. Against a backdrop of relatively stable fuel prices and plentiful supplies, the issue that gripped our attention and governed our lives twice in the past decade has been replaced by the more immediate problems of the federal budget deficit, tax reform, and relations with the Soviet Union.

A few oil company executives, among others, are attempting to rouse the American public from its understandable complacency. Allen Murray, president and chief operating officer of Mobil, warns of an "impending energy crisis." Writing in the "My Turn" column of *Newsweek*, Murray insists that the nation is "headed for another round of energy shortages. Certainly by the end of the century. Possibly well before then." With the world awash in oil and the once-arrogant OPEC in a shambles, Murray's warning is greeted with "raised eyebrows and skeptical sneers." Although public attitudes toward the oil companies and energy development have undergone fundamental changes since the first energy crisis a decade ago, the reactions to Murray's forecast reflect—as we shall see—a persistent, underlying American attitude. Oil industry executives and others who worry about the nation being caught off guard by another energy crisis have good reason to be concerned.

Concern about Energy

When Cambridge Reports began its syndicated national public opinion research program at the end of 1974, Americans were only mildly worried about energy, despite the traumas of the 1973-1974 oil embargo. Fewer than 10 percent named the energy situation as one of the two most important problems facing the country. They were, in fact, more concerned about inflation. President Carter's aggressive attempt to delineate a national energy policy in 1977 did awaken energy worries, and during that year energy and inflation concerned Americans equally—each was cited as a top priority by approximately a third of those surveyed. But, by the end of 1978, just 13 percent placed the energy crisis in the top two, while 71 percent put inflation there.

The combined shocks of the Iranian revolution, a new round of OPEC price hikes, and the return of long gas lines in some parts of the country rekindled public anxieties in 1979, and by midyear energy outranked inflation on the public's list of national priorities. But with the first hint of the 1980-1982 recession, when oil surpluses were developing and energy prices were stabilizing, the public's attention shifted once again to other national problems, a pattern that was interrupted only briefly at the start of the Iran-Iraq war.

The Oil Industry Conspiracy

Throughout the protracted energy problems of the 1970s, Americans doubted there was a real oil and gasoline shortage stemming from a genuine depletion of natural resources. They believed that the oil shortages were contrived—a conspiracy manufactured by large oil companies. The argument that energy supplies were limited was seen not as an explanation for raising prices, but as an excuse used by oil companies to justify their desire for greater profits. In mid-1978 a solid majority felt world oil production either met or exceeded demand, and in an expression of skepticism that today seems prescient, 48 percent doubted the CIA's widely publicized projection of a major world oil shortage by the mid-1980s.

Other data reinforce even more pointedly the conclusion that Americans explained the energy problems of the 1970s with a conspiratorial view of oil company behavior. At the end of 1974, and repeatedly through mid-1978, roughly seven out of ten people agreed that "while there may be a shortage of oil and gas, the oil companies have conspired to make it worse in order to get higher prices." Over the same period, equally large majorities disagreed that "the oil companies are doing all they can to help solve the energy problem and should not be criticized so much." And table 1 reveals that between October 1979 and July 1981, roughly two-to-one majorities consistently thought whatever shortages existed were the result of oil company manipulations rather than any real depletion of petroleum resources.

Table 1
OIL SHORTAGE: REAL OR CREATED?

Question: Which of these two statements is closer to your opinion?

	Oct. 1979	Jan. 1980	Apr. 1980	July 1980	Oct. 1980	Jan. 1981	Apr. 1981	July 1981
There is a real shortage of petroleum in the world and we're just going to have to learn to live with less gasoline	36%	28%	27%	34%	28%	26%	25%	25%
There is plenty of petroleum in the world; the only reason we're having oil shortages is that the oil companies want an excuse to raise prices	54	61	59	58	60	64	64	65

Note: "Don't know" not shown.
Source: Surveys by Cambridge Reports, latest that of July 1981.

Energy Attitudes in a Time of Plenty

Fears of recurring oil shortages have receded substantially over the past few years. The proportion of people in the 1980s who think the nation will experience "things like gasoline shortages, sharply higher prices, and oil supply disruptions" has shrunk from 60 percent in 1981 to 49 percent in 1985, and 47 percent now agree that "the present oil surplus and the lowering of world oil prices show that the problems of oil shortages and skyrocketing oil prices are behind us."

Despite the skepticism of the 1970s, a strikingly positive shift in attitudes toward the oil companies has accompanied the energy abundance of the 1980s. Between 1980 and 1985, the oil industry's overall ratings nearly reversed, from 67 percent generally negative at the start of the decade to 52 percent generally positive at the beginning of this year. Viewed in isolation, these data appear to be welcome news for the industry. But other data provide a different picture. The current calm on the energy front does not mean the oil industry can relax.

Recent survey results indicate a lingering resentment of big oil. In January 1985, 67 percent of the population agreed that "the oil companies are just waiting for a chance to create another oil shortage so they can increase their prices again like they did in the 1970s." And as late as January 1984, when we asked Americans to state in their own words what caused the energy problems of the 1970s, over a third of the population blamed profit-hungry oil companies or felt the crisis was a hoax by the oil industry to raise prices. These responses had jumped nine percentage points from the preceding year.

To understand what form this lingering public resentment of the oil industry might take should another crisis occur, we must examine the changes that have taken place in American attitudes toward energy development and energy conservation.

Changing Attitudes toward Energy Development

Since the public tended to define the energy crisis of the late 1970s as a problem of increasing fuel prices rather than limited world energy supplies, their support for energy development measures revolved around their perceptions of the costs involved—to the consumer and to our environment. Our data showed a consistently strong preference for controlling fuel prices and running the risks of shortages at some future date, as opposed to putting up with higher prices as part of a longer-term solution to supply problems.

A tariff on imported oil was, for example, consistently opposed between mid-1976 and the end of 1981, even "if it would end our dependence on foreign oil" (see table 2). The public also regularly favored rationing over higher prices. By contrast, large majorities supported energy development alternatives that were perceived as costing them little. Until the Three Mile Island accident, most Americans favored building additional nuclear power plants. Large majorities also liked the idea of creating a federal oil reserve, forming a national energy corporation, and offshore drilling for oil and natural gas.

Environmental concerns played a part in all of this, too. Beginning in 1976, majorities or pluralities consistently opposed "increasing strip mining for coal, even

Table 2
IMPOSING IMPORTED OIL TARIFF

Question: Do you favor or oppose a tariff—tax—on imported oil that would raise the price of gasoline 10 cents to 15 cents per gallon, if it would end our dependence on foreign oil?

	Favor	Oppose
April 1976	32%	56%
October 1976	30	52
April 1977	39	50
October 1977	37	51
April 1978	35	48
October 1978	30	55
April 1979	40	45
October 1979	52	35
April 1980	38	52
October 1980	45	43
April 1981	37	52
October 1981	36	53

Note: "Don't know" not shown.
Source: Surveys by Cambridge Reports, latest that of October 1981.

if it damages the environment" (see table 3), and "converting electric utilities to burn coal, even if coal burning means dirtier air." Support for offshore oil drilling was based both on the remoteness of that form of development—Americans preferred the waters off Alaska to any other sites for future drilling—and on exceedingly high expectations about the energy supplies that offshore drilling would produce.

Americans' reluctance to accept higher prices as an incentive for production and as a disincentive to consumption was intertwined with their attitudes toward the oil industry. It is possible, for example, that had the public believed world energy supplies were limited, they might have been more willing to forgive the oil companies for rising fuel prices and more willing to put up with those prices for the sake of stimulating domestic energy resource development.

But Americans were cynical about what oil companies would do with the additional revenues, and they believed that greed would keep prices up, even if supplies increased. The responses to an open-ended question in mid-1978 revealed that very few people—9 percent—expected the additional money from higher gasoline prices to be applied to energy research, exploration, or development. By far the largest group saw the extra money ending up either in the hands of government, where it would probably be "wasted," or in the hands of the oil industry, where it would "increase profits." Similarly, at the end of 1978, only 16 percent of the population found a lot of truth in the statement that natural gas price decontrol would "encourage exploration for natural gas and thus increase natural gas supplies by the middle of the 1980s."

Only during the peak of public anxiety about energy problems in 1979 did the American people briefly react kindly to policies described as discouraging consumption or stimulating exploration. As overall concern about energy rose and fell, so too did support for energy development solutions that imposed a cost, either in dollars or in damage to the environment. Thus, in 1979, for the first and only time in our data series, support for a tariff on imported oil rose to a majority, and opposition to increased strip-mining and coal conversion for electric utilities declined markedly. As worries about energy declined through 1979 and into 1980, attitudes toward these potential solutions quickly returned to their earlier negative patterns.

Table 3

STRIP MINING AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Question: Do you favor or oppose increasing strip-mining even if it damages the environment?

	Favor	Oppose
October 1976	20%	61%
April 1977	34	51
October 1977	28	58
April 1978	25	58
October 1978	27	56
April 1979	38	47
October 1979	43	45
April 1980	42	42
October 1980	44	41
April 1981	33	54
October 1981	32	54
April 1982	31	60
October 1982	29	59
April 1983	25	65
October 1983	26	60
January 1984	26	62
January 1985	19	69

Note: "Don't know" not shown.

Source: Surveys by Cambridge Reports, latest that of January 1985.

The Current Climate

With the decline of concern about the nation's energy problems and the improved economic picture, attitudes toward the environment have been increasingly shaping opinions on energy issues. Since 1981 roughly three-to-one majorities have opposed strip-mining for coal and the construction of more nuclear power plants—both seen as potential threats to the environment. In the past, the more serious a person judged the energy situation to be (as measured on a 10-point seriousness scale), the more likely he was to support such energy development alternatives. Today, opposition to these alternatives cuts across all levels of concern about the energy situation. Majorities continue to favor both offshore drilling and energy exploration of publicly owned wilderness lands, though support has declined decidedly over the past two years.

More generally, the public is divided on whether protecting the environment or ensuring sufficient supplies of energy should be the country's primary consideration when developing new energy sources. In fact those people who rate the nation's energy problems as very serious are *more* likely than others to emphasize the environment over sufficient supplies of energy. Thus, those who are paying attention to warnings about future energy problems are the very people who are likely to be most opposed to increased energy development.

Attitudes toward Conservation

Initially, the American people were skeptical about the usefulness of conservation practices, particularly the likelihood that they as individuals could make a difference. In 1977 and 1978, only a five-to-four majority disagreed that "conservation is a good alternative, but frankly, there is not much I can personally do about it." People were also reluctant to alter longstanding behavior in order to reduce energy consumption. In mid-1979, at the height of public concern about energy problems, only a slim plurality of Americans reported they had cut down on the amount of driving they did, for example.

Again, we saw clear evidence that these attitudes were rooted in people's fundamental views about the nature and cause of the country's energy problems. Those who believed there were no real shortages of energy supplies—that whatever shortages existed resulted from oil company manipulation—were hesitant to embrace conservation. Reflecting these attitudes, the vast majority of Americans in mid-1978 believed business was consuming more or about the same amount of energy as five years earlier; at the same time, people thought they personally had cut back significantly.

Nonetheless, the experience of making practical adjustments to the energy problems of the late 1970s engendered a deep and unwavering commitment to conservation on the part of the American public. At the beginning of 1981, close to three out of four people claimed to be doing more to conserve energy than they had a few years earlier, and almost half believed they could be doing even more. At the end of the same year, 41 percent of the population said they would be very likely to invest $1,000 in energy-saving improvements if they could be assured of regaining their investment in three years' time, and another 25 percent said they would be somewhat likely to make such an investment. Belief in the effectiveness of conservation became so prevalent that by the end of 1981 conservation was given more importance as a cause of the developing oil surpluses than either increased exploration or the actions of the OPEC countries.

At first, this commitment to conservation existed despite the persistent view that it more than anything else involved personal sacrifice. In January 1981, for example, a majority responded to an open-ended question about the meaning of conservation by mentioning ideas such as using less energy, driving less, or lowering thermostats. And when asked whether they thought conservation meant using less energy—an idea that connotes sacrifice—or increasing energy efficiency, a substantial minority chose the former.

By 1984, our data showed that the public was beginning to subscribe to a more sophisticated view of conservation. In October 1984, 65 percent—a dramatic 14-percentage point jump from the previous year—identified energy conservation with the idea of increased efficiency rather than using less energy (see table 4). And, unlike the past, there were no significant differences among income and educational groups on this issue. Since we first started asking this question in January 1981, those people who associate conservation with energy efficiency have been noticeably more likely than those who associate it with reduced energy consumption to say they could increase their conservation efforts.

Table 4

DEFINITION OF ENERGY CONSERVATION

Question: In general, do you think the words "energy conservation" mean using less energy or using energy more efficiently?

	Using less energy	Both	Using energy more efficiently
January 1981	30%	21%	46%
October 1982	20	25	54
October 1983	21	26	51
October 1984	15	17	65

Note: "Don't know" not shown.

Source: Surveys by Cambridge Reports, latest that of October 1984.

There are signs, however, that many people—particularly lower-income people—may feel they are reaching the practical limits of conservation. Overall, 59 percent of the population still claimed in October 1984 that they were doing more to conserve than in the past, but this represents a drop from 73 percent of the population reporting an increased effort to conserve in early 1981. And only among people with household incomes over $20,000 do we find majorities saying they could be doing more to conserve; among those earning less, the majority view is that they are already doing all they can.

An Uncertain Energy Future

Should the energy shortages and skyrocketing fuel prices of the 1970s repeat themselves in the coming years, the pattern of public attitudes we have just outlined will present some serious potential hazards for oil company executives and government officials alike. The strong and persistent belief that large oil companies manufactured the energy problems of the 1970s for their own benefit may lead to a rapid and stronger public condemnation of oil companies if such a crisis recurs. Moreover, the American people's view that they have made significant efforts to conserve energy—indeed, that they may be reaching the practical limits of their conservation efforts—is likely to intensify their frustration and anger in any future energy crisis.

The changes in attitudes toward energy development we have outlined—particularly the heightened public sensitivity to environmental issues—also suggest that it might be much more difficult than in the past to win popular support for massive new energy development efforts, even in the face of price and supply disruptions.

The oil industry seems to recognize its vulnerability on this issue, as the column by Allen Murray suggests. In a recent *New York Times* interview, another oil company executive, John F. Bookout of Shell, was asked why the industry was warning the country not to be too complacent about future energy supplies. Bookout responded:

> It is a matter of self-interest and also national interest. The industry learned a lesson from the 1970s. We were largely silent about the dangers of dependency before, and when the embargo hit, we came in for a lot of blame. We want to get the message across that the country should not put off until tomorrow what it should be doing today.

The data discussed here indicate that if the message is to be convincing, it will have to take into account the American people's growing worries about the environmental impact of energy development alternatives and their skepticism about past shortages. This kind of public education task, while difficult, is worth undertaking now, since experience has shown that it is easier to enlighten the public on important issues when these issues are not the stuff of front-page, "crisis" headlines.

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

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HOW MUCH RISK? AN EVALUATION OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES

When the Space Shuttle Challenger disintegrated last January, it transformed one of our proudest accomplishments into one of our biggest tragedies. The suddenness of its demise forced us to realize once again that—no matter what precautions we take—the world and beyond remains a dangerous place.

There is no right or wrong in assessing risk, so our days involve a series of decisions about just how much danger each situation entails and how much danger we are willing to allow into our lives. Flying, driving, smoking, gambling, even walking around one's own neighborhood after dark involve taking risks. A few people even believe that doing housework is "very risky," and fully 50 percent think that jogging involves at least some risk.

In the following pages we look at the risks encountered in daily life and we examine fears about crime, health, and the environment, with special attention to nuclear power. From there, we broaden our inquiry to include general assessments of the benefits and risks inherent in science and technology, including the space shuttle. Finally, we look at the public's notion of who is and should be responsible when things go wrong—individuals, corporations, or the government.

There are some interesting differences among demographic groups. Attitudes toward risk consistently differentiate the sexes, for example, with women being more risk averse than men.

Question: Would you say that people are subject to more risk today than they were 20 years ago, less risk today, or about the same amount of risk today as 20 years ago?



Note: Sample size = 1,488. Differences by race are: 79% said more, 6% less, 15% same (whites); 91% more, 3% less, 6% same (blacks).

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates for Marsh and McLennan, December 17-27, 1979 and January 2, 1980.

RISK CHECK LIST

Question: After I read each of these activities, please tell me how risky you think that activity is—very risky, somewhat risky, not very risky, or not risky at all?



Note: Sample size = 1,255. "It depends" (volunteered) was calculated out. It never exceeded 2%.

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates for the Insurance Information Institute, August 4-21, 1983.

LIFE AS A RISKY BUSINESS

Question: Which of these five statements comes closest to how you personally would describe cigarette smoking? Is it . . .?



Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, September 19-23, 1985.

Question: Do you feel your money is absolutely safe (in the credit union or savings and loan institution or bank where you have your account) or not?



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, May 28-June 2, 1985.

Question: Everybody has fears about different things. But some are more afraid of certain things than others. Sometimes people fear things more than perhaps they should logically. I'm going to read a list of some of these fears. For each one, would you say whether you're afraid of it, whether it bothers you slightly, or whether you're not at all afraid of it. . . . Being alone in a house at night.



Note: There were substantial differences on this question by sex: only 1% of men were afraid of being alone in a house at night while 8% of women were; 6% of men compared to 26% of women were "bothered slightly"; 93% of men and 65% of women were not at all afraid.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 84-3), February 11-25, 1984.

Question: People feel differently about using seat belts in automobiles. Some feel they are useful and important. Others feel they are dangerous or confining. Which of these statements comes closest to describing *your* use of seat belts in cars? (Card shown respondent)



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 85-6), latest that of June 15-22, 1985.

Question: In your opinion, are there substantial risks with using the birth control pill?



Note: Sample size = 1,036 women and 520 men. The national figures were 70% "substantial risks," 25% "no."

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, January 14-February 10, 1985.

Question: Here is a list of some different things. (Card shown respondent) If you had to have two of those within ten miles of here, which two would you be least willing to have?

Would be least willing to have within ten miles of here...



Note: Adds to more than 100% due to multiple responses. "Don't know" not shown = 2%.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 82-4), March 20-27, 1982.

ASSESSING CRIME FEARS

Question: Is there any area around here—that is, within a mile—where you would be afraid to walk alone at night?



Note: Not all years asked are shown. 1973 = 41%, 1976 = 44%, 1977 = 45%, 1982 = 47%, 1984 = 42%.

Source: Surveys by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, latest that of February-April, 1985.

Question: On a different topic, how safe do you feel when you are alone at night on your neighborhood streets? Do you feel . . . very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe, very unsafe, don't know?



Note: The 1981 ABC News/*Washington Post* figures are virtually identical to the 1982 figures shown above. In January 1986, ABC News/*Washington Post* interviewers asked the question of blacks only. The results were 28% very safe, 35% somewhat safe, 20% somewhat unsafe, and 16% very unsafe.

Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, December 7-8, 1982.

THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF FEAR

Concrete Fear

The Index of Concrete Fear is comprised of six items:
—Being murdered
—Being sexually assaulted or raped
—Being mugged
—Being knifed
—Being beaten up
—Being held up by an armed robber

Formless Fear

The Index of Formless Fear is comprised of six items:
—Being out alone during the day in the central business district or main shopping center
—Being out alone at night in the central business district or main shopping center
—Being out alone during the day in the neighborhood
—Being out alone at night in the neighborhood
—Being alone at home during the day
—Being alone at home at night



Source: Survey by Research and Forecasts, Inc., conducted for A-T-O, Inc. *The Figgie Report on Fear of Crime: America Afraid*, May 1-9, 1980.

HEALTHY FEARS?

Question: What disease or illness do you, yourself, fear the most?



Note: Adds to more than 100% due to multiple responses. "Miscellaneous" and "Don't know" not shown = 7% combined.
Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, August 13-15, 1985.

Question: Some people have said that for certain products where the risk of side effects or developing cancer are low, the government should not ban the products entirely, but instead should require a warning of the possible dangers printed on them so people could decide for themselves whether the benefit to them outweighs the risk. I'm going to name some of these types of products, and for each one would you tell me whether you think it should be banned by the government so that no one can use it, or should carry a warning of the dangers so people can decide for themselves whether to use it or not? First . . .



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 85-7), July 13-20, 1985.

FEARS OF FLYING

Question: Would you be afraid to travel on some international flights because of the danger of hijacking or terrorism—or do you think the danger is so small that you would not be afraid?



Note: Sample size = 1,208. The TWA highjacking occurred on June 14, 1985.
Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, June 30-July 1, 1985.

Question: If a friend were planning a trip abroad this year, would you suggest cancelling the trip because of terrorism, or not?



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, January 19-23, 1986.

INTERNATIONAL RISKS

Question: When it comes to the situation in Central America, are you more worried about the United States getting involved in a war there, or more worried about a Communist takeover in that area?



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, May 28-June 2, 1985.

Question: How often do you worry about the possibility of nuclear war? Do you worry about it a great deal of the time, or often, or seldom, or do you hardly ever worry about the possibility of nuclear war?



Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, November 1-7, 1985.

Question: In your opinion, would developing this system ("Star Wars," a space-based defense against nuclear attack) make the world safer from nuclear destruction, or less safe?



Note: Asked only of those who said they had followed the Star Wars discussion very or fairly closely = 61%.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, October 11-14, 1985.

ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS

Question: Here are some things that environmentalists have said are problems for us. (Card shown respondent) Would you read down that list, and then tell me for each one whether you think it is one of our most serious environmental problems, or not more serious than other environmental problems, or one of our least serious environmental problems? First, strip mining of coal, iron, copper, etc.



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 84-10), October 27-November 3, 1984.

Question: What do you think is the likelihood of such an accident (like that at a Union Carbide plant in India in which more than 2,000 people recently died) happening in this country? Would you say that it is . . .



Note: Sample is registered voters who had heard of accident in Bhopal = 96%.

Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, December 10-24, 1984.

NUCLEAR POWER

Question: On another subject, would you describe yourself as a supporter of nuclear power plants as a means of providing electricity, an opponent of nuclear power plants, or haven't you made up your mind on nuclear power plants?



Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, January 11-16, 1985.

Question: There have been a number of proposals for ways to reduce the risks of nuclear power plants. I'd like to ask you whether you favor or oppose each of them, bearing in mind that each one would either increase the cost or reduce the supply of electricity to some extent. Would you favor . . . or don't you think the risks and costs justify that?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 83-6), June 4-11, 1983

THE SPACE PROGRAM: RISKS AND REWARDS

Question: Given the costs and risks involved in space exploration, do you think the space shuttle is worth continuing, or not?



Note: Sample size = 1,120. There were significant differences on this question by sex. Among the men 93% thought the shuttle was worth continuing compared to only 78% of the women. Only 7% of the men thought the shuttle was not worth continuing, compared to 22% of the women. Support for the space shuttle program has increased despite the Challenger accident. NBC News found that 72% of those surveyed thought the space shuttle program was a good investment in 1981, 77% in 1985, and 79% in February 1986.

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, January 30-31, 1986.

Question: Some people say that only trained astronauts should go into space because it is dangerous and there is not much room on the shuttle. Others say that if teachers, congressmen, and journalists go too, they can help explain the program for the benefit of all of us. Do you think only astronauts should go on shuttle flights, or should civilians be allowed to go too?



Note: Sample size = 1,120. Boys nine to seventeen said other people should be allowed to travel in space (84%); 79% of girls did.

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, January 30-31, 1986.

Question: If you had a chance in your lifetime to travel into outer space, would you do so, or not?



Note: Sample size = 1,120. A 1981 question by NBC News found that 57% would not travel into space, while 43% would. When asked after the shuttle explosion, 56% said they would not travel into space, 44% [illegible] they would.

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, January 30-31,

Question: If you had a chance when you're older to travel into outer space, would you go, or not?



Note: Sample size = 223 children between the ages of 9 and 17.

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, January 30-31, 1986.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Question: Before the accident, was your confidence in science and technological ability quite high, or rather low, or somewhere in between?



Note: Sample size = 1,003.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for *U.S. News & World Report*, January 29-30, 1986.

Question: Does this week's space shuttle accident shake your faith in science and technology, or is your degree of confidence in science and technology the same now as it was before the accident?



Note: Sample size = 1,003.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for *U.S. News & World Report*, January 29-30, 1986.

Question: All in all, if you had to say, in the past, do you think science and technology did more good than harm for the human race, or more harm than good?



Note: Sample size = 1,256.

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates for Southern New England Telephone, September 1-11, 1983.

Question: Let me ask you about some scientific and technological developments from the past. For each, tell me if you feel that development made the quality of life a lot better for people such as yourself, somewhat better, or made the quality of life somewhat worse, or a lot worse?

Now, let me ask you about some more recent developments. For each, from what you know or have heard, do you think it will make the quality of life a lot better for people such as yourself, somewhat better, make it somewhat worse, or a lot worse?



Note: Sample size = 1,256.

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates for Southern New England Telephone, September 1-11, 1983.

Question: And, in the future, over the next twenty years, if you had to say, do you think science and technology will do more good than harm for the human race, or more harm than good?



Note: Sample size = 1,256.

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates for Southern New England Telephone, September 1-11, 1983.

Question: Many things in our society have both good and bad effects. For example, aviation is good because it provides fast transportation. It is bad because it has caused a number of deaths. Here is a list of things that have resulted in both good and bad effects. (Card shown respondent) Would you read down that list, and for each one tell me whether, on balance, you think the good effects outweigh the bad, or whether the bad effects outweigh the good? First . . .



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 85-4), March 23-30, 1985.

HANDLING RISK TODAY: WHO'S RESPONSIBLE

Question: How much control do you feel you have over the risks faced in daily living: almost complete control, or not much control, or hardly any control over the risks faced in daily living?



Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, December 5-12, 1985.

Question: If you had to choose, who do you think should be principally responsible for ensuring an acceptably safe society for the future—the business community, government, or the individual?



Note: Sample size = 1,047.

Source: Survey by Research and Forecasts, Inc., conducted for A-T-O, Inc. *The Figgie Report on Fear of Crime: America Afraid*, May 1-9, 1980.

Question: I'm going to read some situations that involve personal injury and product usage. For each situation please tell me who you feel should have primary financial responsibility for the injury—the consumer, the manufacturer, or shared responsibility?



Note: Sample size = 1,047.

Source: Survey by Research and Forecasts, Inc., conducted for A-T-O, Inc. *The Figgie Report on Fear of Crime: America Afraid*, May 1-9, 1980.

Question: The following situations concern industrial risks and worker safety. For each situation, please tell me who you feel should have the primary financial responsibility for the injury or disease—the employee, the employer, or shared responsibility?



Note: Sample size = 1,047.

Source: Survey by Research and Forecasts, Inc., conducted for A-T-O, Inc. *The Figgie Report on Fear of Crime: America Afraid*, May 1-9, 1980.

Question: I'm going to read some questions about individual responsibility and risk in society. For each one, please tell me whether you tend to agree or disagree.



Note: Sample size = 1,488.

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates for Marsh and McLennan, December 17-27, 1979 and January 2, 1980.

Question: I would like to read you some statements people have made about various household and personal risks. For each statement please tell me whether you tend to agree or disagree.



Note: Sample size = 1,488.

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates for Marsh and McLennan, December 17-27, 1979 and January 2, 1980.

EXPORTING AMERIC

America's influence around the world can be measured in hundreds of ways. We can count missiles and warships, chart the value of the dollar, or gauge the political power of the President and Congress. But we can also look at the export of American culture and products. In this issue, we do just that. Tim Page looks at the influence of American music, John

McDonald's restaurants:

1,926 restaurants in 41 countries, not including the United States.

Japan	532
Canada	491
West Germany	227
United Kingdom	197
Australia	164
Netherlands	37
Brazil	31
Hong Kong	27
France	25
New Zealand	21
Sweden	19
Austria	15
Singapore	14
Spain	14
Switzerland	12
Puerto Rico	11
Philippines	10
Taiwan	10
Belgium	8
Malaysia	8
Denmark	7
Ireland	7
Panama	6
Bahamas	3
Costa Rica	3
Curacao	3
El Salvador	3
Guatemala	3
Virgin Islands	3
Finland	2
Guam	2
Mexico	2
Andorra	1
Aruba	1
Bermuda	1
Italy	1
Luxembourg	1
Nicaragua	1
Norway	1
Thailand	1
Venezuela	1

Source: McDonald's, as of December 31, 1985

Best Sellers

Manila, Philippines
(January 11-February 10, 1986)

1. *Iacocca* by Lee Iacocca with William Novak
2. *If Tomorrow Comes* by Sidney Sheldon
3. *The Sicilian* by Mario Puzo
5. *In Search of Excellence* by Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman
6. *Strong Medicine* by Arthur Hailey

Source: National Book Store, published in *Asiaweek*.

Fulbright Scholarships

Countries: 120
Scholarships: Over 3,500 per year
Total foreign participation (1949-1985): 99,414
Total U.S. participation (1949-1985): 52,957

Source: Board of Foreign Scholarships

Major World Figures Attending/Graduating American Universities

Nicolas Ardito Barletta
President of Panama
University of Chicago

Birendra Bir Bickram Shah Dev
King of Nepal
Harvard University

Jacques Chirac
Prime Minister of France
Harvard University

Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado
President of Mexico
Harvard University

Jose Napoleon Duarte
President of El Salvador
Notre Dame

Manuel Esquivel
Prime Minister of Belize
Loyola University

Jean-Andre Francois-Poncet
Minister of Foreign Affairs, France (1978-1981)
Wesleyan University
Fletcher School of Diplomacy
Stanford University

Evilio Javier
Late Campaign Director for Corazon Aquino
Harvard University

Sheikh Hamed bin Isa al-Khalifa
Crown Prince of Bahrain
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Lho Shin-young
Prime Minister of South Korea
Kentucky State University

Nalumino Mundia
Prime Minister of Zambia (1981-1985)
Atlanta University, Georgia

Dr. Yeo Ning Hong
Minister of Communications and Defense
Singapore
Stanford University

Olof Palme
Late Prime Minister of Sweden
Kenyon College

Andreas Papandreou
Prime Minister of Greece
Harvard University, taught at University of Minnesota, Northwestern University, University of California

Shimon Peres
Prime Minister of Israel
New York University
Harvard University

Edward Seaga
Prime Minister of Jamaica
Harvard University

Pierre Trudeau
Ex-Prime Minister of Canada
Harvard University

Rt. Hon. Shirley Williams
President of Social Democratic Party, England
Columbia University

Kuo-Hwa Yu
Prime Minister of Taiwan
Harvard Graduate School

Source: *The International Who's Who* 1985-86, Europa Publications Limited

INTERPLAST

(A program that sends American reconstructive and plastic surgeons abroad.)

Countries to which INTERPLAST doctors have gone:

Mexico, Peru, Honduras, Colombia, Ecuador, Western Samoa, Lesotho, Jamaica, Philippines

Source: INTERPLAST, as of March 1986

A HERE AND ABROAD

Russonello at the export of political campaign technology, Jack Valenti at our movies and television programs. In the pages that follow, we have pulled together data that show the diversity of our exports. What does all of this say about America? On page 2, Richard Grenier provides some insights.

Number of foreign students studying in the United States



Note: In the 1983-1984 academic year, the number of institutions reporting foreign students was 2,498.

Source: Institute for International Education, latest that of 1985.

Best Sellers

Singapore
(January 11-February 10, 1986)

1. *Iacocca* by Lee Iacocca with William Novak
3. *The Sicilian* by Mario Puzo

Source: MPH Bookstores, published in *Asiaweek*

COUNTRIES BUYING NBC FEED OF SUPER BOWL XX

Australia
Bahamas
Bermuda
Canada
Chile
Costa Rica
Dhubai
Great Britain
France
Guatemala
Holland
Honduras
Hong Kong
Indonesia
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Kuwait
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Philippines
Saudi Arabia
South Korea
Spain
Thailand
Venezuela

Total: 28

Source: NBC sports division

Ford Motor Company

Ford has active manufacturing, assembly, and sales operations in 28 countries that distribute products to 150 countries through a global network of 10,700 dealers.

Source: Ford Motor Company, as of August 8, 1985

International Executive Service Corps

Founded: 1950

Scope: Sends retired executive volunteers to third world and developing countries to assist local private enterprise with managerial or technical expertise. Over 600 projects were completed in 1985. Since its founding, 10,000 projects have been undertaken in 82 countries.

Portion of *The Economist*'s newshole devoted to American news:

Issue date:	
February 7, 1986	19%
February 14, 1986	12
February 21, 1986	13
February 28, 1986	12

Note: Editorials, book reviews and letters to the editor have been excluded from this count.

Source: American Enterprise Institute calculation.

Portion of *Paris Match*'s newshole devoted to American news:

Issue date:	
January 31, 1986	13%
February 7, 1986	18
February 14, 1986	9

Source: American Enterprise Institute calculation.

SISTER CITIES INTERNATIONAL

Year	U.S. Cities	Foreign Cities
1956	50-60	50-60
1961	165	165
1965	305	305
1971	366	444
1976	602	781
1981	683	917
1986	752	1225

Note: Total number of foreign countries participating = 84

Source: Sister Cities International, latest that of January 1986.



FOREIGN ARRIVALS IN THE UNITED STATES 1960-1984



Note: Of the 20 million arrivals in 1984, 53% were from Canada, 11% from Mexico, 14% from Europe, and 10% from Asia. The remaining 11% came from other areas of the world.

Source: United States Travel and Tourism Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.

Cigarettes sold in 1985

Camel:

Germany	11 billion
France	4 billion
Holland	2 billion
Italy	1.5 billion

Winston:

Spain	6.5 billion
Puerto Rico	3 billion
Canary Islands	1 billion

Salem:

Germany	900 million
Malaysia	600 million
Singapore	550 million
Japan	500 million

Source: R. J. Reynolds Tobacco, as of December 31, 1985.

Best Sellers

Canada
(Early March)

Fiction

1. *The Mammoth Hunters* by Jean Auel
2. *Texas* by James Michener
6. *Contact* by Carl Sagan
7. *Secrets* by Danielle Steel

Nonfiction

4. *Iacocca* by Lee Iacocca with William Novak
6. *Dancing in the Light* by Shirley MacLaine
7. *Yeager* by Chuck Yeager with Leo Janos
10. *Elvis and Me* by Priscilla Presley with Sandra Harmon

Source: *Macleans*, Canada.

THE PEACE CORPS



Of the twenty countries surveyed by UNESCO, nine send a majority of their students who study abroad to the United States. They are:

Saudi Arabia	86%
Canada	84
China*	78
Japan	75
Venezuela	73
India	70
Iran	69
Nigeria	69
Hong Kong	53

Note: *Includes Taiwan.

Three countries send a plurality of their students who study abroad to the United States. They are:

Lebanon	32%
Jordan	31
United Kingdom	31

Source: Survey by UNESCO, 1979, published in *UNESCO Statistical Yearbook*, 1982.

Peace Corps

	Countries	Volunteers			
Year		Inter-American	NANEAP*	Africa	Total
1961	7	80	—	44	124
1962	35	823	1,178	779	2,816
1963	47	2,194	2,222	2,230	6,646
1964	48	3,986	2,570	3,522	10,078
1965	48	4,904	4,198	4,146	13,248
1966	52	5,452	5,518	4,640	15,556
1967	66	5,038	5,820	4,110	14,968
1968	67	4,486	5,599	3,738	13,823
1969	68	3,362	4,483	3,386	12,131
1970	69	3,096	3,642	2,775	9,513
1971	69	2,401	1,943	2,722	7,066
1972	66	1,819	2,837	2,238	6,894
1973	68	2,199	2,672	2,483	7,341
1974	70	2,613	2,772	2,659	8,044
1975	70	1,997	2,509	2,509	7,015
1976	68	1,717	2,060	2,181	5,958
1977	66	1,838	1,859	2,055	5,752
1978	63	2,170	2,442	2,460	7,072
1979	65	1,904	2,023	2,401	6,328
1980	62	1,728	1,802	2,464	5,994
1981	62	1,484	1,562	2,399	5,445
1982	59	1,419	1,563	2,298	5,380
1983	60	1,524	1,489	2,470	5,483
1984	60	1,621	1,616	2,462	5,699

Source: The Peace Corps. *NANEAP = North Africa, Near East, Asia and Pacific.

GETTING THE MESSAGE OUT

United States Information Agency
Founded: 1953
1986 budget: $837.33 million

Personnel:		
	1,103	Foreign Service Officers
	4,360	Domestic Employees
	3,900	Foreign Nationals
Total	9,363	

Foreign posts: 214 Countries: 129
Magazines: 15 in 18 languages

Voice of America
Hours of programming per week: 1,003.75
Languages: 42 including English
Estimated audience: 120 million

Radio Marti
Hours of programming per week: 119

Source: United States Information Agency

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
Hours of programming per week: 1,055
Languages: 21 East European and Soviet languages
Estimated audience: 50 million Eastern European and Soviet citizens

Source: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

Burger King restaurants:

Canada	128
Puerto Rico	52
Australia	39
West Germany	24
Spain	20
England	10
Venezuela	10
France	7
Singapore	7
Colombia	6
Japan	4
Panama	4
Switzerland	4
Denmark	3
Hong Kong	3
South Korea	3
Bahamas	3
Ireland	2
Ecuador	2
Malaysia	2
Sweden	1
Italy	1
Aruba	1
Grand Caymen	1
Jamaica	1
British West Indies	1
Netherlands	1

Source: Burger King, as of May 31, 1985

THE BIG THREE MAGAZINES

Time
Total foreign circulation: 1,336,000

Newsweek
Total foreign circulation: 1,007,000

Note: *Newsweek* is the first American newsweekly to publish in a forei
language, Japanese. Its first edition appeared in January 1986.

U.S. News and World Report
Total foreign circulation: 16,500

NEWSPAPERS

The Asian Wall Street Journal
Total foreign circulation: 29,295

The Wall Street Journal Europe
Total foreign circulation: 34,452

The Wall Street Journal
Total foreign circulation: 10,715

The New York Times
Average daily foreign circulation (Monday-Friday edition): 8,132
Average Sunday edition foreign circulation: 23,06

USA Today
Total foreign circulation: 26,300

Foreign correspondents in selected cities in the United States

District of Columbia: 550-600
New York City: 500
Los Angeles: 200
Miami: 100
Total: 1,400

Source: United States Information Agency, Foreign Press Center

Artistic Ambassador Program
Founded: 1983
The program has sent 17 American pianists to 41 different countries including the Soviet Union and China. Each of the 17 has played a newly commissioned piece of American music.

Source: United States Information Agency

Reader's Digest

Total foreign circulation: 12.4 million

Nike
(Beaverton, Oregon)

Pairs of Nike sport shoes exported in an eight-month period to:

Europe	4,996,000
Japan	1,349,000
Asia/Pacific (excluding Japan)	840,000

Source: Nike, for period June 1985-February 1986.

Best Sellers
Bangkok, Thailand
(January 11-February 10, 1986)

1. *What They Don't Teach You at Harvard Business School*, by Mark McCormack
4. *Iacocca* by Lee Iacocca with William Novak
5. *Lincoln* by Gore Vidal

Source: Duang Kamol Book House, published in *Asiaweek*.

Dunkin' Donuts shops:

Canada	78
Japan	62
South Korea	18
Thailand	15
Philippines	13
Colombia	4
Venezuela	3
Bahamas	2
Brazil	2
Panama	2
Singapore	2
Indonesia	1
Saudi Arabia	1
Taiwan	1

Source: Dunkin' Donuts, as of October 26, 1985

Best Sellers
Melbourne, Australia
(Third week of January 1986)

Fiction
2. *Cider House Rules* by John Irving
3. *Inside, Outside* by Herman Wouk
6. *Texas* by James Michener

Nonfiction
2. *Dancing in the Light* by Shirley MacLaine

Source: *The Age*, Melbourne, Australia

Best Sellers
West Germany
(March 10, 1986)

Fiction
3. *The Sicilian* by Mario Puzo

Nonfiction
4. *Iacocca* by Lee Iacocca with William Novak
6. *Amusing Ourselves to Death* by Neil Postman
7. *Godel, Escher, Bach* by Douglas Hofstadter

Source: *Der Spiegel*, March 10, 1986

EXCHANGE PROGRAMS

American Field Service International (AFS)
Founded: 1947
Focus: Academic/Cultural
Participation: (1985) 10,000 student exchanges among 70 countries.

Goethe House German American Partnership Program

Founded: 1972
Focus: Academic/Cultural
Participation: (1985) 362 partnerships between American and German high schools that exchange students for three- to four-week programs. 3,086 American students sent to Germany and 3,250 German students brought to America under their auspices.

Future Farmers of America
Founded: 1928
Focus: Academic/Cultural
Participation: (1985-1986) 150 Americans working on farms abroad and 200 foreigners working on American farms.

Operation Crossroads Africa
Founded: 1958
Focus: Cultural/Development projects
Participation: (1985) 90 high school students sent to the Caribbean region. 150 students at the university level and above sent to African countries. 209 professionals from Africa and the Caribbean region brought to the United States to study.

Amigos de las Americas
Founded: 1965
Focus: Public Health Projects
Participation: (1965-1985) 9,400 high school and university students have been sent to Mexico, Latin America, and the Caribbean.

The Experiment in International Living
Founded: 1932
Focus: Academic/Cultural
Participation: (1985) 900 high school students studied abroad and 400 college students participated in semester abroad programs.

Youth for Understanding
Founded: 1951
Focus: Academic/Cultural
Participation: (1985-1986) 2,500 American high school students sent abroad and 4,000 foreign high school students hosted here.

REAGAN AND HIS PREDECESSORS

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way (name of President) is handling his job as president?

APPROVAL

	Truman (4/45)	Eisenhower (1/53)	Kennedy (1/61)	Johnson (11/63)	Nixon (1/69)	Ford (8/74)	Carter (1/77)	Reagan (1/81)
Month took office	—	—	—	—	59%	71%	—	51%
After 1st month	—	68%	—	79%	61	50	71%	55
After 2nd month	—	59	73%	80	63	55	72	60
After 3rd month	87%	74	83	75	61	48	63	67
After 4th month	—	74	76	73	65	42	64	68
After 5th month	—	—	74	77	63	39	63	58
After 6th month	—	71	71	75	65	39	67	60
After 7th month	75	—	73	74	62	37	66	60
After 8th month	—	75	75	—	58	39	59	52
After 9th month	—	65	76	—	56	51	51	56
After 10th month	63	—	77	—	68	52	56	54
After 11th month	—	60	78	—	59	—	57	49
After 12th month	50	68	77	69	61	46	52	47
After 13th month	—	71	78	69	56	47	50	47
After 14th month	—	68	79	71	53	44	48	46
After 15th month	43	—	77	—	56	41	41	44
After 16th month	—	64	73	69	59	39	43	45
After 17th month	—	61	71	67	55	46	42	44
After 18th month	32	—	69	64	55	48	39	41
After 19th month	—	71	66	70	56	50	43	42
After 20th month	—	65	67	69	—	48	48	42
After 21st month	35	64	62	65	58	47	49	42
After 22nd month	48	57	—	65	57	45	50	43
After 23rd month	60	63	74	63	52	—	51	41
After 24th month	—	69	76	64	56	—	43	35
After 25th month	—	71	70	63	50	—	37	40
After 26th month	54	66	67	61	50	—	42	41
After 27th month	—	68	66	56	50	—	40	41



REAGAN AND HIS PREDECESSORS

	Approval							
	Truman	Eisenhower	Kennedy	Johnson	Nixon	Ford	Carter	Reagan
After 28th month	—	69%	64%	57%	49%	53%	32%	46%
After 29th month	55%	—	61	54	48	—	29	47
After 30th month	--	72	61	51	50	—	29	42
After 31st month	—	71	63	48	49	—	32	43
After 32nd month	—	—	56	56	—	—	30	48
After 33rd month	—	—	58	47	52	—	31	46
After 34th month	—	77	58	46	49	—	38	53
After 35th month	—	75	—	44	50	—	54	54
After 36th month	36	77	—	49	50	—	58	55
After 37th month	—	76	—	44	52	—	55	55
After 38th month	39	72	—	46	53	—	39	54
After 39th month	—	69	—	45	—	—	39	52
After 40th month	—	—	—	45	62	—	38	54
After 41st month	—	—	—	49	57	—	31	54
After 42nd month	—	69	—	45	—	—	21	52
After 43rd month	—	67	—	51	—	—	32	54
After 44th month	—	—	—	47	—	—	—	57
After 45th month	69	—	—	39	—	—	—	58
After 46th month	—	75	—	38	62	—	—	61
After 47th month	57	79	—	38	59	—	34	59
After 48th month	—	73	—	42	67	—	—	64
After 49th month	—	72	—	46	65	—	—	60
After 50th month	57	72	—	49	—	—	—	56
After 51st month	—	67	—	41	48	—	—	52
After 52nd month	—	62	—	—	44	—	—	55
After 53rd month	51	—	—	50	44	—	—	58
After 54th month	—	63	—	41	39	—	—	63
After 55th month	—	—	—	43	36	—	—	65
After 56th month	—	59	—	40	33	—	—	60
After 57th month	45	57	—	35	27	—	—	63
After 58th month	—	—	—	—	27	—	—	65
After 59th month	—	—	—	42	29	—	—	63
After 60th month	—	58	—	43	26	—	—	64
After 61st month	37	54	—	44	27	—	—	—
After 62nd month	37	50	—	59	26	—	—	63

Note: In months in which more than one approval poll was conducted, the last results of the month are presented.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of March 4-10, 1986.



WHAT WE'RE READY TO WEAR

Question: Here is a list of some different items people wear. (Card shown respondent) Would you tell me for each of those items how often you wear it at this time of year—nearly every day, a couple of times a week, a couple of times a month, a couple of times a year, or it is something you never wear? First . . .



Note: * = less than .5%.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 85-10), October 26-November 2, 1985.

PRIME TIME POLITICS: EARLY RETURNS ON EARLY MEDIA

by Stuart Rothenberg

BY THE END of January 1986—more than nine months before the general election—a dozen major candidates for the United States Senate had started advertising on television. Paula Hawkins of Florida began in September; Mark Andrews of North Dakota got going in June; and Alabama's Jeremiah Denton went on the air in October. Democratic Congressman Tom Daschle of South Dakota, who is running for the Senate, actually began airing "non-political" spots in March of 1985.

Senate candidates were not the only ones who turned to television early. In Idaho, hardly a media megacenter, both a Republican congressional candidate and the incumbent he hopes to challenge started their television advertisements over the winter, as did Democratic congressional candidates in Alabama and Louisiana. Around the country, more and more House and Senate candidates—challengers and incumbents alike—have turned to early media, some of it surprisingly heavy.

How did this come about? At least part of the explanation is that technological developments, more abundant financial resources, and the growing professionalism of campaigns have led candidates to jump onto the screen earlier and earlier. Add to this some broader changes in the relationship between parties and the electorate, and you have the rest of the answer.

Earlier Early Starts

This season's political candidates aren't the first to get off to an early start. When Governor John Burns of Hawaii ran for reelection in 1970, for example, his first wave of television advertising appeared eight months before the election. And that was nothing compared to Alabama gubernatorial hopeful Fob James in 1978. His television campaign began eighteen months before the election. Senator George Mitchell's media first aired in September 1981 for a 1982 election, and Senator Jesse Helms's television spots started in June of 1983 for a 1984 election. (Interestingly, all four won despite early public opinion polls that showed them trailing badly.)

Successes such as these may be partly responsible for the growing popularity of early television ads. And if they continue to do the trick, they are likely to become even more prevalent. "The real political season," says Adam Goodman, political director of the Robert Goodman Agency, which specializes in media for Republican candidates, "begins six or eight months out. But the pre-season begins sixteen to eighteen months before the election."

The New Advertising Age

Political campaigns have changed dramatically over the past few decades, partly because the parties and the electorate are different, but also because campaign technology has become more sophisticated, and resources have expanded. The new political environment makes early television advertising both possible and necessary.

- **The Decline of Parties and Partisanship.** The demise of machine politics and the decline of strong partisan attachments among the electorate have forced candidates to reorient their campaigns. Voters are less likely to support candidates on the basis of party alone, and few House and Senate hopefuls can rely on strong party organizations to turn out the faithful. Individual voters must now be persuaded or reinforced by campaign messages. And as ticket-splitting has increased, campaigns have become more candidate-centered, with issues and candidate personality now more important elements in determining victory. Television is one of the best ways to reach individual voters, and the earlier the message gets out, the better.

- **The Television Age.** As television itself became more ubiquitous, it was inevitable that it would become a more important political tool. Today, almost every household has a television set, and more than 50 percent have two or more. The average household has the set on at least seven hours per day, and the average adult spends over thirty-two hours each week viewing. Television provides most people with more of their news than any other medium. Knowing this, and also noticing how successfully products are sold via television, political candidates came to believe that TV was their best campaign weapon, and that their best weapon was best deployed early.

- **New Campaign Technology.** The growth of survey research in political campaigns is inextricably linked to the growth of early television advertising. Public opinion polls have become a staple of political campaigns. Survey data show a candidate his strengths and weaknesses, as well as possible points of attack. Once the information is available, the candidate becomes anxious to get started, and for some hopefuls, that means



early television advertising. So the very existence of survey information encourages campaigns to begin earlier than in the past.

- **The Growth of the Campaign Industry.** Political consultants have always been an important part of campaigns, but in recent years their number has mushroomed. More than 40 percent of all consulting firms listed in the National Republican Congressional Committee's Campaign Services Directory (1985-1986) were established during the 1980s. Fewer than a third of them existed prior to 1977. The increased professionalism associated with campaigns has brought with it hundreds of political consultants who make their living by providing campaign advice. These consultants need to reduce the seasonal fluctuations of their business, and one way to do this is to encourage the "permanent campaign." They believe, no doubt, that they are providing their clients with the best possible advice, but they are also serving their own interests by recommending early television advertising.

- **Money.** Twenty years ago most candidates simply could not afford lengthy media campaigns. Television advertising is the most expensive part of some House and all Senate campaigns, and few candidates have had the resources to air television spots in the winter or spring before an election without diverting funds from the crucially important post-Labor Day period. Naturally, all campaigns have "wish lists"—things they would like to do but cannot because of the costs involved—and early media is usually somewhere on those lists. The recent growth of campaign fund raising and spending has meant that more of those wishes can be granted.

Early Media and Campaign Strategy

While the growth of campaign technology, campaign spending, and political independence among the electorate explain what made early television advertising possible, it does not explain why many campaigns have adopted the tactic. Two factors—early starts by other candidates in recent years, particularly presidential hopefuls, and the proven success of early media—account for its popularity with congressional candidates.

- **The Lessons of Victory.** Those in the political campaign industry are obsessed with what the competition is doing, and it is standard operating procedure for one consultant to pick up another consultant's tricks. Over the past two decades presidential campaigns have begun earlier and earlier, and this development has filtered down to Senate races and, to a lesser extent, House contests. The first Democrat to announce for his party's 1984 presidential nomination was Alan Cranston, who became a candidate in February of 1983. By the end of that month, both Walter Mondale and Gary Hart had announced. The other Democratic front-runner, John Glenn, became a candidate in April. A decade ago, Jimmy Carter, an obscure former governor of Georgia, formally entered the 1976 presidential race in December of 1974, one month after Morris Udall made his candidacy official. In the Senate contests, Jesse Helms's surprise victory in 1984 is largely credited to his early start, and this has had a profound effect on contestants' plans for 1986 Senate and House races.

The continuous race for the presidency accustomed consultants, candidates, political reporters, and other participants to early campaigns, including early media. To extend the practice to House and Senate races was the logical step.

- **Strategy and Tactics.** The most important reason behind the development of early media by House and Senate candidates is that it works. More than anything else, tactical and strategic considerations drive campaigns to run television spots well before the start of the "normal" campaign season.

For an incumbent, early media has a number of advantages. First, it allows him to seize a political issue, possibly placing an opponent on the defensive or preempting his use of the issue. Second, it helps him to bolster a weak image or reputation by highlighting his

Table 1

EARLY TELEVISION ADVERTISING BY MAJOR 1986 SENATE CANDIDATES

Senate candidates	State	Population rank	Date of first TV	Major TV buys thru 1/31/86[a]	Media consultant
Tom Daschle (D)	SD	45	Mar. 1985	$ 9,000	Karl Struble
Mark Andrews (R)[b]	ND	46	June 1985	13,000	Bob Goodman
Paula Hawkins (R)[b]	FL	7	Sept. 1985	1,300,000	Bob Goodman
Jim Abdnor (R)[b]	SD	45	Oct. 1985	50,000	Roger Ailes
Jeremiah Denton (R)[b]	AL	22	Oct. 1985	60,000	Bob Goodman
Martha Ezzard (R)	CO	28	Nov. 1985	10,000	Bob Goodman
Steve Symms (R)[b]	ID	41	Nov. 1985	15,000	Ed Debolt
John Breaux (D)	LA	19	Jan. 1986	51,000	Ray Strother
Bob Graham (D)	FL	7	Jan. 1986	265,000	Bob Squier
Mack Mattingly (R)[b]	GA	13	Jan. 1986	300,000	Murphy & Castellano
Henson Moore (R)	LA	19	Jan. 1986	275,000	Roger Ailes
Richard Shelby (D)	AL	22	Jan. 1986	185,000	Bob Squier

[a] Includes buys begun before the end of the month but concluded in February.

[b] Incumbent.

Source: Candidates' consultants and campaign managers; Republican and Democratic Senate campaign committees.

accomplishments or concerns. Getting on television before the campaign is in full swing is important because, as Republican consultant John Deardourff notes, "It is harder to use paid media to change a perception than to create a new one." Third, early media offers candidates a chance to inoculate themselves against charges that they know will be made later in the race. Finally, it allows candidates to increase their visibility immediately before a poll is taken, possibly scaring away primary or general election opponents before they have actually entered the race.

Challengers and candidates for open seats usually cannot use early media the way incumbents do, but they can gain substantial benefits from running television advertisements before the heavy campaigning begins. For non-incumbents, early media provides visibility and instant credibility, both of which can be translated into fund-raising potential and free media coverage. "Early media seeks to reach unconventional audiences such as political action committees, state party people, the national party, and other opinion makers," argues Republican consultant Maxene Fernstrom. "It helps establish that you are a real, live, credible candidate."

Examples of early media abound. When Republican Congressman Cooper Evans of Iowa found early in 1982 that few of his constituents knew much about him, he aired early television spots to inform voters of his accomplishments and efforts in Washington. In 1981, Senator George Mitchell found himself with little name recognition and trailing his likely opponent by thirty points. He went on the air fourteen months before the election with four weeks of thirty-second spots sandwiched around a thirty-minute television program. None of the advertisements asked voters for political support. Rather, they simply sought to connect Mitchell with the social security issue. Democrat Tom Daschle, congressman from South Dakota who is running for the Senate against incumbent Jim Abdnor, has taken this approach one step further. Daschle ran a few television spots twenty months before election day to urge voters to call the White House in support of a farm bill with which he was closely identified. Eight months later, he went on the air again with spots indicating his support for Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. In neither case did the advertisements ask viewers to "vote for Daschle." Nor did the ads in any way indicate that the congressman would be a candidate for the Senate in a few months. But anyone familiar with politics knows that the spots were campaign-related, a soft-sell approach for Daschle, paid for by his congressional campaign fund-raising committee.

The trend toward early media should not be surprising. Candidates are always looking for the little advantage that will lead them to victory, and early media is a logical step. For a candidate who trails his opponent early and who may not be able to make up lost ground under normal circumstances, early media is an obvious alternative. As Democratic consultant Peter Fenn notes, "If an incumbent has the money and is in some reelection trouble, there is no gamble about going on TV." Early media, then, is a natural development that follows from the more general development of earlier campaign planning.

How Much Is Enough?

The explosion of early television advertising raises one troubling question: Can too much of a good thing be bad? Will the public stand for political commercials a full year before an election?

Clearly, there are risks associated with early television. For one thing, candidates who spend money on media in January may be using resources they will need in September or October. Elliott Richardson, for example, did not have funds during the end of his 1984 Massachusetts Senate primary against fellow Republican Ray Shamie because he had depleted his resources on early media. Important as early media is, it is never as crucial as media immediately before an election.

Second, candidates risk tipping their hands when they run television ads early. They may waste an issue in January that could have greater impact in October, or they may let the opposition see the type of race they are going to run.

The fatal problem, though, would be that the prolonging of a campaign actually proved to annoy voters or put them off enough to change votes. According to most political insiders, this is unlikely.

"We rarely approach the level of commercial advertising," says Democratic pollster Mark Mellman, "so we rarely have the problem of saturation." Republican consultant Charlie Black agrees: "If you took the same spot and ran 2,000 gross rating points, sure people would get tired of it. But that's not what we do."

Voters may complain about early commercials, and political reporters may decry the year-round campaign, but until there is evidence that early media actually hurts a candidate's standings in the polls, we are likely to see more of it, not less. "I don't think there is any 'how early' for political media," says Maxene Fernstrom. "Some candidates should be running 'thank you' spots the day after the election. Others should be running ads year round." Consultants know the dangers of a poorly planned and executed media campaign, and they are likely to avoid the pitfalls. This will make early media even more effective and imitated.

Early television spots for House and Senate candidates are a natural development in a campaign industry that is increasingly confident about what works politically and what doesn't. Candidates who set a campaign's agenda and define their own images in the most positive way have a huge advantage when election day approaches. As long as this is the case, and as long as systemic factors allow and encourage early television, the public will see more and more House and Senate hopefuls turning to paid television advertising ten, twelve, and even sixteen months before an election. ☑

California's Coming Minority Majority

by Bruce Cain and Roderick Kiewiet

One-third of this country's immigrants settle in California, and they are creating a new minority there—the white population. By the year 2010, according to one demographic projection, non-Hispanic whites will drop to 47 percent of the state's population. As recently as 1950, 87 percent of Californians were white; but by 1980 that number had dropped to 67 percent. (Latinos constitute 19 percent, blacks 8 percent, and Asians 5 percent of the population.)

These trends will certainly have vast social consequences, and they may be politically significant as well. Many earlier immigrant groups—the Irish, Italians, and East European Jews in particular—gravitated toward the Democratic party in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and it is plausible that the new immigrants will follow their lead. If this happens, and if immigration reform gives amnesty to undocumented aliens, California could become a Democratic party stronghold. But if the new immigrants prove to have fewer interests in common than their predecessors did, they will be less likely to form a coalition of minorities that adheres to one party.

To understand these possibilities better, the Seaver Institute, a California foundation, commissioned a statewide telephone survey of minorities in California over the age of eighteen. The aim was to oversample the relevant minority groups rather than randomly sample the state population. The sample included 409 whites, 335 blacks, 593 Latinos, and 305 Asians.

One basic discovery from the survey is that the political interests of California's minorities are quite diverse, so that prospects for a single coalition are unlikely. How coalitions form will depend on which issues prove to be most important. Variations in opinion *within* each ethnic/racial group suggest that minority attitudes may change in important ways, so that political alliances will probably change, too.

Differences between Racial/Ethnic Groups

The survey explored minority attitudes in four broad areas—issues involving assimilation, social attitudes, standard left-right themes, and partisanship. The first category includes problems of language, immigration, and discrimination.

Because Latinos and Asians are both nonwhite groups, and because so many of them are immigrants, one might expect them to have common interests on matters of assimilation. There are similarities, it turns out, but there are also important differences between the two groups. Asians and Latinos, for example, had similar experiences with the acquisition and use of the English language. Fifty-two percent of the Asians reported that their primary language was not English; the corresponding figure for the Latinos was 57 percent. When those who said they spoke a foreign language were asked to say which language they spoke at home, 47 percent of Asians and 43 percent of Latinos said that they spoke their native language more, 37 percent of Asians and 38 percent of Latinos said they spoke both languages about the same amount, and 16 percent of both Asians and Latinos said they spoke English more.

Latinos, however, were more likely to support bilingual education programs than Asians, as table 1 indicates: 69 percent of Latinos favored and 22 percent opposed bilingual education as com-

Table 1
ISSUES BY ETHNICITY
(California)

		White	Black	Latino	Asian-American
Increased military expenditure	Favor	32%	18%	28%	38%
	Oppose	56	52	48	42
	Don't know	13	30	24	20
Equal Rights Amendment	Favor	66	81	76	70
	Oppose	19	6	9	13
	Don't know	15	13	15	17
Tax credit for parochial-private schools	Favor	46	41	40	40
	Oppose	37	37	37	37
	Don't know	17	22	23	23
Prayer in public schools	Favor	50	62	53	46
	Oppose	41	22	26	33
	Don't know	9	16	21	21
Increased spending on welfare	Favor	59	84	73	66
	Oppose	30	6	16	24
	Don't know	11	10	11	10
Ban federal spending on abortions	Favor	35	36	32	31
	Oppose	48	40	48	44
	Don't know	17	25	20	25
Ban on handguns	Favor	47	40	47	55
	Oppose	47	41	39	33
	Don't know	6	19	14	12
Death penalty for murder	Favor	75	47	57	73
	Oppose	15	30	21	14
	Don't know	10	23	22	13
Amnesty for undocumented aliens	Favor	44	41	61	43
	Oppose	40	35	20	33
	Don't know	16	24	19	24
Use of employer sanctions	Favor	62	52	40	51
	Oppose	25	33	42	34
	Don't know	13	15	18	15
Bilingual education programs	Favor	41	63	69	51
	Oppose	51	25	22	40
	Don't know	8	12	9	9
Bilingual ballots	Favor	29	49	60	44
	Oppose	67	38	31	49
	Don't know	4	13	9	7

Note: Sample size = 1,358.
Source: Survey by Bruce E. Cain and D. Roderick Kiewiet for the Seaver Institute, December 1984.

pared to 51 percent of Asians in favor and 40 percent opposed. They showed a similar pattern on several related issues:

- Asians (44 percent) were less likely to favor bilingual ballots than Latinos (60 percent);
- Asians (43 percent) were less likely to favor amnesty for undocumented aliens than Latinos (61 percent);
- Asians favored sanctions against employers of illegal aliens (51 percent to 34 percent), whereas Latinos were slightly opposed to them (40 percent to 42 percent).

Blacks in our sample were more sympathetic to the Latino position on bilingualism, but were considerably less enthusiastic about the Latino position on immigration reform. A majority of blacks favored the use of employer sanctions (52 percent to 33 percent), but they divided over amnesty for undocumented aliens (41 percent in favor; 35 percent opposed; 24 percent no opinion). Blacks may be concerned about the adverse economic effects that the employment or legalization of illegal immigrants might have upon them.

Blacks and the other racial/ethnic minorities also differ in their ideas about discrimination. Blacks (62 percent) were much more likely than Latinos (36 percent) or Asians (47 percent) to report that they had personally experienced discrimination, and blacks were more likely to say that the discrimination they had experienced was job-related (52 percent versus 31 percent for Latinos and 22 percent for Asians). It was not surprising, therefore, that blacks were more inclined to believe that most or at least some Americans were prejudiced toward members of their racial group (79 percent) than Asians (57 percent) or Latinos (64 percent) were.

Social Issues

The second area of comparison, social issues, included attitudes toward the death penalty, abortion, school prayer, and a ban on handguns. The differences between the various racial/ethnic groups on these issues tended to be smaller than on other issues, but even so, some patterns were clear. Latinos and blacks (especially blacks who belong to evangelical Protestant sects) were less likely than Asians to take a pro-choice position on abortion, and much more likely to favor prayer in the public schools.

Question: Which of the following three statements best agrees with your own views?

	White	*Black*	*Latino*	*Asian-American*
1. By law, abortion should never be performed	*4%*	*9%*	*13%*	*5%*
2. The law should permit abortion only in cases of rape, incest, or when the mother's life is in danger	*36*	*44*	*47*	*42*
3. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice	*60*	*47*	*40*	*53*

The differences were even sharper when the predominantly Christian Filipinos were taken out of the Asian category. As table 1 shows, Asians were also more prone to favor the death penalty and a ban on handguns than either the blacks or Latinos.

The third area includes traditional left-right issues. The most salient of these, especially in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings era, are questions about military and welfare spending, which may figure prominently in the 1986 and 1988 elections. All the racial/ethnic groups agreed on these matters: all opposed increased military spending, and all favored increased welfare spending. Among the different racial/ethnic groups, though, the degree of agreement varied. Blacks and Latinos, being more economically disadvantaged, were more favorably disposed toward increased spending on welfare and more opposed to increased spending on the military than were Asians and whites.

Partisanship

Our survey found some striking differences in the partisanship of California's minorities (see table 2). Sixty-seven percent of the Asian-Americans in our survey voted for Ronald Reagan in the 1984 election, and 32 percent voted for Walter Mondale. By comparison, blacks (6 percent Reagan, 92 percent Mondale) and Latinos (36 percent Reagan, 63 percent Mondale) overwhelmingly preferred Mondale. The Asian-American preference for Reagan in 1984 does not appear to be a transient phenomenon. Table 2 displays the racial/ethnic groups by strength of partisanship. Only 10 percent of the Asian-Americans classified themselves as strong Democrats, compared to 26 percent of Latinos and 56 percent of blacks. Seventy percent of the Asian-Americans fall in the persuadable range from weak Democrats to weak Republicans.

Table 2
CALIFORNIA PARTY IDENTIFICATION BY RACE/ETHNICITY

	White	Black	Latino	Asian-American
Strong Democrat	18%	56%	26%	10%
Weak Democrat	19	22	28	25
Leaning Democrat	9	9	7	7
Independent	7	5	10	10
Leaning Republican	7	2	6	9
Weak Republican	15	1	12	19
Strong Republican	20	2	8	19
Other	5	2	3	1

Note: Sample size = 1,358.
Source: Survey by Bruce E. Cain and D. Roderick Kiewiet for the Seaver Institute, December 1984.

Differences within Groups

The coalitional picture is complicated by important divisions of opinion within each of the racial/ethnic groups. To begin, although no substantial differences turned up between Mexican and non-Mexican Latinos, there were several important distinctions between the various Asian nationalities. Specifically, we found that:

- Of all the Asian-American groups, the Japanese had political attitudes that most closely resemble those of the Anglo majority. This is consistent with the highly assimilationist ethos of the Japanese-American community.
- Koreans were the most sympathetic of the Asian-Americans to the Latino position on bilingualism and immigration reform. Sixty-two percent of the Koreans favored bilingual education (compared to 44 percent of the Japanese), and only 45 percent favored employer sanctions (compared to 61 percent of the Japanese).
- Filipinos, coming from a Christian country, were the Asian-American group most likely to favor prayer in the public schools. They were also the strongest supporters of increased military expenditures.
- Chinese attitudes showed no distinguishing pattern other than being generally conservative. It is difficult to say what this means, since the Chinese in California are the most bifurcated between previous and recent immigrants.

On the whole, grouping the various Asian-American nationalities together works reasonably well for most issues: differences between them are more often in degree than direction. On issues affecting immigrants, however, it is important to remember that the Japanese are not part of the new wave of immigration, whereas the Koreans and some Chinese are. This distinction, in addition to cultural and linguistic ones, may inhibit coalitions between the various Asian-American groups.

Another factor that complicates any solid predictions about how Asians and Latinos will align in the future is the difference between the political attitudes of first, second, and third generations. These appeared on a number of issues, but we will mention two—one that applies especially to Latinos and the other to Asian-Americans. The first is that third generation Latinos were more like the rest of the population on issues like bilingualism and immigration reform than first generation Latinos were. The best example of this is the amnesty issue: 74 percent of first generation Latinos favored amnesty for illegal aliens as compared to 49 percent of the third generation. Combined with evidence of important differences in the attitudes of upper- and lower-income Latinos on a number of issues, including bilingualism and welfare spending, these generational differences raise the possibility that Latino attitudes, like those of the Irish and Italians before them, may change as Latinos become more established and move up the socioeconomic ladder.

Another sort of generational effect could move Asian-Americans in a different direction. We saw earlier that Asian-Americans were less likely to perceive discrimination against them than blacks were. Asian-American perceptions of discrimination, however, seem to sharpen in the second generation: 39 percent of first generation Asians said that they have experienced personal discrimination as compared to 61 percent of second generation Asians. It is possible, therefore, that Asians will develop a stronger sense of their racial and political identity in the future.

What this might mean politically will depend on how the Democratic and Republican parties address discrimination issues. The general political conservatism of Asian-Americans, manifested in their relatively strong support of Ronald Reagan in 1984, bodes well for the California Republican party. Recently, however, in a number of California cities, conservative whites have introduced initiatives to ban non-English business signs and to declare English the official language of the community. If Republicans become identified with this reaction, Asian-Americans could gravitate toward the Democrats despite their conservatism on other issues. On the other hand, if tensions between Asian-Americans and blacks worsen, then this could push the Asian-Americans into the Republican party even further.

BLACK AMERICA:

DIVIDED BY CLASS?

by Franklin D. Gilliam Jr.

IN THE PAST six months, we have heard a great deal of discussion about political differences within the black community. One recent study contends that black leaders are out of touch with the rest of the black community.[1] This study alone spawned dozens of responses—negative and positive—in print and on TV. Ideological differences are represented on one side by black conservatives such as Thomas Sowell, Samuel Pierce, Walter Williams, and Clarence Pendleton, who have become visible in national political and academic circles.[2] On the other side of the political spectrum are black Marxists such as Manning Marable.

A strong case can be made that black America is at a crossroads. The dust has settled from the days of Montgomery, Selma, Little Rock, and Watts, and the unifying elements of the civil rights movement are fading away. In socioeconomic terms, a growing number of black Americans are entering the middle class, while a large underclass remains. It is only natural that some attitudinal differences would develop from these changes. But a sharply divided black community could have major implications for policy and politics. Exploring whether blacks at different social levels view the world differently is an important part of any analysis of changing black America.

One of the problems confronting anyone interested in examining black attitudes is the scarcity of good data. In standard public opinion samples, there are too few blacks to allow reliable conclusions. For this analysis, I have depended heavily on surveys conducted by the National Opinion Research Center. In 1982, NORC's General Social Survey (GSS) oversampled black Americans. The standard sample plus the oversample yielded 500 black respondents. Other data—a Gallup survey conducted for the Joint Center for Political Studies in summer 1984 (a sample of 902 black adults) and from the ABC News/*Washington Post* poll in January 1986 (a sample of 1,000 black adults)—offer useful comparisons. There are biases inherent in any black sample. The GSS, for example, underrepresents the youngest and oldest black adults, and overrepresents black women. Then, too, comparisons among the three surveys cannot be exact because questions are worded differently, and definitions of social class vary slightly from survey to survey. Despite this, the survey results are remarkably close.

One of the most difficult tasks in discussing social class is defining it. I have chosen to look at lower-, working-, and middle-class black attitudes in straightforward economic terms. In reality, there is no black "upper class." There are so few truly affluent black Americans that to talk of an "upper class" is absurd. Social class, then, is based on family income—lower-class status refers to families who earn less than $12,500 a year. working class is delineated as $12,500 to $25,000 a year; middle class encompasses those black families with yearly incomes over $25,000.

The Touch of Class

If polarization exists in the black community, we should be able to find evidence of it in attitudinal differences concerning government and politics. Theoretically the black middle class would be more concerned about high income taxes and interest rates than increasing expenditures for social programs. Class, not race, should play a larger part in forming their opinions. To analyze the relationship between class and public opinion within the black community I examined three areas: (1) domestic spending priorities; (2) political orientations; and (3) government and social issues.[3]

Polarization theory posits that middle-class blacks are not as willing as lower-class blacks to favor increased government spending for social programs. Yet the data in table 1 do not support this. In general, blacks as a group are distinctly liberal on questions of government spending. To the degree that class polarization exists, middle-class blacks are actually *more* supportive of increased levels of spending than lower-class blacks. On the six spending questions, the middle class is uniformly more in favor of higher expenditures for social programs than the two lower classes. The most significant differences occur on aid to the cities, health care, and drug problems. The results for the education and environment questions are not as distinct, but the answers go in the same direction.

These findings have at least three possible explanations: middle-class blacks are responding out of self-interest—they have the most at stake in their communities and seek policies aimed at upgrading the quality of life in them. Second, middle-class blacks are sensitive to the plight of their lower-class counterparts and believe an increase in expenditures is one solution to the problems. Third, a combination of the first two is possible—middle-class blacks may believe that upgrading the quality of life will benefit them as well as other blacks.

The ABC News/*Washington Post* poll examines spending priorities retrospectively. Interviewers asked whether a number of government spending programs begun in the 1960s and 1970s have helped poor people, hurt poor people, or made no difference. In general, the pattern is quite similar to the one found in the GSS questions on domestic spending priorities. Blacks per-

Table 1

GOVERNMENT SPENDING

Question: We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount.

Social Class

	Lower			Working			Middle		
Spending:	**Too little**	**About right**	**Too much**	**Too little**	**About right**	**Too much**	**Too little**	**About right**	**Too much**
Cities	62%	23%	14%	73%	15%	12%	76%	14%	10%
Crime	72	17	12	80	16	5	89	7	3
Health	69	25	6	80	15	5	83	13	5
Drugs	64	25	11	73	14	12	81	14	6
Education	75	23	3	84	12	5	85	14	1
Environment	63	28	9	67	23	11	74	17	10

Source: Survey by NORC/GSS.

ceive that government programs designed for the poor have worked. A clear majority in each class have positive perceptions of the contribution made by government assistance programs over the past two decades. Moreover, the little class polarization that does exist is in the same direction found in the GSS data.

Table 2

GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS DESIGNED FOR THE POOR

Social class	Helped poor people	Hurt	No difference
Lower	62%	16%	22%
Working	58	15	27
Middle	65	18	16

Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post.*

One thing is clear—on questions that involve government spending on social programs, blacks are solidly liberal. Moreover, class divisions are such that the black middle class is more willing than either of the lower classes to increase federal outlays to solve social problems.

Political Orientations

A basic assumption of polarization theory is that individuals located in different strata of the social structure will view the political world differently. We would expect middle-class blacks, then, to orient themselves to the political system in noticeably divergent ways from the lower classes. To get at political orientations, I look at three dimensions: the extent to which one identifies with a political party; confidence in political institutions; and general political ideology.

The GSS data in table 3 show little variation in partisan identification across classes. Roughly three-quarters of the blacks surveyed identified themselves as "Strong" or "Weak" Democrats. When the "Independent Leaning Democratic" category is included, almost nine out of ten blacks of all classes identify with the Democrats. Further, even if all of the Republican categories within each class are collapsed, only about one respondent in ten identifies with the GOP.

Table 3

PARTISAN IDENTIFICATION

Question: Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what?

	Social Class		
Party ID	**Lower**	**Working**	**Middle**
Strong Democrat	46%	39%	37%
Weak Democrat	31	32	37
Independent Democrat	11	12	15
Independent	7	6	8
Independent Republican	2	6	1
Weak Republican	3	2	2
Strong Republican	1	4	0

Note: This question was recoded by the GSS to match the Michigan National Election Study question. The recode is based upon a two-part question, which first asks the respondent to state his affiliation; the second part then measures intensity.

Source: Survey by NORC/GSS.

The Gallup/JCPS data are similar to NORC-GSS data. Table 4 compares the two surveys. Again, blacks are clearly in the Democratic camp regardless of class differences. Only a small number of blacks across the classes identify themselves as Republicans.

Table 4

PARTISAN IDENTIFICATION

Party ID	Lower class GSS	Lower class JCPS	Working class GSS	Working class JCPS	Middle class GSS	Middle class JCPS
Democratic	77%	77%	71%	76%	74%	75%
Independent	18	16	18	17	23	19
Republican	6	6	12	7	3	5

Note: Following the Cavanaugh analysis of JCPS/Gallup data, all Independents who lean Republican are classified as Republicans.

Source: Surveys by NORC/GSS, Gallup for the Joint Center for Political Studies.

Confidence in Political Institutions

The executive branch, the Congress, and the judiciary have played significant roles in the history of black America. Blacks' orientation toward these institutions can be explored through the GSS data. We can come up with at least three different interpretations of the data presented in table 5. From the broadest perspective, one cannot help but notice the relatively low levels

Table 5

CONFIDENCE IN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Question: I am going to name some institutions in this country. As far as the people running these institutions are concerned, would you say that you have a great deal of confidence, only some, or hardly any confidence at all?

	Social Class								
	Lower			Working			Middle		
	Great deal	Some	Hardly any	Great deal	Some	Hardly any	Great deal	Some	Hardly any
Executive	12%	52%	37%	12%	51%	38%	4%	48%	47%
Congress	14	58	28	16	59	25	7	61	33
Supreme Court	28	57	15	33	56	11	16	70	14

Source: Survey by NORC/GSS.

of confidence in government institutions exhibited by black adults across all classes. In fact, the only significant difference between classes shows up on the Supreme Court question, with the working class having the most confidence.

A second approach to these data is to consider the rank ordering of the institutions. Across the classes, the executive branch ranks the lowest, and the Supreme Court the highest. The low rating of the executive branch may come from the generally negative image most blacks have of President Reagan.

The last interpretation concerns the amount of cynicism or distrust that characterizes all classes. If one takes the average percentage of respondents in the "great deal" category within each class across the three institutions, the following figures emerge: the lower class has an average rating of 18 percent, the working class 20 percent, and the middle class 9 percent. Middle-class blacks, then, exhibit the highest degree of political cynicism.

Aside from their disenchantment with the Reagan administration, middle-class blacks might be cynical because of their more frequent and frustrating contact with the machinery of government. Such acts as trying to obtain a small business loan, being involved in litigation, or taking part in local politics may have disillusioned middle-class blacks. Lower-class blacks—ostensibly more concerned with day-to-day survival—may have less contact with these institutions.

The ABC News/*Post* poll includes an item that measures black opinion about another governmental unit, the police. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with a series of statements, including one that compared police treatment of blacks and whites. The data in table 6 support the GSS finding of high levels of distrust among blacks of all classes. These results also indicate that the black middle class is significantly more cynical than the lower class. More than four-fifths perceive inequitable treatment by the police as compared to about three-quarters of the lower class.

Table 6

POLICE TREATMENT OF BLACKS AND WHITES

Question: I am going to read you a few statements and for each I'd like you to tell me whether you tend to agree or disagree with it, or if perhaps you have no opinion about the statements. These days police in most cities treat blacks as fairly as they treat whites.

Social class	Agree	Disagree
Lower	26%	74%
Working	21	79
Middle	19	81

Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*.

Political Ideology

Political ideology represents an individual's overall orientation toward the political system. Table 7 indicates that blacks are not much different from most Americans —the majority identify themselves as "Moderates" in the GSS data. Indeed, the greatest class variations are found within the "Moderate" category. The most significant difference exists between the working class and the middle class (56 percent to 72 percent moderate). Moreover, the working class is the most ideological group among blacks—it has the highest percentage of conservatives and the highest percentage of liberals. Given the liberal inclinations of the black middle class on government spending issues, it is somewhat surprising that there are not more self-proclaimed liberals. Perhaps this is because the liberal label has had pejorative connotations in recent years.

Table 7

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

Question: We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal—point 1—to extremely conservative—point 7. Where would you place yourself on this scale or haven't you thought much about this?

	Social Class		
	Lower	Working	Middle
Liberal	23%	29%	20%
Moderate	64	56	72
Conservative	13	15	8

Note: The seven-point scale has been collapsed into three categories.
Source: Survey by NORC/GSS.

When ABC News/*Washington Post* interviewers asked blacks about their political ideology, they used a different question, making comparisons between the two data sets difficult. The ABC News/*Post* survey asked respondents whether their views on most political matters were "very liberal, liberal, moderate, conservative, or very conservative—or don't you think of yourself in those terms?" About 20 percent of blacks in the survey said they didn't think of themselves in those terms or gave the "don't know" response. The GSS has a much smaller category of "don't knows." But the pattern of distribution in the two surveys is similar. In both data sets, the black middle class is more likely to say that they are liberal than conservative. Among working-class blacks, liberals outnumber conservatives in both surveys. Lower-class black liberals outnumber their conservative counterparts in the GSS data, but in the *Post* survey the reverse is true.

Government and Social Issues

The final area to be examined concerns contemporary questions of social policy. Table 8 shows that class polarization is evident on issues such as abortion and euthanasia, with about a 25-percent gap between the middle class and the lower class. This is probably explained by a combination of higher educational levels among the middle class and higher levels of religiosity among the lower class.

A weak relationship exists between class and the school prayer question which asks respondents to agree

Table 8
GOVERNMENT AND SOCIAL ISSUES

Questions: 1. In general, do you favor or oppose the busing of black and white students from one district to another? 2. Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion if the woman wants it for any reason. 3. Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder? 4. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that no state or local government may require the reading of the Lord's Prayer or Bible verses in public schools. What are your views on this—do you approve or disapprove of the court ruling? 5. When a person has a disease that cannot be cured, do you think doctors should be allowed to end the patient's life by some painless means if the patient and his family request it?

	Social Class					
	Lower		**Working**		**Middle**	
	Favor	**Oppose**	**Favor**	**Oppose**	**Favor**	**Oppose**
Busing	53%	47%	59%	41%	54%	46%
Abortion	23	77	34	66	46	54
Capital punishment	48	52	59	41	43	57
Prayer*	19	81	17	83	30	70
Euthanasia	31	69	43	57	53	47

Note: *Oppose category is opposition to the U.S. Supreme Court ruling that banned required prayer.
Source: Survey by NORC/GSS.

or disagree with the Supreme Court decision limiting prayer. Blacks solidly reject it. Further, only a slim majority of the middle class was supportive of euthanasia. What is interesting about these issues in the NORC survey is that across the classes majority support does not exist for abortion or for the Supreme Court's decision on prayer. The findings from the ABC News/*Washington Post* question on abortion are similar to those of the GSS, though the question is different. The *Post* abortion question asks the respondent to agree or disagree with the following statement:

Table 9
ABORTION

Question: Generally speaking, a woman should be able to get an abortion if she decides she wants one, no matter what the reason.

Social class	**Agree**	**Disagree**
Lower	50%	50%
Working	61	39
Middle	74	26

Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*.

In the ABC/*Post* survey there is about a 24-point difference between the lower class and the middle class, within one point of the GSS gap. The *Post* poll does show greater black support for abortion, but this could be caused by question wording.

The black community has never settled on a single opinion about busing. While the busing of school children to achieve racial balance has been a mainstay of the civil rights struggle, it also has engendered resistence from blacks who dislike its dislocating effects. Moreover, certain segments of the black community concerned with preserving a strong ethnic identity are also opposed to busing. Though a majority favor busing in the GSS question, opposition to it is substantial. Yet class differences on busing are weak in the GSS as well as the ABC News/*Washington Post* survey. The *Post* question produces a greater number in support of busing, perhaps because of the question wording, but again, class differences are small.

Table 10
SCHOOL BUSING

Question: Thinking of school busing, would you say you favor or oppose the busing of black and white students as a last resort for school integration?

Social class	**Favor**	**Oppose**
Lower	57%	43%
Working	65	35
Middle	59	41

Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*.

Conclusion

There is little evidence to support the contention that significant attitudinal differences characterize blacks of different social classes. What variations do exist are in the opposite direction from the predictions of polarization theory. Social issues produce the most serious splits, but that can be explained to some degree by religiosity.

The findings of this study should not be surprising. Though some blacks may be cynical about government, they largely approve of its role. Many blacks were socialized during a period in which civil rights was the predominant issue. To reject government intervention as the basis of public policy would be to deny their own histories. This seems particularly true for middle-class blacks.

There *are* divisions in black public opinion. Signs indicate a slight trend toward conservatism among the black lower class, for example. Moreover, social class may not tell us everything: analyses by age, ethnicity, gender, region, and religiosity might produce greater distinctions.[4] Given this, one can begin to imagine the implications for public policy debates and electoral strategies. What is clear though, is that despite the few gaps that do exist within the black community, it remains one of the most solidly liberal and solidly Democratic population groups.

---

[1] Linda S. Lichter, "Who Speaks for Black America?," *Public Opinion* (August/September 1985).

[2] Indeed, black conservative organizations such as the New Coalition for Social Change have begun to appear, and it seems that the groups will proliferate if wealthy, white conservative organizations continue to provide funding.

[3] Granted, there are several other issues one might analyze: the economy, foreign affairs, and race relations, to name a few. The data utilized for this paper do not allow me to examine the first two, and there is a relatively well-established body of literature chronicling race issues. [See, for example, Donald K. Kinder and Laurie A. Rhodebeck, "Continuities in Support for Racial Equality, 1972 to 1976," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 46 (1982): 195-215; Howard Schuman and Shirley Hatchett, *Black Racial Attitudes: Trends and Complexities* (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research) 1974; Howard Schuman, Charlotte Steeh, and Lawrence Bobo, *Racial Attitudes in America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press) 1985.]

[4] I have found some preliminary evidence to this effect.

Public Opinion

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The Consequences of Ideas:

The Reagan Revolution and Beyond

Six years ago we assembled Jeane Kirkpatrick, Michael Novak, and Herbert Stein to talk about an America poised for change. Here they regroup to tell us what's happened, why, and what's ahead.

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TO OUR READERS

There are two important changes in this issue of *Public Opinion*.

First, we are taking advertising. This will enable AEI to put the magazine on a sounder financial footing. We are delighted that big companies and small have responded. We welcome General Motors, Dow Chemical, AT&T, Forbes, and Gannett—and *Election Politics*, MYCOM, Opinion Research Service, Peter Hart, the American Federation of Teachers, and others.

We believe *Public Opinion* will prove to be a remarkable advertising medium. Many of our regular readers happen to be the people who make the world go 'round: in the White House, the Congress, the regulatory agencies, Cabinet departments, business, and the media.

Advertising—believe it or not—helps readers, too. Because we are running full-color advertisements, we can run full-color illustrations.

Second change: Note the date on our front cover: "Summer 1986." For years, astute readers (our readers are nothing if not astute) have noticed that the date they received the magazine was substantially later than the cover date. This made it seem as though we were always late. We weren't. The calendar was early. Anyway, it's a long story. We've now fixed it. Our next issue will be called "September/October." We expect it to be in the mail by late August.

If you are confused, remember this important point: all subscribers will get all the issues they paid for. Thanks for your continued support. We think *Public Opinion* will be getting better and better.

The Editors

THE PUBLIC ASSESSES THE REAGAN RECORD ON FOREIGN POLICY

From Weakness . . .

Question: Of course in any campaign a lot of things are said. Do you personally mostly agree or mostly disagree with each of the following statements (about the 1980 presidential election)? You're afraid that Reagan might be trigger happy.



Note: Sample size = 1,644 registered voters.

Source: Survey by Time/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, August 26-28, 1980.

Question: Now that Ronald Reagan has been elected president, are you afraid that he might get us into war?



Note: Sample size = 2,651 reinterviews from a survey of 3,091 conducted October 30-November 11, 1980.

Source: Survey by CBS News/New York Times, November 7-12, 1980.

To Strength

Question: Do you have confidence in Ronald Reagan's ability to deal wisely with a difficult international crisis, or are you uneasy about his approach?



Note: *October 1983 survey was taken after Grenada invasion. Sample size for April 1986 = 704.

Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of April 15, 1986.

Question: Considering all of our relations abroad—including the situation in Europe, the Middle East, in Latin America, in Asia, in our nuclear weapons negotiations with the Russians, and all the rest—would you say that we have more forceful world leadership than we had five years ago or not?



Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, November 1-7, 1985.

Question: Do you trust Reagan to make the right decisions or not when it comes to what the United States should do in world affairs?



Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, April 24-28, 1986.

See data for these charts on page 32.


Approve Reagan's Handling of Relations with Russia/Soviet Union


Approve Reagan's Handling of Foreign Affairs/Policy/Relations

Major Foreign Policy Events during the Reagan Years

1/25/81	Hostages return
4/24/81	Grain embargo lifted
10/6/81	Sadat assassinated
10/28/81	AWACS sale approved
11/16/81	Reagan approves CIA plan to aid Nicaraguan rebels
11/30/81	U.S./Soviet Euromissile negotiations begin
12/13/81	Martial law declared in Poland
2/24/32	Caribbean Basin Initiative
4/30/82	U.S. backs Britain in Falklands War
6/6/82	Israeli invasion of Lebanon
6/29/82	START talks begin
8/25/82	U.S. Marines sent to Beirut
9/1/82	Reagan's Middle East Peace Plan
9/14-20/82	Bashir Gemayel assassinated, Sabra and Shatila massacres
11/10/82	Brezhnev dies/succeeded by Andropov
3/8/83	"Evil Empire" speech
3/23/83	"Star Wars" speech
4/11/83	Scowcroft Commission recommendations
4/18/83	U.S. Embassy in Beirut bombed
8/21/83	Aquino assassinated
8/25/83	U.S. and U.S.S.R. grain agreement
9/1/83	Soviets shoot down KAL 007
10/23/83	Terrorist bomb kills 239 Marines in Beirut
10/25/83	Grenada invasion
11/14/83	First U.S. Cruise missiles in England
12/4/83	U.S. planes bomb Syrian positions in Lebanon
12/8/83	Soviets walk out of START
12/10/83	Democratic election in Argentina
12/14/83	U.S.S. New Jersey fires on Lebanon
12/20/83	Evacuation of PLO from Beirut
1/11/84	Kissinger Report on Central America
1/11/84	U.S. helicopter shot down on Nicaraguan border
1/3/84	Goodman released by the Syrians
2/9/84	Andropov dies/succeeded by Chernenko
4/10/84	CIA admits mining Nicaraguan harbors
4/18/84	U.S. proposes chemical weapons ban
4/26-5/1/84	Reagan visits China
5/6/84	Salvadoran elections
5/8/84	Soviets boycott Olympics
6/6/84	40th anniversary of D-Day
10/11/84	Congress votes to continue ban on Contra aid
10/14/84	CIA manual on insurgency
10/31/84	Indira Ghandi assassinated
11/4/84	Nicaraguan elections

Continued on page 26

Americans Assess

Question: In your opinion, which of the following best describes Russia's primary objective in world affairs? (Card shown respondent)



	1	2	3	4
6/78	7%	25%	34%	23%
10/79	9	30	37	18
2/80	5	18	34	39
11/80	5	21	38	28
9/81	6	18	35	34
3/83	9	23	34	29
9/84	7	28	38	20
9/85	8	29	35	20

Note: "Don't know" not shown. It was 11%, 6%, 4%, 8%, 7%, 5%, 6%, and 9%.

Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 85-9), latest that of September 21-28, 1985.

Question: Do you believe the Soviet Union is an evil empire that threatens our moral and religious values, or don't you believe that?



Note: A similar Gallup question in November 1985 found that 56% of the respondents thought that Reagan's description of Russia as an "evil empire" was accurate; 44% did not.

Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, November 1-7, 1985.

Question: Would you be willing to risk the destruction of the United States rather than be dominated by the Russians, or not?



Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, November 1-7, 1985.

Soviet Intentions

Question: In your opinion, what is the Soviet Union's/United States's main objective at the (November 1985 Reagan-Gorbachev) summit conference in Geneva? Do you think the Russians/Americans are more interested in negotiating a strong military position with respect to the Americans/Russians, or are they more interested in influencing world public opinion, or do you think the Russians/Americans are more interested in reducing world tensions?



Note: "Equally" and "none" (volunteered responses) not shown.

Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, November 1-7, 1985.

Question: If an agreement is reached at the (Reagan-Gorbachev) summit meeting, do you think we can trust the Soviet Union to keep its word?



Note: Sample size = 1,020 registered voters.

Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, November 14-18, 1985.

Question: Right now, would you say the United States is superior in military strength to the Soviet Union, or is it about equal in strength, or is it not as strong as the Soviet Union?



Note: Sample size = 1,422 for June 1979, 1,468 for January 1980, 1,433 for June 1981, 1,470 for May 1982, 1,489 for April 1983, 1,145 for June 1983. "No opinion" not shown.

Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of November 6-10, 1985, *New York Times*, June 13-18, 1985.

Question: Do you think the American people in general have a more friendly attitude toward the Soviet Union than the United States government does, or do you think the United States government and the American people feel the same way about the Soviet Union?



Question: Do you think the Russian people in general have a more friendly attitude toward the United States than the Soviet government does, or do you think the Soviet government and the Russian people feel the same way about the United States?



Note: Sample size = 1,277.

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, September 15-19, 1985.

Question: Do you think the military strength of the United States should be superior to the Soviet Union, should be about equal in strength, or doesn't the United States need to be (exactly) as strong as the Soviet Union?



Note: Sample size = 1,422 for June 1979; 1,417 registered voters for September 10-14, 1980; 817 registered voters for September 19-21, 1980; 810 registered voters for September 23-25, 1980. October 1980 results were based on probable electorate.

Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of January 2-4, 1985.

ENTER (AND KEEP) TALKING

Question: Do you think there should be another (summit) meeting between Reagan and (Soviet leader) Gorbachev in the near future?



Note: Sample size = 400
Source: Survey by CBS News/New York Times, November 20, 1985.

Question: Should Reagan invite (Soviet leader) Gorbachev to come to the United States for another (summit) meeting?



Question: Some people have said that leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union should have summit meetings every year. Others say the two countries should have summit meetings only when there is a good chance for a major foreign policy agreement between them. Which would you prefer—annual summit meetings or summit meetings only when there's a good chance of a major agreement?



Source: Survey by ABC News/Washington Post, November 10-13, 1985.

In the Next Issue:

- **Homeowners and Renters: Where They Differ Where They Don't**
- **The Birds and the Bees**
- **Party I.D. Updates**

Continued from page 23

12/9/84 Iranian authorities end hijacking of Kuwaiti plane, 2 Americans killed
12/19/84 U.S. pulls out of UNESCO
3/10/85 Chernenko dies/succeeded by Gorbachev
3/25/85 U.S. Army Major Nicholson shot by Soviets in East Germany
3/31/85 Duarte wins Salvadoran elections
5/1/85 Reagan announces trade embargo against Nicaragua
5/5/85 Reagan visits Bergen-Belsen and Bitburg
6/19/85 6 Americans shot in El Salvador restaurant
6/14-30/85 Hijacking of TWA flight 847
10/7-9/85 Hijacking of *Achille Lauro* cruise ship
10/7/85 U.S. announces it will no longer automatically comply with World Court rulings
10/10/85 *Achille Lauro* hijackers intercepted by U.S. planes
10/14-17/85 Reagan sends Sen. Laxalt to Philippines to urge Marcos to reform
11/4/85 Yurchenko goes back to the Soviet Union
11/19-21/85 Reagan-Gorbachev summit
11/23-4/85 Hijacking of EgyptAir plane, 1 American dead in Malta
12/10/85 U.S. sends aid to anti-government rebels in Angola
12/27/85 5 Americans killed in Rome airport
1/7/86 Reagan imposes economic sanctions against Libya
2/7/86 Duvalier flees Haiti
2/7/86 Philippine elections held
2/11/86 Shcharansky exchanged by the Soviets
2/20/85 Reagan attends Caribbean summit in Grenada
2/25/86 Marcos leaves the Philippines
3/24-5/86 U.S. fires on Libyan ships and missile sites
4/2/86 4 Americans killed in bomb blast on TWA 840
4/5/86 Terrorist bombing of West Berlin discotheque kills 1 American
4/14/86 U.S. bombs Tripoli and Benghazi
4/15/86 1 American hostage killed in Beirut

Dealing with Terrorism

Firmness . . .

Question: In October of this year, the United States used military aircraft to intercept and force down an Egyptian airliner carrying the hijackers of the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro*. Do you think this was a good thing for the United States to have done, or that we'd be better off if we hadn't done it?



Note: Sample size = [illegible]

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for [illegible], December 7-14, 1985.

Question: Do you agree or disagree that the U.S. should take military action against Libya if we find that Libya has been aiding terrorist actions against Americans?



Note: [illegible]

Source: Survey by ABC News, January [illegible], 1986.

Question: Regardless of which country is right, do you think the United States should have held military exercises in the Gulf of Sidra or not?



Note: [illegible]

Source: Survey by ABC News, March [illegible], 1986.

Question: President Reagan said that he will take military action against Iran or Syria if it can be proved that either country was behind terrorist acts against Americans. If evidence is found linking Iran or Syria to such terrorists acts, would you approve or disapprove of the United States launching such an attack?



Source: Survey by ABC News/Washington Post, April 24-28, 1986.

Question: I'm going to read you some statements and after each please tell me whether you tend to agree or disagree with each. First, Reagan is taking too many risks in the situation with Libya and it's not worth it. (If needed: Do you agree or disagree?)



Note: Sample size = [illegible]

Source: Survey by ABC News, March 25, 1986.

Question: Which of these statements comes closest to your view of the bombing of Libya: The United States should have launched an even bigger attack. **Or,** the U.S. should have launched a smaller attack. **Or,** the attack was about the right level. **Or,** the U.S. should not have bombed Libya?



Note: Sample size = [illegible]

Source: Survey by CBS News/New York Times, April 15, 1986.

Not Adventure

Question: Which of these two statements comes closest to your view: The United States has made its point with Libya and we should now remove our fleet from the Gulf of Sidra. The United States should consider Libyan military actions against our fleet as an act of war and invade Libya with the goal of overthrowing Libyan leader Qaddafi.



Note: Sample size = [illegible]

Source: Survey by ABC News, March 25, 1986.

Question: It's time to teach Qaddafi a lesson even if that means risking a larger war with Libya. (If needed: Do you agree or disagree?)



Note: Sample size = [illegible]

Source: Survey by ABC News, March 25, 1986.

Question: The United States should see to it that Libyan leader Qaddafi is killed by whatever means available before he becomes even more powerful. (If needed: Do you agree or disagree?)



Note: Sample size = [illegible]

Source: Survey by ABC News, March 25, 1986.

Evaluating the Situation in Central America



Approve Reagan's Handling of Situation in Latin America/Central America

Reagan ratings on handling the situation in Latin America/Central America

	ABC News/*Washington Post*			Gallup			Harris		
	App.	Dis.	No opinion	App.	Dis.	No opinion	Excellent/ Good	Fair/ Poor	Not sure
February 1983	29%	47%	25%						
April	27	50	22	21%	50%	30%			
May	30	39	31						
June				25	46	29			
July	33	48	19						
August				24	51	25			
October				26	50	24	33%	58%	9%
November				36	44	20	40	52	8
December							34	59	7
January 1984				28	49	23	30	64	6
February	42	46	12	29	48	23	30	61	9
March							29	61	10
April				29	48	23			
May	37	51	12	28	49	23	31	62	7
June							33	63	4
July				27	45	28	31	66	3
September							41	57	2
October							42	53	5
November				34	43	23			
March 1985							34	59	7
May	40	47	14	29	50	21	32	63	5
June	43	45	12				36	57	6
July	44	45	11				36	59	5
September							32	64	4
November							38	57	5
January 1986							39	58	3
March	47	34	19						
April							40	54	6

Source: Surveys by ABC News/*Washington Post*, the Gallup Organization, Louis Harris and Associates, latest that of April, 1986.

Awareness of Nicaragua . . .

Question: Have you read or heard anything about the fighting between the Sandinista government in Nicaragua and rebels seeking to overthrow the government?

Heard/read about the fighting between the Sandinista government and rebels seeking to overthrow it



Note: Sample size [illegible] 543

Source: Survey by ABC News, latest that of March 6, 1986.

Question: Do you happen to know which side the U.S. is backing, the rebels or the government? (1983 and 1985) Is the United States backing the government there, or the rebels trying to overthrow the government? (1986)



Note: [illegible]

Source: Survey by ABC News, latest that of March 6, 1986.

And the Threat It Poses

Question: Do you think the government of Nicaragua threatens the security of other Central American countries, or not?



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, April 6-10, 1986.

Question: Do you think Nicaragua will provide military bases for the Soviet Union?



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, April 6-10, 1986.

Question: Do you think it's important to the security of the United States to eliminate Communism from Latin America, or can Communist governments exist in Latin America without threatening U.S. security?



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, April 6-10, 1986.

But Don't Get Involved

Question: Do you think the U.S. government should give $100 million in military and other aid to the Contras trying to overthrow the government in Nicaragua?



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, April 6-10, 1986.

Question: President Reagan is asking Congress for new military aid for the Nicaraguan rebels known as the "Contras." Do you agree or disagree with Reagan that Congress should approve that money?



Note: Sample size [illegible] 543

Source: Survey by ABC News, March 6, 1986.

A RELUCTANCE TO GET INVOLVED

Question: There have been some discussions about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I'd like to ask your opinion about several different situations. First, would you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops if . . . (Read list)



Favor/Oppose/Don't know

	1978	1981	1985
U.S. embassy employees were taken hostage *	NA	64/24/12	65/24/11
Soviet troops invaded Western Europe	43/43/14	51/35/14	53/35/12
If Cuban troops were involved in a Communist takeover of a Central American country	NA	42/42/16	51/36/13
If Israel is overrun by an Arab country *	21/65/15	26/58/16	31/53/16

	1978	1981	1985
If Soviet troops invaded Poland	NA	23/58/19	26/58/16
If North Korea invaded South Korea	19/69/13	20/63/17	23/61/17
If Nicaraguan troops invaded Honduras	NA	NA	21/59/21
If North Vietnamese troops invaded Thailand	NA	NA	16/67/17

Note: * Question wording varied slightly.

Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 85-4), latest that of March 23-30, 1985.

Question: Suppose Arab forces invaded Israel, would you be in favor of using U.S. troops, or would you be opposed to that—or haven't you heard enough about that yet to say? (If in favor or opposed) Is that (in favor/opposed) strongly or (in favor/opposed) somewhat?

Favor strongly/somewhat	29%
Oppose strongly/somewhat	48
Haven't heard enough	15
Not sure	8

Question: Generally speaking would you be in favor of using U.S. troops if Russia invaded Western Europe, or would you be opposed to that—or haven't you heard enough about that yet to say? (If in favor or opposed) Is that (in favor/opposed) strongly or (in favor/opposed) somewhat?

Favor strongly/somewhat	58%
Oppose strongly/somewhat	23
Haven't heard enough	12
Not sure	7

Source: Survey by Los Angeles Times, April [illegible]

Question: If . . . would that justify United States military involvement, including the use of American troops?

	Yes	No	Don't know
Israel were being defeated by the Arabs	32%	52%	16%
The Arabs cut off the oil supply to Western Europe	33	53	14
Mexico were invaded	76	16	9
Canada were invaded	84	11	5
Western Europe were invaded	54	32	15

Source: Survey by CBS News/New York Times, February 23-27, 1986.

DATA FOR PAGES 22 and 23

Approve/Disapprove of Reagan's Handling of Foreign Affairs/Relations/Policy

		Jan.	Feb.	March	April	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
Gallup	1981		51/16	53/29					52/26		56/29		49/36
	1982		44/38	36/44	36/45	43/27	45/36	36/41			38/39		
	1983	36/41			32/44				31/46		44/40	46/41	
	1984	38/49	40/46	37/49		37/48	39/46	38/42				50/35	
	1985	52/33		45/39		43/45		50/37					
	1986	50/34											
Harris	1981		54/34	45/49			49/46	47/46	45/48	51/43	50/46		47/50
	1982	49/47	44/51	36/59	39/56	43/52	45/51	38/56	38/58		37/59	39/55	
	1983		37/59	36/60	32/62	38/60	35/58	34/60		45/53	47/48	44/53	38/58
	1984	42/56	38/59	36/60		38/59	41/56	43/56		49/49	53/45		
	1985												
	1986												
ABC/*Post*	1981										63/30	54/35	53/33
	1982	52/33	40/41	45/43	53/34	46/35				50/35	44/39		40/41
	1983	45/33					47/44	42/49		42/50	55/38	55/37	47/45
	1984	42/50	42/52			42/50		43/51		52/41			
	1985	55/38	53/40	57/36		48/45	53/41	56/38		55/39	62/32	61/34	58/31
	1986		61/35										
CBS/*NYT*	1981				54/22		48/26			52/25			
	1982	52/31		37/40		43/38				39/41	48/34		
	1983	39/38			34/37		43/36			41/40			
	1984	43/43	39/47	40/44	43/43		42/44		42/40	45/38	45/38		
	1985	54/32	49/34			47/37		52/35				56/33	
	1986	54/32											
NBC	1981		48/33		51/37	48/41		40/51	46/47	45/46	45/49	42/52	43/52
	1982	42/53		35/58		40/54	42/53		34/61		36/57	36/57	
	1983												
	1984	33/62											
	1985		43/52					50/47					
	1986				*								

Note: * In the CBS/*NYT* asking of April 6-10, 1986 (before bombing of Libya) the results were 51/36. April 15 results (after bombing of Libya) were 76/17.

Approve/Disapprove of Reagan's Handling of Relations with Russia

		Jan.	Feb.	March	April	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
Gallup	1981			58/19	56/17	53/23	48/25				53/25		53/29
	1982	47/33	49/33	41/36	44/36	45/32	49/31	44/34			40/35		
	1983	41/37			36/41				41/36		44/43	46/40	
	1984		43/42			46/40		44/39				52/36	
	1985	54/31		53/34		51/35		52/31					
	1986	65/22											
Harris	1981						48/45						
	1982												
	1983				39/58								
	1984		37/58			38/59	40/58	40/59		40/58	43/55		
	1985			51/46		42/55	51/45	47/50		48/51		61/38	
	1986												
ABC/*Post*	1981												
	1982												46/35
	1983									44/49	48/43	55/33	52/36
	1984	47/39				50/42		47/45					
	1985	51/40				56/35		62/31		62/31	64/28	64/29	
	1986		75/21										
CBS/*NYT*	1981				58/20					62/19			
	1982	54/31											
	1983	45/32											
	1984									48/37			
	1985	60/26											
	1986												

LOOKING AT EDUCATION IN AMERICA

RANKING THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS . . .

Question: I am going to read you a list of institutions in American society. Would you please tell me how much confidence you, yourself, have in each one—a great deal, quite a lot, some, or very little?

Percent expressing "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence



Note: Those expressing "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in public schools in 1973 were 58% and 39% in 1983.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, May 17-20, 1985.

AND GRADING THEM

Question: Students are often given the grades A, B, C, D, and FAIL to denote the quality of their work. Suppose the public schools themselves, in this community, were graded in the same way. What grade would you give the public schools here—A, B, C, D, or FAIL?



	National								
	1977	**1978**	**1979**	**1980**	**1981**	**1982**	**1983**	**1984**	**1985**
A	11%	9%	8%	10%	9%	8%	6%	10%	9%
B	26	27	26	25	27	29	25	32	34
C	28	30	30	29	34	33	32	35	30
D	11	11	11	12	13	14	13	11	10
FAIL	5	8	7	6	7	5	7	4	4

	White								
	1977	**1978**	**1979**	**1980**	**1981**	**1982**	**1983**	**1984**	**1985**
A	12%	10%	9%	10%	9%	8%	7%	10%	9%
B	27	27	26	26	27	31	26	33	34
C	28	30	30	29	33	33	33	34	30
D	11	10	11	11	13	13	12	11	10
FAIL	5	8	6	6	8	4	6	4	4

	Non-white								
	1977	**1978**	**1979**	**1980**	**1981**	**1982**	**1983**	**1984**	**1985**
A	8%	8%	6%	9%	9%	11%	4%	11%	7%
B	23	21	22	20	24	17	16	26	35
C	25	27	24	29	39	33	29	38	32
D	14	15	12	15	13	16	19	10	10
FAIL	5	14	16	7	7	11	9	6	8

Note: "Don't know" not shown.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization for *Phi Delta Kappan*, latest that of May 17-26, 1985.

SPENDING ON EDUCATION

Question: Turning now to the business of the country—we are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount? First . . .



	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Too much	10%	9%	9%	11%	10%	10%	8%	10%	7%	5%	5%	5%	5%
Too little	48	50	53	52	57	53	55	55	58	59	61	59	65
About right	42	41	38	38	33	37	36	35	34	36	33	36	30

Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 86-1), latest that of December 7-14, 1985.

ACTUAL SPENDING



	1969-70	71-72	73-74	75-76	76-77	77-78	78-79	79-80	80-81	81-82	82-83
Current $	816	990	1,207	1,504	1,638	1,823	2,021	2,272	2,493	2,731	2,948
Constant $	2,121	2,362	2,540	2,662	2,740	2,857	2,896	2,873	2,826	2,848	2,948

Note: ¹Includes day school expenditures only; excludes current expenditures for other programs. Based on pupils in average daily attendance in public elementary and secondary schools. ²Based on Consumer Price Index, prepared by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Statistics of State School Systems; Revenues and Expenditures for Public Elementary and Secondary Education and unpublished data.

EDUCATION CUTS TO REDUCE THE DEFICIT? PUBLIC SAYS NO

Question: Which program is that (which you think worthwhile, but would be willing to see cut in order to reduce the deficit)?

(Of those who named worthwhile government program they are willing to see cut 31%)

Would be willing to cut



Note: Other categories (3% or less) not shown.

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, January 14-17, 1985.

TEACHERS' PAY

Question: Do you think salaries in this community for teachers are too high, too low, or just about right?



Teacher salaries:	1969	1981	1983	1984	1985
Too high	2%	10%	8%	7%	6%
Too low	33	29	35	37	33
About right	43	41	31	41	43
Don't know	22	20	26	15	18

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization for Phi Delta Kappan, latest that of May 17-26, 1985.

ACTUAL SPENDING



	1970-71	71-72	72-73	73-74	74-75	75-76	76-77	77-78	78-79	79-80	80-81	81-82	82-83	83-84
Current	$9,269	9,705	10,176	10,778	11,690	12,591	13,352	14,198	15,032	15,971	17,642	19,270	20,715	22,019
Constant	*$23,755	24,006	24,194	23,521	22,972	23,103	23,159	[illegible]	22,333	20,941	20,733	20,841	21,479	22,019

Note: *Based on the consumer price index, prepared by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor.

Source: National Education Association, *Estimates of School Statistics, 1983-84*, and unpublished tabulations.

Question: (President Reagan believes strongly in certain things. Let me ask you about some of them. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each.) . . . The key to improving education is not to spend more money on it, but to teach more discipline to the children in the classrooms so they get serious about learning.



Note: Sample size = 1,255.

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, January 31-February 3, 1986.

PERFORMANCE NEEDS IMPROVEMENT



Average SAT Test Scores: 1963 to 1984

Year	Verbal	Mathematics	Composite
1963	478	502	980
1964	475	498	973
1965	473	496	969
1966	471	496	967
1967	466	492	958
1968	466	492	958
1969	463	493	956
1970	460	488	948
1971	455	488	943
1972	453	484	937
1973	445	481	926
1974	444	480	924
1975	434	472	906
1976	431	472	903
1977	429	470	899
1978	429	468	897
1979	427	467	894
1980	424	466	890
1981	424	466	890
1982	426	467	893
1983	425	468	893
1984	426	471	897

Source: Admissions Testing Program, the College Board, latest that of 1984

STRONG EMPHASIS ON REQUIREMENTS FOR STUDENTS . . .

Question: Would you look over this card, which lists high school subjects. If you were the one to decide, which subjects would you require every high school student who plans to go to college to take?

What about those public high school students who do not plan to go to college when they graduate? Which courses (in this list of high school subjects) would you require them to take?



Note: Adds to more than 100% due to multiple responses.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for *Phi Delta Kappan*, May 17-26, 1985.

AND PERFORMANCE . . .

Question: What do you think happens in most high schools today —is there too much emphasis on football, not enough emphasis, or about the right amount of emphasis?



Note: Sample size = 1,277

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, September 15-19, 1985

Question: Some people say college athletes should be required to maintain higher academic standards than other students because they get a free education. Other people say they should be required to maintain the same academic standards as other students, while still others say they should be allowed to have lower academic standards because of the hours they must put into their sports. In your opinion, should athletes be required to maintain higher academic standards, the same standards, or lower standards than other students?



Note: Sample size = 1,402

Source: Survey by Media General for the Associated Press, May 1-7, 1985

Question: What should high schools do about varsity athletes whose academic average is below a C? Should high schools allow them to participate in sports, or should high schools not allow them to participate until their grades improve?



Note: Sample size = 1,277

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, September 15-19, 1985

Question: Do you feel that high school students who participate in sports and extracurricular activities should or should not be required to maintain a minimum grade-point average and school attendance record?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for *Phi Delta Kappan*, latest that of May 17-26, 1985

FOR TEACHERS, TOO

Question: Before they are hired by a school district, do you feel all teachers should or should not be required to pass a basic competency test to measure such things as their general knowledge and ability to think?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for *Phi Delta Kappan*, latest that of May 17-26, 1985

Question: How do you, yourself, feel about the idea of merit pay for teachers? In general, do you favor or oppose it?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for *Phi Delta Kappan*, latest that of May 17-26, 1985

DISCIPLINE

Question: What do you think are the biggest problems with which the public schools in this community must deal? (Gallup for Phi Delta Kappan) Now I am going to read some things that some people have said are problems with the public schools. After I read each one, please tell me if you think that problem is very serious, somewhat serious, not very serious, or not at all serious in the public schools in which you teach. (Harris for Metropolitan Life)



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for Phi Delta Kappan, May 17-26, 1985 and Louis Harris and Associates for Metropolitan Life, June 1985.





Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, High School and Beyond Study, unpublished tabulations (October 1984).

GETTING GOOD TEACHERS AND KEEPING THEM: TEACHERS' OPINIONS

Question: I will now mention some reforms that might be adopted to attract good people into teaching. For each please tell me whether you think that that reform . . .

Question: I will now read some steps that might be taken to encourage good teachers to remain in teaching instead of leaving the profession. For each, tell me whether you think it . . .

Question: I will now mention some reforms that might be adopted to produce high quality teachers in the future. For each please tell me whether you think that that reform . . .



Note: * = less than .5%.

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, for the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, *The American Teacher, 1985*, April-June 1985.

YES TO PRIVATE SCHOOLS, NO TO HOME SCHOOLS

Question: In recent years the number of non-public schools, that is, private and church-related schools, has increased in many parts of the country. In general, do you think this increase in non-public schools is a good thing or a bad thing for the nation?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for *Phi Delta Kappan*, May 17-26, 1985.

Question: Recently there has been a movement toward "home schools," that is schools where parents keep their children at home and teach the children themselves. In general, do you think this movement is a good thing or a bad thing for the nation?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for *Phi Delta Kappan*, May 17-26, 1985.

WHAT IT TAKES TO GET AHEAD

Question: I'm going to read a list of some of the top positions in our society (Card shown respondent). For each one, would you tell me the reason you think most people reach them—is it because of chance, say the type of family you're born into, who you know, etc., or is it more due to talent, hard work, and a strong will on the part of individuals to reach those positions in spite of chance? First, do you think more people get to be . . . because of who they are and who they know, or more get there because of hard work, talent, and strong will?

Success more due to:

☐ *Who they are, who they know* ▨ *Hard work, talent, and strong will*



		By party ID:			By region:			
		Rep.	Dem	Ind	Northeast	Midwest	South	West
Important political leaders such as president, state governor, or U.S. senator	☐	63%	60%	68%	66%	65%	62%	60%
	▨	37	40	32	34	35	38	40
Heads of country's big labor unions	☐	59	64	57	66	65	57	51
	▨	41	36	43	34	35	43	49
Millionaires	☐	58	46	58	57	51	60	47
	▨	42	54	42	43	49	40	53
Heads of the country's largest corporations	☐	51	39	52	54	45	51	39
	▨	49	61	48	46	55	49	61
Major TV, radio, and newspaper commentators	☐	30	26	27	32	26	29	28
	▨	70	74	73	68	74	71	72
Successful people in the arts	☐	18	14	18	15	14	20	17
	▨	82	86	82	85	86	80	83
Successful professional people such as doctors, lawyers, architects, etc.	☐	9	8	11	11	9	11	7
	▨	91	92	89	89	91	89	93

Note: "Don't know" calculated out. For millionaires, it was 11%. For subgroup analysis, "don't know" exceeded 10% in some cases. It never exceeded 14%.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 86-2), January 11-25, 1986.

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THE POLITICS OF
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OWNERS AND RENTERS

Early in this century, housing reformers such as Lawrence Veiller and John Nolan campaigned for better housing to help foster "a conservative point of view in the working man." Increasing homeownership was usually, though not always, a major part of the reform efforts. As a business contemporary of Veiller and Nolan put it: "Get [workers] to invest their savings in homes and own them. . . . It ties them down so they have a stake in our prosperity." The most dramatic set of measures to increase homeownership was initiated by the quintessentially conservative President Franklin Roosevelt. In 1934, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), for example, established the concept of long-term, amortized mortgages and low down payments. Previously, a first mortgage typically covered only 50 to 60 percent of the total housing cost and had to be paid back in five to seven years—arrangements not uncommon in Europe today.

The value that society has placed on homeownership led us to compare owners with renters through survey research findings. We also wanted to test the proposition put forth by some of the early reformers. Does homeownership make Americans more conservative?

The government's Annual Housing Survey provides certain demographic data on owners and renters. Here we draw on demographic data from regular opinion polls to explore the social make-up of those who own and those who rent. Combining data from eight Gallup polls taken in 1985 (yielding about 12,000 respondents) provides a good base for this analysis. Compared to owners, renters include higher proportions of blacks, of those with low incomes and generally lower socioeconomic status, of the young, and of people not currently living with spouses. These findings are hardly surprising, but it is always useful to document our hunches.

The difficulty in looking at opinion and attitudinal differences between owners and renters is obvious: It is exceedingly hard to determine how much difference is attributable to the distinction we are focusing upon—homeowning and renting—and how much to other overlapping characteristics like age, and, especially, income. This is a more common problem than we like to acknowledge. When we compare the political views of income groups, for example, how often do we point out that those with high incomes are far more likely to be ages forty to sixty than those with low incomes, much less likely to be ethnic minorities, much more likely to have attended college, and so on? Here we control in part for income by comparing middle-income ($20,000-$40,000 a year) owners and renters. We also compare specific age cohorts: owners and renters age thirty to forty-four, for example.

We did find that the owner/renter distinction is more than a crude surrogate for upper and lower income differences, and in social and political outlook, owners are not simply "more conservative" than renters. On many policy questions and in partisan identification, the two groups don't differ at all. Renters are consistently more inclined to take "liberal" positions on a variety of social questions: death penalty, gun control, abortion, divorce, "lifestyle" matters, and the like. This is true even when income and age are held constant. Renters are much more likely to think of *themselves* as liberal.

Some of the variations in owners' and renters' outlook seem to stem from specific differences in experience or interest. For example, renters of all types react much more favorably to the idea of housing vouchers (p. 24). The two groups don't differ in their professed confidence in such central institutions as the military or Congress, but owners are much more likely than renters to express high confidence in banks!

E.C.L.

HOMEOWNERSHIP BY AGE



Question: Do you own or rent your home?

Age	White	Black	National
18-24*	44%	36%	43%
25-29*	55	30	52
30-34	66	40	62
35-39	77	52	74
40-44	81	60	77
45-49	85	45	81
50-54	87	65	84
55-59	88	66	86
60-64	88	72	86
65-69	90	69	88
70-79	87	74	86
Over 80	84	74	83

Note: * Not shown on graph. The Gallup figures shown here correspond very closely with the government's Annual Housing Survey data on homeowners. The data represented here show the proportion of each age group living in dwellings owned by them or their families.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, 1985 data combined.

Who Owns, Who Rents



Note: * = less than .5%. The category, "Separated," under marital status, is not shown.
Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, January-July 1985 combined.

Split Level Attitudes

n our examination of hundreds of survey questions for this section, we found no substantial difference between the attitudes of homeowners and renters, especially when we controlled for income. There were two exceptions. On issues that related to homeown-



Question: (1) A plan has been proposed to help unemployed people now living in large cities to move to areas where job opportunities are better. Under the plan, he federal government would provide housing vouchers to help pay the family rent anywhere in the U.S. Would you favor or oppose such a plan? (2) Do you avor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder? (3) Would you favor or oppose a law which would require a person to obtain a police pernit before he or she could buy a gun? (4) Please tell me whether or not *you* think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a *legal* abortion if . . . he woman wants it for any reason? (5) Should divorce in this country be easier or more difficult to obtain than it is now? (6) At present, the federal budget deficit

on Social Issues

ership or renting, respondents gave answers reflecting their self-interest as homeowners or renters (see question 1 below). On many social issues, we also found sizable differences (see questions 2-7 below).



Favor abortion if the woman wants it for any reason (4)

Divorce should be easier to obtain (5)

Approve of cutting government spending on social programs to reduce the deficit (6)

Approve of cutting defense spending to reduce the deficit (7)

is running at the rate of over 200 billion dollars per year. Basically, there are only a few ways this deficit can be reduced. Please tell me whether you approve or disapprove of the following ways to reduce the deficit . . . cut government spending for social programs? (7) . . . cut defense spending?

Source: (1) Survey by the Gallup Organization, June 7-10, 1985. (2-5) Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, February-April, 1985. (6, 7) Survey by the Gallup Organization, April 12-15, 1985.

Political Differences Between

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as president?



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of April 11-14, 1986.

% Approve Ronald Reagan's performance by selected categories

			30-62 years			Owner/renter					
						30-62 years			30-62 years Middle Income		
		Natl	College educa.	Less than H.S. grad.	Gap	Own	Rent	Gap	Own*	Rent*	Gap
1981	March	59%	72%	50%	22	67%	50%	17	67%	66%	1
	June	59	71	47	24	65	49	16			
	Sept.	52	64	41	23	58	42	16			
	Dec.	49	55	29	26	52	35	17			
1982	March	46	54	32	22	51	38	13	50	51	– 1
	June	45	55	29	26	47	33	14			
	Sept.	42	53	30	23	46	33	13			
	Dec.	41	48	22	26	44	24	20			
1983	March	41	55	30	25	50	30	20	54	46	8
	June	43	54	32	22	48	37	11			
	Sept.	47	56	38	18	52	35	17			
	Dec.	54	62	45	17	62	47	15			
1984	March	54	58	36	22	56	46	10	63	60	3
	June	54	61	45	16	60	45	15			
	Sept.	57	58	42	16	61	44	17			
	Dec.	59	66	46	20	64	57	7			
1985	March	56	67	41	26	62	39	23	66	57	9
	June	58	66	36	30	61	45	16			
	July	63	67	46	21	66	57	9			
	Oct.	63	69	56	13	66	58	8			
1986	Jan.	63	71	46	25	67	52	15	70	53	17
	April	62	67	52	15	67	57	10			

Note: * = yearly average.

In this table, we show approval of President Reagan by selected groups. Education tends to be a powerful predictor of attitudes; there are substantial differences between those with a college education and those who didn't finish high school. The differences between owners and renters are not as large as the education differences, and they almost disappear when owners and renters are stratified by income and age.

Owners and Renters

Question: In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent?



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of April 11-14, 1986.

Question: In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent?



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of April 11-14, 1986.

% Republican by selected categories

		National	30-62 years College educ.	30-62 years Less than H.S. graduate	Gap	30-62 years			30-62 years Middle income		
						Own	Rent	Gap	Own*	Rent*	Gap
1981	**March**	28%	44%	19%	25	32%	24%	8	31%	36%	–5
	June	29	37	17	20	29	29	0			
	Sept.	26	34	18	16	28	15	13			
	Dec.	25	26	16	10	27	26	1			
1982	**March**	24	29	15	14	23	19	4	30	23	7
	June	28	34	13	21	30	22	8			
	Sept.	26	28	22	6	29	20	9			
	Dec.	27	28	15	13	31	11	20			
1983	**March**	24	36	13	23	29	17	12	30	25	5
	June	24	31	18	13	28	16	12			
	Sept.	26	32	16	16	29	17	12			
	Dec.	26	33	16	17	30	15	15			
1984	**March**	27	30	12	18	28	26	2	33	30	3
	June	31	36	29	7	33	24	9			
	Sept.	35	35	24	11	36	28	8			
	Dec.	33	36	20	16	33	29	4			
1985	**March**	34	40	31	9	39	28	11	34	31	3
	June	31	35	12	23	30	27	3			
	July	33	37	19	18	32	26	6			
	Oct.	35	40	22	18	35	27	8			
1986	**Jan.**	33	36	19	17	34	21	13	34	25	9
	April	32	36	21	15	34	28	6			

Note: * = yearly average.

% Democratic by selected categories

		National	30-62 years College educ.	30-62 years Less than H.S. graduate	Gap	30-62 years			30-62 years Middle income		
						Own	Rent	Gap	Own*	Rent*	Gap
1981	**March**	41%	29%	58%	–29	40%	53%	–13	36%	41%	–5
	June	45	35	65	–30	43	53	–10			
	Sept.	47	33	59	–26	43	59	–16			
	Dec.	41	34	53	–19	39	42	– 3			
1982	**March**	42	36	54	–18	43	51	– 8	40	40	0
	June	45	35	69	–34	44	54	–10			
	Sept.	44	39	51	–12	43	47	– 4			
	Dec.	46	38	60	–22	41	58	–17			
1983	**March**	44	34	58	–24	40	55	–15	41	36	5
	June	47	34	58	–24	43	53	–10			
	Sept.	45	35	56	–21	42	53	–11			
	Dec.	41	34	58	–24	38	49	–11			
1984	**March**	44	35	63	–28	44	42	2	38	37	1
	June	40	32	50	–18	39	45	– 6			
	Sept.	40	38	52	–14	39	42	– 3			
	Dec.	38	34	48	–14	38	44	– 6			
1985	**March**	37	30	46	–16	32	41	– 9	34	37	–3
	June	40	32	67	–35	40	47	– 7			
	July	36	30	53	–23	35	48	–13			
	Oct.	43	33	64	–31	40	52	–12			
1986	**Jan.**	39	33	59	–26	39	50	–11	42	35	7
	April	41	34	58	–24	41	41	0			

HOMEOWNERS MORE CONSERVATIVE, TRADITIONAL

Question: We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. I'm going to show you a 7-point scale on which the *political* views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal—point 1—to extremely conservative—point 7. Where would you place yourself on this scale?



Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, February-April 1985.

Question: Some people have very traditional values about such matters as sex, morality, family life, and religion. (Hand respondent card D) If 1 represents someone who has *very traditional, old-fashioned* values and 7 represents someone who has *very liberal, modern* values about these matters, where on this scale would you place yourself? Just read off the number.

Percent describing their values as traditional (Points 1 and 2 on the scale)



Note: Those describing themselves as having very liberal, modern values (points 6 and 7 on the scale) were 11%, 8%, 19%, 8%, 14%, 8%, 21%, 8%, and 18%.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, April 11-14, 1986.

CONFIDENCE IN INSTITUTIONS

Question: I am going to read a list of institutions in American society. Would you tell me how much confidence you, yourself, have in each one—a great deal, quite a lot, some, or very little?

Percent expressing a great deal and quite a lot of confidence



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, May 17-20, 1985.

Differences in confidence in major institutions between owners and renters are consistently small, with one notable exception. Owners have much more confidence in banks!

HAPPIER HOMEOWNERS

Question: On the whole, how satisfied are you with the work you do—would you say you are very satisfied, moderately satisfied, a little dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?



Note: Satisfied = "Very satisfied" + "Moderately satisfied." Dissatisfied = "A little dissatisfied" + "Very dissatisfied."

Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, February-April 1985.

Question: Here is a picture of a ladder. Suppose we say that the top of the ladder represents the *best* possible life for you and the bottom represents the *worst* possible life for you. On which step of the ladder do you feel you personally stand at the *present time*?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, March 8-11, 1985.

Question: Some people say that people get ahead by their own hard work; others say that lucky breaks or help from other people are more important. Which do you think is most important?



Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, February-April 1985.

Question: We are interested in how people's financial situation may have changed. Would you say that you are financially better off now than you were a year ago, or are you financially worse off now?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, January 10-13, 1986.

CONSUMER CONFIDENCE







Note: For question wording and methodological information used in producing these indexes, see *Public Opinion*, August/September 1985, page 22.

Source: Survey by Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, latest that of July 1986.

Source: Survey by the National Family Opinion, Inc. for The Conference Board, latest that of July 1986.

A PORNOGRAPHY REPORT

Question: Some people are very concerned about the amount of pornography we have in this country; others are not much concerned at all. How about you? Are you . . .



Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, July 7-9, 1986.

Question: Are you confident that you are able to tell whether something is pornographic or not?



Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, July 7-9, 1986.

Question: In your view, which of the following are pornographic, and which are not?

Do you feel we should pass laws making . . . illegal? How about . . .? In the past year have you . . .? (If no, ask:) Have you ever in your life . . .?

	Q 1 Consider to be pornographic	**Q 2 Should be illegal**	**Q 3 Have seen or read . . . in the past year**	**(If no to previous question) Have ever seen or read . . . in your life**
Female nudity in a movie	35%	32%	54%	81%
A magazine showing men or women in the nude	46	35	43	84
Topless nightclubs or bars	52	38	11	38
Books containing passages that graphically describe acts of sex	56	36	37	69
An X-rated movie in a theater or on a VCR	77	43	38	62
A magazine showing men and women engaging in sexual intercourse	84	50	23	58
A magazine showing two women or two men engaging in a sex act	86	57	25	46

Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, July 7-9, 1986.

Question: Do you think laws should totally ban any of the following activities in your community, allow them as long as there is no public display—or impose no restrictions at all for adult audiences?

	Laws in your community		
	Should totally ban	**Allow them but no public display**	**Impose no restrictions for adult audiences**
Magazines that show nudity	21%	52%	26%
Magazines that show adults having sexual relations	47	40	12
Magazines that show sexual violence	73	20	6
Theaters showing X-rated movies	40	37	20
Theaters showing movies that depict sexual violence	68	21	9
Sale or rental of X-rated video cassettes for home viewing	32	39	27
Sale or rental of video cassettes featuring sexual violence	63	23	13

Note: Sample size = 1,020.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for *Newsweek*, March 6-7, 1985.

Question: The next questions are about pornography—books, movies, magazines, and photographs that show or describe sex activities. I'm going to read some opinions about the effects of looking at or reading such sexual materials. As I read each one, please tell me if you think sexual materials do or do not have that effect. (NORC-GSS)
Do you think it is true or not true that sexually explicit movies, magazines, and books . . . (*Time*/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman)

NORC



Time/YCS



Source: Survey by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, February-April 1986; *Time*/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, July 7-9, 1986.

Question: Some people say that a newsstand should be allowed to sell any kind of magazine even if it is what many people call pornography. How about you, do you think newsstands should be allowed to sell such magazines or not?



Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, February 6-12, 1986.

Question: I'm going to read you a list of statements and I would like you to tell me for each one whether you agree strongly, agree partially, or disagree with this statement.



Note: Agree = "Agree strongly" + "Agree partially."
Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, July 7-9, 1986.

Question: Which of these statements comes closest to your feelings about pornography laws . . .?



Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, latest that of February-April 1986.



Note: Under Marital Status, the category of "Separated" is not shown. Under race, "Other" is not shown.
Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, February-April 1986.

COMPARABLE WORTH: PUBLIC

According to the National Commission on Pay Equity, forty states have started collecting data on comparable worth, thirty-four have established task forces or commissions to study it, twenty-four are preparing job evaluation studies, and thirteen states have already implemented comparable worth plans. Many corporations are considering their own systems, and some have already adopted them. All this suggests that comparable worth has a certain momentum.

Proponents refer frequently to the broad public support that exists for comparable worth, yet only a few survey results—like the Mark Clements question for *Glamour* on page 35—bear that out. Comparable worth seems to be one of those solutions that sounds good as a general proposition, but that becomes less attractive as people learn more about it. The public is skeptical that dissimilar jobs can be compared in such a way that fair pay rates could be established.

Americans—men as well as women—are strongly committed to equal opportunity in the workplace. The Harris question on page 34 shows that nearly three-quarters of Americans believe women and men are not paid equally for comparable work or for equal work. People are anxious to give more concrete expression to this important value, and that explains their willingness to endorse an *idea* like comparable worth. They have their doubts, however, that such a system could work or that it would be fair.

K.H.K.

Question: Do you feel that . . .?



Note: Not all categories asked are shown. Sample size = 1,254.

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, July 25-28, 1985.

Question: How much, if anything, have you heard or read about the idea of "pay equity" or "comparable worth"—that is, requiring the *same* pay for *different* jobs if jobs are judged by some kind of rating or evaluation system to be of the same value to an employer—have you heard or read a great deal about this idea, a fair amount, only a little, or haven't you heard or read anything at all?



Note: Sample size = 1,009.

Source: Survey by the Opinion Research Corporation, January 24-30, 1986.

Question: Have you heard or read anything recently about something called comparable worth and what people get paid?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 85-6), June 15-22, 1985.

Question: Here is a list of four statements (card shown respondent). Would you please read all the statements and tell me which *one* comes closest to what you think "comparable worth" is?



Note: "Don't know" not shown = 14%.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 85-6), June 15-22, 1985.

UNINFORMED AND SKEPTICAL

Question: Do you think it is possible to compare jobs that are quite different—such as a secretary and an electrician—using some kind of rating or evaluation system, and then set fair salaries or pay rates as a result; or do you think such comparisons would be too difficult to do and, therefore, not fair?



Note: Sample size = 1,009.

Source: Survey by the Opinion Research Corporation, January 24-30, 1986.

Question: I am going to read some statements to you about current issues. Please indicate if you strongly agree, slightly agree, slightly disagree or strongly disagree . . . men and women should be paid equally for jobs of comparable worth.



Note: Sample size = 800. "Don't know" = .4%.

Source: Survey by Mark Clements Research, Inc. for *Glamour*, August 16-September 5, 1985.

Question: [Actually, it is item "b."*] How well do you think the comparable worth of different kinds of jobs—like truck driver and secretary, nurse and insurance salesman—can be determined? Do you think comparability can be determined accurately, or that it can be determined only very approximately, or that it is not possible to determine comparability at all?



Note: *In the previous Roper question, respondents were given four definitions of comparable worth. The correct answer, "b," is shown on the bottom of page 34.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 85-6), June 15-22, 1985.

Question: Do you think that "comparable worth" is something worth pursuing or not?
(Asked of those who think that comparable worth can be determined = 57%.)



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 85-6), June 15-22, 1985.

Question: To the extent that comparable worth is a good idea, who do you think should decide if two jobs really are of comparable worth and thus merit the same pay: should this decision be made by government through regulations, by the courts through legal decisions, or should employers themselves decide which jobs are of comparable worth?



Source: Survey by Cambridge Reports, Inc., October 5-November 5, 1985.

Question: Some people believe working women are not paid as fairly as working men. To correct this situation they say U.S. employers should adopt the principle of "comparable worth," under which men and women would get the same pay for doing jobs of similar difficulty and requiring equivalent skills. They say, for instance, that a janitor and a secretary should be paid the same wage if they are doing work of equal difficulty and requiring equivalent skills. In general, do you think that comparable worth is a good idea or a bad idea?



Source: Survey by Cambridge Reports, October 5-November 5, 1985.

THE BIRDS AND THE BEES

Question: Should the distribution of information on birth control be made legal?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, May 1936.

Question: Would you approve or disapprove of having government health clinics furnish birth-control information to married people who want it?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, January 1940.

Question: Do you believe that knowledge about birth control should or should not be made available to all married women?



Source: Survey by Elmo Roper for *Fortune*, August 1943.

Question: It has been suggested that a course in sex education be given to students in high schools. Do you approve or disapprove of this plan?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, May 1943.

Question: Should colleges have classes that take up the subject of sex education, or should sex education be discussed in classes only when students ask about it, or would it be better not to discuss it at all?



Source: Survey by Elmo Roper for *Fortune*, September 1949.

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of schools giving courses in sex education?



Note: Of those who approved, 46% said they would still approve of sex education in the schools if those classes discussed birth control. 18% disapproved, and 5% had no opinion.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, April 23-28, 1965.

SEX EDUCATION TODAY

GRADE SCHOOL: JUST THE BARE FACTS

Question: Do you feel the public elementary schools should or should not include sex education in grades 4 through 8?



Question: Which of the following topics, if any, listed on this card should be taught in elementary school?

Topics that should be taught in elementary school:



National		Public school parents response	Nonpublic school parents response
Birth control	48%	44%	51%
Venereal disease	49%	45%	60%
Biology of reproduction	89%	91%	39%
Premarital sex	34%	28%	48%
Nature of sexual intercourse	45%	37%	54%
Abortion	28%	26%	42%
Homosexuality	28%	22%	41%

Note: Multiple responses.

HIGH SCHOOL: TEACH THEM THE WORKS

Question: Do you feel the public high schools should or should not include sex education in their instructional program?



Question: Which of the following topics, if any, listed on this card should be included in high school?

Topics that should be included in high school:



National		Public school parents response	Nonpublic school parents response
Birth control	85%	83%	88%
Venereal disease	84%	81%	89%
Biology of reproduction	82%	79%	90%
Premarital sex	62%	59%	69%
Nature of sexual intercourse	61%	57%	73%
Abortion	60%	57%	68%
Homosexuality	48%	45%	62%

Note: Multiple responses.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for *Phi Delta Kappan*, May 17-26, 1985.

TEEN PREGNANCY

Question: Do you think that the number of teenage pregnancies in the United States is a serious problem, or a not-so-serious problem?



Note: Sample size = 1,253.

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, for The Planned Parenthood Federation of America, August-September 1985.

Question: We have a number of problems in our society today, and there is always a limit on the amount of money and effort that can be directed toward anything. Considering that, which two or three problems on this list would you personally like to see the most money and effort put toward solving? (Card shown respondent)

Would like most money and effort put toward solving:



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 85-1), December 1-8, 1984.

HIGH SCHOOL SENIORS: A REPORT FROM THE FRONT

Question: Did you have a unit on sex education when you were in high school?

Question: Did you ever study about birth control methods in high school?





Source: *Monitoring the Future*, Jerald G. Bachman, Lloyd D. Johnston, and Patrick M. O'Malley, Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1985.

THE PARENT TRAP: CONTROL AND CONSENT

Question: I'd like your impression of how much control most parents have over their teenagers' sexual activity—a great deal of control, some control, not too much control, or no control at all?



Note: Sample size = 1,253.

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates for The Planned Parenthood Federation of America, August-September 1985.

Question: Do you think that parents should or should not be notified if they have an unmarried female child under eighteen who is provided with birth control devices or pills by public agencies or clinics?



Note: Sample size = 1,200.

Source: Survey by The Merit Report, May 3-6, 1982.

Question: I'd like to ask you some questions about the abortion issue. Do you favor or oppose a federal law prohibiting family planning clinics from giving birth control assistance to teenagers unless they have received permission from their parents?



Note: Sample size = 1,257. In a 1984 Harris survey for *Ms.*, 45% favored the proposed law . . ., 55% opposed it.

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates for The Planned Parenthood Federation of America, August-September 1985.

Question: There is a proposed government regulation which would require clinics to inform the parents of children under eighteen when those children request birth control devices. Do you think this regulation would result in more, less, or about the same number of teenaged pregnancies?



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, March 11-15, 1982.

MR. PRESIDENT, BEN BRADLEE CALLING

Question: Here is a different kind of question . . . if President Reagan had the following four calls at the same time waiting for him, which call do you think he *would* take first? (Hand respondent card). In *your* opinion, which call *should* he take first?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the Los Angeles Times Mirror Foundation, June-August and November-December 1985.

POLITICS AND POLITICAL SCIENTISTS

by Walter B. Roettger and Hugh Winebrenner

THE HARDY PERENNIAL, campus political controversy, bloomed in several different forms at American colleges and universities during 1985–1986. Among the more interesting —and, for some, more ominous—variations was that cultivated by Accuracy in Academia (AIA), a group that monitored the classroom statements of faculty and reported to institution officials those they regarded as "seriously in error." In doing so, the group quickly gained national notoriety, becoming the subject of discussion on television talk shows and editorial pages. AIA's actions were denounced by the American Association of University Professors as well as groups of college and university presidents.

AIA's approach to partisanship and classroom teaching is relatively novel, but the attitudes of faculty members have long interested academics. The most ambitious study of the "professoriate," conducted over seven years by Everett Carll Ladd and Seymour Martin Lipset, was sponsored by the Carnegie Foundation. Their findings, published in *The Divided Academy* in 1975, were based on surveys of more than 60,000 faculty at more than 300 institutions. Faculty in the social sciences were more than twice as likely to be "left-liberal" than faculty in either business or engineering, and they were more than three times as likely to be "left-liberal" than faculty in agriculture.

Ladd and Lipset also found significant variations within the social sciences. Sociologists, anthropologists, and psychologists were more likely to be to the left of the "average" social scientist on a political self-identification scale; political scientists and economists were more likely to be to the right.

A narrower thread of inquiry has concentrated on the political behavior and attitudes of American political scientists. As a group they are arguably the keenest observers of the American political scene. They frequently position themselves as critics—sometimes controversial ones. This has prompted occasional challenges from groups such as AIA whose members feel that a professor's beliefs can shape and even determine his students' value systems. With this in mind, it seems reasonable to explore these beliefs.

In the fall of 1984, we repeated our survey of political scientists' electoral attitudes and behavior. We mailed a six-page questionnaire on October 15, 1984, to

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Table 1

PARTY ID OF APSA MEMBERS AND GENERAL ELECTORATE
1959, 1970, 1976, 1980, AND 1984

	1959[1]		1970[2]		1976[3]		1980[4]		1984[5]	
	APSA	**Natl.**	**APSA**	**Natl.**	**APSA**	**Natl.**	**APSA**	**Natl.**	**APSA**	**Natl.**
Democrat	74%	47%	73%	44%	61%	43%	61%	41%	68%	39%
Republican	16	29	12	24	6	25	14	25	8	35
Independent	8	19	13	31	24	31	17	34	21	26
Sample size =	213		304		210		221		294	

Note: 1980 and 1984 figures created by collapsing "Strong Republican (Democrat)" into "Republican (Democrat)" and "Independent: Closer to Republican (Democrat)" into "Independent." Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding. "Other" or "No Answer" not shown.

[1] Turner, McClintock, and Spaulding, 1963: 652. Figures for general electorate are for 1958.
[2] Turner and Hetrick, 1972: 363.
[3] Roettger and Merriman, 1979: 39.
[4] Roettger and Winebrenner, 1983: 137.
[5] Gallup Organization, reported in *Public Opinion*, (December/January 1985), 39.

a random sample of 770 teaching faculty who are members of the American Political Science Association (APSA). Forty-one percent responded within three weeks to produce a sample that was representative of the discipline's major professional association. The findings are provocative, but they provide no basis for claiming that personal beliefs influence or do not influence the classroom presentation.

Table 1 documents the received wisdom: American political scientists are heavily inclined toward the Democratic party and have been so since at least 1959 (Henry Turner and Carl Hetrick trace this Democratic predominance to at least 1940). They are nearly twice as likely (68 percent) to identify themselves as Democrats as are members of the electorate (39 percent). Moreover, while the portion of Republicans within the electorate has grown, that within the teaching faculty of the APSA has declined unevenly. Finally, the percentage of Independents, which grew from 1959 to 1976, seems to have plateaued.

Table 2 shows the strength of identification with major political parties. Only 1 percent of our sample were pure Independents. Among other Independents, 14 percent leaned toward the Democrats and 5 percent toward the Republicans. We clustered the leaners with the Independents for this article.

Table 2

PARTY IDENTIFICATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENTISTS
1984

Strong Democrat	38%	Democrats
Democrat	31	
Independent: closer to Democrat	14	Independents
Independent: strictly neutral	1	
Independent: closer to Republican	5	
Republican	6	Republicans
Strong Republican	2	
Other	2	

Note: Percentages do not add to 100% due to rounding.

Partisanship varies among the subfields of political science. Specialists in comparative politics (83 percent Democrats), American government (76 percent), and public law/judicial behavior (72 percent) are more likely to identify themselves as Democrats than the average (70 percent). Republicans (8 percent overall) more often gravitate toward political philosophy (20 percent Republican), public administration (17 percent), and empirical theory/methodology (14 percent). Finally, Independents (21 percent overall) are more likely to be found in international relations (44 percent), political philosophy (30 percent), and empirical theory/methodology (29 percent) than in the other specializations.

We also inquired into the ideological orientation of our respondents. A majority (52 percent) identified themselves as liberals; of these, 17 percent were "very liberal." By comparison, 37 percent located themselves in the moderate camp, while 3 percent said they were conservative. A 1983 Roper poll found that 22 percent of the American public regarded themselves as liberal, while 43 percent identified themselves as conservative; the remainder were moderate. CBS (19 percent liberal; 32 percent conservative) and NORC (24 percent liberal; 35 percent conservative) polls administered in the same year produced comparable results.

Table 3

IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENTISTS
1984

Very Liberal	17%	Liberals
Liberal	35	
Moderate: closer to liberal	22	Moderates
Moderate: strictly moderate	6	
Moderate: closer to conservative	9	
Conservative	3	Conservatives
Very conservative	0	
Other	7	

Note: Percentages do not add to 100% due to rounding.

The coincidence we found between partisan identification and ideological orientation was expected. Nearly nine out of ten liberals (86 percent) are Democrats; two out of three conservatives (64 percent) are Republicans. A majority of the moderates (55 percent) identify with the Democrats.

Assessing Actors and Institutions

Respondents were invited to assess American political institutions, the competence of elected and appointed officials, and the nature of the issues those officials were addressing.

Substantial fractions expressed concern about the governing capacity of institutions. For example, one-quarter (25 percent) agreed that ". . .the existing structures and institutions of the U.S. government are no longer capable of functioning effectively." A similar percentage (23 percent) agreed that ". . .current governmental problems are largely the result of the incompetence of elected and appointed officials."

Finally, we asked respondents to react to the proposition that U.S. governments are addressing "new social and economic issues" that ". . .are simply not suited to public action." About one-fifth of all respondents agreed with this. Three out of five Republicans (63 percent) agreed, compared to only one out of ten Democrats (11 percent).

Survey participants were asked to rate particular institutions as "very effective," "moderately effective," "marginally effective," or "not effective." Political scientists were most likely to regard the Supreme Court as performing its tasks either "very effectively" or "moderately effectively" (65 percent) and least likely to rate the performance of political parties as "very" or "moderately" effective (22 percent). The ratings given the

Supreme Court (as well as the presidency, the civil service, and Congress) by Republicans and Democrats differed significantly; the partisans agreed, however, in their assessment of political party performance.

One of the surprising results of the study was the comparatively high regard in which the federal civil service was held by American political scientists. Overall, about two-thirds (64 percent) felt that it was "very" or "moderately" effective. This exceeded the overall rating given the president (54 percent) and Congress (51 percent); Democrats gave somewhat more positive ratings (76 percent) to the federal civil service than Republicans did (64 percent).

The Issues

We asked respondents to indicate their feelings about a number of proposals on issues that usually divide liberals and conservatives, including: (1) holding a constitutional convention; (2) amending the U.S. Constitution to require a balanced budget; (3) amending the U.S. Constitution to permit prayer in schools; (4) amending the U.S. Constitution to prohibit busing for the purpose of integration; and (5) legalizing the sale and use of marijuana. Table 4 shows the predictable variation among partisan groups (and, by implication, ideological orientation). All groups were opposed to a constitutional convention; indeed, two-thirds (67 percent) of all respondents strongly opposed this action. About a third of Republican respondents favored amending the U.S. Constitution to require a balanced budget (38 percent), to permit prayer in the schools (29 percent), and to prohibit busing for the purpose of integration (31 percent). Independents and Democrats were generally united in opposition to these proposals. About a quarter (26 percent) of all respondents favored legalizing the sale and use of marijuana, with the greatest support coming from Independents.

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Rating Reagan

We asked respondents to rate (excellent, good, fair, poor, don't know) President Reagan on his handling of the economy, foreign policy, key political appointments, arms control talks with the Soviets, and public assistance programs, and then asked them to rate his

Table 4

POLITICAL SCIENTISTS' VIEWPOINTS ON MAJOR ISSUES BY PARTY ID
1984

Question: Please indicate your feelings concerning the following proposals which have been raised in recent years.

	All respondents	By party ID: Republican	Independent	Democratic
Holding a Constitutional Convention				
Favor	6%	13%	6%	5%
Oppose	90	87	88	92
Amending the U.S. Constitution to require a balanced budget				
Favor	10	38	16	4
Oppose	89	62	81	94
Amending the U.S. Constitution to permit prayer in schools				
Favor	4	29	4	2
Oppose	94	63	92	98
Amending the U.S. Constitution to prohibit busing for the purpose of integration				
Favor	4	31	4	1
Oppose	95	70	91	98
Legalizing the sale and use of marijuana				
Favor	26	16	35	24
Oppose	53	80	48	53

Note: "Don't know" not shown. Favor = "Favor" + "Favor strongly." Oppose = "Oppose" + "Oppose strongly."

Table 5

POLITICAL SCIENTISTS RATE REAGAN'S PERFORMANCE

Question: Please rate the performance of President Reagan in the following areas:

	All respondents	By party ID:		
		Republican	Independent	Democratic
Handling of the economy				
Excellent/good	24%	88%	39%	12%
Fair/poor	76	13	61	88
Handling of foreign policy				
Excellent/good	11	46	13	7
Fair/poor	89	54	87	93
Appointments to key administrative positions				
Excellent/good	9	50	10	4
Fair/poor	91	50	90	96
Handling of arms control talks with Soviets				
Excellent/good	9	52	8	4
Fair/poor	91	48	92	96
Handling of public assistance programs				
Excellent/good	8	48	8	3
Fair/poor	92	52	92	97
Overall performance in office				
Excellent/good	14	71	23	4
Fair/poor	86	29	77	96
In your judgment, is Mr. Reagan a more or less effective president than Mr. Carter*				
Much more/more effective	53	96	62	46
Much less/less effective	29	4	25	32

Note: *"Same" (vol.) not shown here.

overall performance in office. A final item asked that participants compare Reagan's effectiveness as president with Carter's. The findings appear in Table 5.

Given their Democratic leanings, we expected that respondents might be critical of Reagan's performance. A 1981 survey of political scientists at the APSA's annual meeting had given the president relatively high marks on maintaining relations with Congress. They gave him low to failing grades, though, for his performance in economics, foreign affairs, and on social issues. Overall, three of ten respondents gave him grades of "B" or better, while 54 percent awarded grades of "D" or "F." Had this changed in three years?

Reagan's handling of the economy was rated highest by our respondents, with one-quarter (24 percent) marking it "excellent" or "good." His performance in foreign policy, political appointments, arms control talks, and public assistance programs, however, elicited "excellent" or "good" ratings from only one in ten. His overall performance rating, while somewhat higher than all but one of his specific ratings, was at best mediocre; only one in seven evaluated it as "excellent" or "good."

The influence of partisanship on mood is evident in Table 5. Republicans were markedly more positive in their outlook; Democrats bordered on despair. Most respondents (53 percent) regarded Reagan as a more effective president than his predecessor. To be certain, this assessment was also qualified by partisan affiliation; it was virtually unanimous (96 percent) among Republicans and was shared by a majority of Independents (62 percent) and a plurality of Democrats (46 percent).

Teaching versus Preaching

What does this imply about Accuracy in Academia's concerns? To reiterate, none of the items in this questionnaire dealt with classroom activities; thus, there is no evidence here that instruction is or is not systematically colored by partisanship. One's behavior as a political scientist is clearly associated with certain personal political opinions—and those opinions are predominantly democratic and liberal. Yet, imparting ideas is one thing, and getting students to accept them is another. Accuracy in Academia must be somewhat surprised by the record numbers of today's college students who hold favorable opinions about Ronald Reagan—liberal political science faculty notwithstanding.

There's always been a certain tension between society and institutions of higher learning, and between students and faculty for that matter. In fact, it is that very tension that educates—in both directions. Resolving the tension for themselves, sorting out the pros and cons of the various debates, is what prepares students to function in the economic, social, and political environment of the United States. ☑

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Trade Talks: Public Attitudes About Protectionism

by Mathew Greenwald and Ruy Teixeira

For fifteen years polls have documented America's protectionist stance on international trade. Yet, politicians who have tried to use this issue nationally have had to retreat, somewhat the worse for the experience. John Connally's 1979 call for action against the Japanese "sitting on the docks in Yokohama in their Toyotas, watching their Sonys, eating their Kobi beef. . ." prompted ridicule from the national press. Connally then abandoned the trade issue for other, equally unproductive ones. In 1984, Walter Mondale ventured into protectionist waters, but had to head back to the more politically productive shore.

Changes since 1984, however, are encouraging a new look at the trade issue for the 1986 elections and beyond. The most important development has been in elite opinion. In the past, economists, journalists, academics, and business leaders were almost unanimous in their support of free trade. But today that elite consensus has broken down, and protectionism has become more respectable. In this climate, what the public thinks takes on renewed importance. Two nationwide surveys (conducted by telephone in March and June of 1986 by Mathew Greenwald and Associates and the Government Research Corporation) help to reveal the current mood.

Trade Barriers

Most Americans are aware of the trade deficit. Five in six know we are buying more from foreign countries than we are selling to them, and many blame cheap foreign labor. To the public, lower foreign labor costs represent unfair competition, and they want steps to be taken to prevent jobs from flowing overseas. Other barriers to the import of our goods, they say, include foreign subsidies and more productive foreign workers. There is no ambiguity in the public mind about the result of the trade deficit. By a seven-to-two margin, Americans believe the trade deficit has hurt the overall economy. About four in five think major American industries have been hurt and that over a million American workers have lost their jobs because of the trade imbalance.

In addition, many Americans say they have had firsthand experience with the trade deficit's negative effects. Almost half say the deficit has had a bad effect on their local community. One-third say that they know someone who has lost a job because of competition from foreign imports. This figure is surprisingly high.

Considering these beliefs, it is not surprising that two-thirds of the public favor import limitations. We asked: "Generally speaking, do you think that the government should or should not place limits on imported goods from other countries that are priced lower than American-made goods of the same type and quality?" Sixty-six percent responded against their self-interest as consumers, in favor of limiting the lower-priced imported goods of the same type and quality. Later we asked whether respondents would "support trade policies that limited the import of some foreign goods, even if the prices of these goods went up as a result." Here, 61 percent said they supported limits on imports, even if prices rose.

Low Priority

Given these reactions, it would seem that the trade issue would be politically potent. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of Americans (eight in ten) say they will consider their congressman's position on trade issues when they decide whom to vote for in November. Even so, the trade deficit ranks low on the public's list of economic issues most likely to affect their votes (see table 1).

When asked which of five economic issues will affect their vote for their representative in Congress, the public places unemployment first and the trade deficit last.

Table 1
ECONOMIC ISSUES MOST LIKELY TO AFFECT VOTING

	Most likely	2nd most likely	Total
Unemployment	29%	19%	48%
Federal budget deficit	20	15	35
Inflation	17	25	42
Interest rates	15	16	31
Foreign trade deficit	10	12	22

The two questions—considering a candidate's view on trade and ranking economic issues—can be combined into a trade sensitivity index. We gave respondents a high rating on trade sensitivity if they said that trade was the first or second economic issue most likely to affect their vote and if they said they would consider their congressman's views on trade when voting in November. Those who gave only one of those answers got a medium rating. This analysis indicates that most Americans, 55 percent, are sensitive to trade: 40 percent show medium sensitivity, and only 15 percent are highly sensitive.

The people most likely to be sensitive to trade issues are those who have experienced the worst consequences of the trade deficit. Among those who feel the trade situation has had a bad effect on their community and who know someone personally who lost a job because of import competition, 52 percent show medium trade sensitivity; 20 percent have high sensitivity. Union members (but not non-union members in union households) are also sensitive.

These results indicate that trade concerns the public, especially those people who feel personally affected, but it is not yet a cutting issue for most people. Another set of questions from the June survey reinforces this conclusion.

We learned that 78 percent of the public support a bill "that would require the government to limit imports from countries that are found to engage in unfair trading practices." But only 16 percent of those supporters say they would "certainly not vote" for their congressman if he voted against the bill; another 36 percent say they would "probably not"; 41 percent say that it would not make much difference.

It is significant, of course, that 52 percent say their votes will be affected. But responses indicate that trade is not now the make-or-break issue that abortion, social security, and similar issues have been.

Americans who oppose the bill to limit imports are a bit less likely to vote against a candidate who opposes their position than people who favor the legislation. Just 41 percent of this group said they will probably or certainly not vote for a congressman on the other side of the issue (see table 2).

Table 2

WHETHER CONGRESSMAN'S VOTE ON TRADE BILL WOULD AFFECT VOTING DECISION

	Certainly not vote for him	Probably not	Wouldn't make much difference	Don't know
If respondent personally favors import restrictions* and congressman votes against them	16%	36%	41%	7%
	52%			
If respondent opposes import restrictions* and congressman votes for them	15	26	48	10
	41%			

Note: *Question: Right now, Congress is considering a bill that would require the government to limit imports from countries that are found to engage in unfair trading practices. In general, do you favor or oppose passage of such a bill? (If favor) Is that strongly or moderately? (If oppose) Is that strongly or moderately? Fifty-four percent strongly favored the bill, 24 percent moderately favored it, 8 percent moderately opposed it, and 9 percent strongly opposed it.

Placing Trade

One factor could hinder the trade issue's ability to affect congressional races this fall. That is that the public is confused about where the political parties stand—a confusion the parties themselves may share. Seventy percent of Americans say they are not sure if the Democratic party is "generally speaking" for free trade or import limitations; 56 percent are not sure about the Republican party. The public is not certain about President Reagan's position either: 37 percent think he is generally a free trader, 16 percent feel he favors import limitations, and 43 percent are unsure. With this uncertainty, trade is not likely to be a decisive issue (see table 3).

Table 3

AWARENESS OF PARTISAN POSITIONS ON TRADE

	Not sure	Free trade	Limit imports	Don't know
Democratic party	70%	8%	16%	6%
Republican party	56	21	13	10
President Reagan	43	37	16	4

How does all this add up? Clearly, the public supports import limitations as a pragmatic way to protect the economy and prevent the loss of jobs. Indeed, the public is willing to accept price increases to protect these jobs. Currently, however, trade is not high on the national political agenda.

Will the trade issue become more important and move up on the national political agenda? The configuration of attitudes described here suggests it has the potential to do so, because people believe so strongly that the trade deficit is directly tied to their primary economic concern, unemployment. But this potential will be realized only if political elites can link the trade issue to their programs for expanding employment and the economy—something they have not been able to do in the past. Now that overall elite opinion is fragmenting, however, it should be significantly easier for political elites to bring trade to the forefront.

Mathew Greenwald is president of Mathew Greenwald and Associates, Inc., a research and consulting company.

Ruy Teixeira is a senior research associate with Greenwald and Associates, and the author of the forthcoming book, Why Americans Don't Vote.

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UNIONS IN DECLINE

by Seymour Martin Lipset

EVERY FOUR YEARS, labor unions in this country have a chance to feel important and loved. Even with the presidential election still two years away, potential candidates are already making the quadrennial trek to woo AFL-CIO president Lane Kirkland. So far, according to the *New York Times*, Jesse Jackson, Bruce Babbitt, and Gary Hart have all completed their initial pilgrimages, and no doubt the other hopefuls will follow. These efforts occur even though union membership has declined from a high point of 34 percent of the nonagricultural labor force in 1955 to about 18 percent today, and even though unions are no longer able to win a majority of their labor representation elections. Democratic candidates still need the labor imprimatur, but in other quarters, the union label has lost its appeal.

Declining Approval and Membership

Public approval of unions has fallen dramatically—albeit unevenly—since Gallup first asked about it in 1936. At that time, almost three-quarters of the public (72 percent) approved. It's still true that more Americans approve of unions than disapprove (58-27 percent in the 1985 Gallup poll), and that the labor image has improved slightly since the previous reading (55-35 percent in 1981), but the downward trend is unmistakable —in other recent polls as well. In any case, Gallup reports that almost all of the increase in their approval ratings between 1981 and 1985 comes from members of labor union families—from 73 to 81 percent. There has been practically no change among those who have no ties to unions.

Favorability was high during the New Deal 1930s, followed by a moderate decline during World War II and the early postwar years, possibly in reaction to wartime strikes and the subsequent high rates of inflation. Union approval peaked during the "conservative" Eisenhower years, which was also a period of prosperity, lower inflation, and generally high levels of confidence in all institutions. The subsequent fall in support paralleled the general loss of faith in all institutions that started in the mid-sixties. By 1979 approval of unions had fallen to an all-time low of 55 percent from its 1957 high of 76 percent. By 1984 the average level of confidence in institutions and their leaders, which had continued to go down during the Reagan recession, finally took an upward swing as the economy improved. In some polls, labor ratings revived as well, but the pattern remains basically negative.

What is important about the public's sentiments toward organized labor is that they have moved virtually in tandem with changes in union strength. By correlating Gallup approval ratings from 1955 with union membership and the percentage of union victories in National Labor Relations Board certification elections, it becomes clear that the public's feelings are a major factor in reduced union strength (see figure 1). The ability of labor organizations to recruit or retain members has declined for the same reasons that the American public generally has become less sympathetic to unions.

Figure 1

GALLUP UNION APPROVAL RATES, UNION DENSITY, AND PERCENTAGE WINS IN CERTIFICATION ELECTIONS



A Necessary Evil?

Americans' ambivalence toward labor unions is similar to their contradictory feelings about large corporations. People approve of the functions of both, but disapprove of what they perceive to be the organizations' actual behavior. Large majorities state that without unions, workers would receive lower pay and would experience worse employment conditions. But the public also sees unions as powerful, self-interested bodies working for their own advantage. Beyond this, organized labor bears the special burden of a widespread belief that its leadership is corrupt and out of touch with the public interest. Americans raise the same criticisms of big business that they do of trade unions—too much power, too little morality. In the case of labor officials, however, the charge of unethical behavior seems to carry special weight.

Low Esteem for Union Leadership

Despite the general approval they elicit, labor organizations are close to being the least esteemed institution in American life, while their leaders' repute is even lower. Almost all survey organizations report that unions have done significantly worse during the Reagan era. Labor unions also placed at the bottom of a list of twelve institutions evaluated in a March 1985 Roper poll. In six national samplings taken between 1975 and 1985, the Opinion Research Corporation inquired about confidence in fourteen institutions, by asking respondents to rate "how much trust and confidence you have" in each one on a scale from 1 (no trust) to 7 (complete trust and confidence). Organized labor consistently placed thirteenth out of fourteen as judged by the mean difference between the low (points 1 and 2) and high (points 6 and 7) confidence scores. Stock markets came in last. Trade unions have fared as poorly in the Gallup polls. In eight polls conducted between 1975 and 1985 that included the same seven institutions, labor ranked sixth between 1975 and 1980, and seventh, the bottom position, in all but one of the four taken between 1981 and 1985.

The public disdain for organized labor appears to be linked to even harsher feelings about its leaders. Union leaders are evaluated more negatively than the heads of most other institutions in polls conducted by a

Table 1

CONFIDENCE IN LEADERS OF LABOR, MAJOR COMPANIES, AND EIGHT OTHER INSTITUTIONS

Question: As far as the people running (organized labor or other institution) are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them?

Percent Expressing a Great Deal of Confidence in Leaders

Date	Major Companies	Organized Labor	Average Eight Other Institutions
February 1966	55%	22%	49%
January 1967	47	20	45
August 1971	27	14	29
October 1972	27	15	30
September 1973	30	20	36
December 1973	28	16	32
August 1974	22	17	33
September 1974	16	18	31
April 1975	20	14	27
August 1975	20	18	30
January 1977	20	14	28
November 1977	23	15	31
August 1978	22	15	28
February 1979	18	10	25
November 1980	16	14	25
September 1981	16	12	27
November 1982	18	8	23
November 1983	18	10	28
November 1984	19	12	34
November 1985	17	13	27
Average 20 polls	24	15	31

Source: Surveys by Louis Harris and Associates, latest that of November 1985.

NORC Surveys

Date	Major Companies	Organized Labor	Average Eight Other Institutions
March 1973	29%	16%	33%
March 1974	31	18	35
March 1975	19	10	28
March 1976	22	12	32
March 1977	27	15	35
March 1978	22	11	26
March 1980	27	15	27
March 1982	23	12	28
March 1983	24	8	25
March 1984	32	9	29
March 1986	26	8	25
Average 11 polls	26	12	30

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, latest that of March 1986.

ariety of survey organizations. In the thirty-one evalations of ten American institutions conducted by ouis Harris and the National Opinion Research enter between 1966 and 1986, the percentage exressing "a great deal of confidence" in the leadership f organized labor has almost invariably been lowest. he executives of major companies have outranked bor leaders in all but one survey. Over the twentyear period, the average voicing high esteem for major ompany leaders has been twice that for union leaders.

These ratings have declined fairly steadily through e eighties, although the latest Harris survey—alone mong the four—has shown a slight, but basically significant improvement.

The Roper Organization has also asked Americans evaluate leaders in politics, business, and labor and eir ability to "make real contributions to our society." abor leaders placed well below the others in 1984, ith a bare majority (53 percent) expressing a great eal or a fair amount of faith in labor union leaders' ontributions. Seventy-three percent expressed confience in business leaders' contributions and 65 percent political leaders. Roper also reported that business eaders rated higher marks than labor union leaders on variety of personality characteristics. Business eaders were more likely than the heads of labor to be een as intelligent, able, competent, forward looking, nd of high moral caliber. Labor union heads led on nly one item, that they were "sincerely interested in olving social problems." Labor union leaders rank ery low on ethical and moral standards, as can be seen an Opinion Research Corporation poll conducted in 985. ORC found that labor leaders came in last of a list f nineteen different occupation groups.

In a July 1985 Gallup survey about ethical stanards, labor leaders placed next to the bottom of wenty-five occupations. Only used car salesmen anked below them. The picture is not completely rim, though. A Roper survey found in 1985 that the ercentage agreeing that "many union leaders are rooked" declined from 54 to 40 percent between 1981 nd 1985.

Union Benefits?

espite their substantial criticisms, most Americans elieve that unions are essential and that they do more ood than harm. People feel that without unions, emloyers would mistreat workers. The Gallup question ited earlier has consistently reported at least majority upport for unions.

But even this general support may be evaporating. he Opinion Research Corporation, for example, ound an increase in those agreeing with the anti-union tatement, "Overall, unions in this country are no onger necessary to protect the interests and well-being f the average worker," from 31 percent in 1982 to 42 ercent in 1986.

Table 2

RATING ETHICAL AND MORAL PRACTICES OF OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS

Question: How would you rate the ethical and moral practices of (specific category) - (1) Excellent, (2) Good, (3) Only Fair, (4) Poor, (5) No Opinion?

	Excellent/Good		
	1981	1983	1985
Labor Union Leaders	23%	21%	23%
Average workers	72	72	74
Small business proprietors	75	68	76
Corporate executives	33	29	39
Corporate board members	28	27	35
Stockbrokers	31	34	34
Bankers	56	49	57
Advertising executives	31	35	38
Lawyers	45	44	43
Physicians	75	70	76
College professors	60	66	69
Scientists	69	64	75
Media news reporters	57	58	51
The president	53	48	65
Supreme Court	56	49	57
Military leaders	55	47	48
U.S. senators and representatives	36	33	42
Federal government officials	23	25	33
State and local government officials	31	31	37
Average	48	46	51

Source: Opinion Research Corporation.

Given so many negatives counterbalanced by so ew positive responses, it is not surprising to find that most workers are unwilling to vote for a union in representation elections. The Harris poll inquired in June 1985, "If an election were held tomorrow to decide whether your work place should be unionized or not, do you think you would definitely vote for a union, probably vote for a union, probably vote against a union, or definitely vote against a union?" Only 34 percent of a sample of employed persons said they would vote for the union (12 percent definitely, 22 percent probably). Sixty-three percent indicated a negative vote (39 percent definitely, 24 percent probably).

Other Harris polls tap the public's contradictory feelings. In 1985, 73 percent of employed people told Harris that unions improve wages and working conditions, but a sizable majority, 58 percent, also stated that "most employees today don't need unions to get fair treatment from their employers." And, even though declining membership and diminished bargaining strength make unions a less formidable power than they used to be, ORC discovered in 1986 that Americans, by 57 to 35 percent (blue-collar workers by 52-42 percent), approved of the statement: "Employers should start taking a harder line with unions than they have in the past."

The data reported here add up to an unhappy picture for organized labor. Clearly, most Americans, including a majority of the employed labor force, view trade unions in negative terms. These results do not bode well for the labor movement's efforts to resuscitate its membership. ☑

Seymour Martin Lipset is co-editor of Public Opinion. *This is excerpted from* Unions in Transition *(forthcoming) from the Institute for Contemporary Studies.*

An Editor's Report On Attitudes In South Africa

> Black South Africans overwhelmingly support international economic sanctions against South Africans . . . .
>
> page 1, story lead, August 25, 1985, the *Sunday Times*, London

> Poll shows South African blacks oppose sanctions
>
> page 1, headline, August 3, 1986, the *Sunday Times*, London

Robert Worcester, one of Britain's leading survey researchers, undertook a formidable task last summer—surveying black and white South Africans for the *Sunday Times* of London. In August 1985, Worcester worked with the Gallup affiliate in South Africa, Markinor, to design a survey of 500 white South Africans and 400 blacks in urban areas of Johannesburg and Durban. The whites were polled by phone and blacks in person through a quota sampling technique. The questionnaire was translated into the main South African vernaculars.

This year, MORI/Markinor went into the field again, but their mission was more ambitious. This time, the pollsters included rural blacks in their survey, a group that accounts for 56 percent of all South African blacks, but who have been sampled only sporadically before. To interview blacks in remote rural areas, black interviewers traveled to sampling points described on maps, and then, according to the *Sunday Times*, went "to the nearest village or cluster of huts." This part of the poll took ten days to complete. The pollsters managed to interview 615 blacks in late July at 123 different locations covering urban areas and homelands. (Transkei had to be excluded because police seized the polling results.) They also polled 200 blacks in metropolitan areas of Johannesburg, the Reef, and Pretoria, and 500 whites.

A cursory glance at the *Sunday Times* headlines from both years would suggest that blacks had changed their minds about sanctions against South Africa in twelve months' time. But a careful examination of the surveys' results tells a different story. The results of the two surveys, the first a sampling of urban blacks (stated in the second paragraph of the story) and the second, a more complete sampling of urban and rural blacks, are different because the samples themselves are so different. Last year, Worcester pointed out that 2.6 million of South Africa's 13 million blacks lived in areas covered by the survey. Thus, the first survey represented only about 20 percent of blacks in South Africa. But the lead in the *Sunday Times* story would have the reader believe that a substantial majority of blacks, 77 percent, favored sanctions. The poll was widely reported abroad, without qualifying cautions, and no doubt added fuel to the fires of those pressing for sanctions. The 1986 survey, though, presents a more complete picture. When urban and rural blacks are combined, 46 percent favor sanctions, 51 percent oppose them.

Several important lessons can be drawn from this poll. We are reminded once again that different samples can produce startlingly different results. But another lesson involves the imperatives of polling and journalism. The union of these two businesses is troubled because their missions are so often at odds. Journalists tend to go for the sexy headline or lead, and their space limitations often make it impossible to convey the nuances and complexities of a polling project such as this. In areas where controversy is high and where lives are involved, "public opinion" can become a powerful and emotional weapon. Exquisite care must be taken to tell the whole story. In the case of the *Sunday Times*, great care was taken with the poll, substantially less with the journalistic treatment of the results.

K.H.K.

	Urban black	White	Black	Urban black	Rural black	White
Do you think that other countries are right or wrong to impose economic sanctions unless South Africa agrees to get rid of the apartheid system?*	1985		1986			
Right	77%	6%	46%	62%	37%	5%
Wrong	21	91	51	37	58	92
If other countries were to impose economic sanctions against South Africa, do you think these would or would not hurt you personally?*						
Sanctions would hurt personally	48	54	69	69	76	63
Would not	46	39	26	24	22	33
Thinking of South Africa's apartheid system, which of these statements comes closest to your view. Are you . . .						
Happy with it	1	36	3	1	5	31
Unhappy with it	96	33	88	96	84	45
Neither happy or unhappy/Don't know	3	31	9	3	11	19
Do you think the system of apartheid will or will not still exist in ten years' time?						
Will still exist	29	22	25	36	25	19
Will not	59	63	59	60	54	72
Thinking first about what would happen, some people say that violence is justified to change the South African apartheid system. Others say that violence to change the system is not justified. Which of these do you believe?						
Violence is justified	43	11	28	43	23	9
Is not	55	84	63	55	68	88
There has been talk about releasing Nelson Mandela, the black ANC leader. Which of the following is closest to your view? Do you think he should be released . . .						
Without preconditions	90	6	83	82	82	12
Only if he renounces violence	6	34	8	15	6	44
Should not be released	2	57	1	2	1	40

Note: *The results reported for this question are for those who, in 1985, knew what sanctions were, and in 1986, had heard of sanctions. In the American press, the results for this question were reported for all those who were surveyed. Reported this way, the results for all blacks in 1986 were: 29% right, 32% wrong; for urban blacks, 47% right, 29% wrong; for rural blacks, 22% right, 34% wrong.

PRESSING OPINION

by Michael J. Robinson

WHAT'S the easiest way to pick a fight with a journalist? You could try first to accuse him or her of liberal bias, but most of them are immune to that by now. You could blame him or her for encouraging international terrorism, but lately journalists have figured out that terrorists stop murdering hostages when the reporters show up. The easiest way to get a journalist to disagree, and to do so disagreeably, is to say that the American public does not hate the press. But it's true. There is no growing public outcry against the news media, and journalists just can't take it. Maybe they don't believe it because they tend to be suspicious of good news. If that's the problem, then the latest *Times Mirror* survey, conducted by the Gallup Organization throughout 1985, should persuade them.

The Least of Our Worries

To talk with newspeople, you might get the impression that the press is a major concern in this country. Not exactly. The *Times Mirror* surveys indicate that the press is by no means a focus of discussion for the public at large (see table 1).

Reporters might assume that the network anchors are household names and faces, even if "the press" isn't often discussed around the dinner table. But even during the TWA crisis, when anchors were on camera constantly, public recognition of them was surprisingly low. Over half the population (53 percent) could *not* identify Dan Rather from his photograph. Nearly two-thirds could *not* identify Ted Koppel's photograph (63 percent); could *not* identify Mike Wallace (64 percent); could *not* identify Tom Brokaw (65 percent); and over three-fourths of the population could *not* identify George Will (88 percent). Only Barbara Walters's face is recognized by a majority—77 percent.

Table 1
FOCUS OF DISCUSSION

Question: Here is a list of some different groups of people. After you read through this list, tell me which, if any, of these groups you sometimes talk about with your friends and acquaintances.

Talk about most often/Sometimes:			
Political leaders	61%	Clergymen	29%
Entertainers	58	Business executives	26
Doctors	53	Journalists	23
Professional athletes	52	Scientists	18
Lawyers	31		

No Believability Crisis

If credibility means "believability," then any allegations concerning a press credibility crisis are wrong. "Believability" is one of the press's stronger suits.

Questions about accuracy and believability appeared in all five waves of this research (see "Methodology"). But the most systematic assessment came last summer during the personal interviews, when each respondent was asked to evaluate the believability of forty persons and organizations. More than eight Americans in ten awarded passing scores to the major news media (see table 2).

Table 2
BELIEVABILITY RATINGS FOR MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS

Question: I am going to read another list. This time please rate how much you think you can believe each organization I name on a scale of 4 to 1. On this 4-point scale, "4" means you can believe all or most of what they say and "1" means you can believe almost nothing of what they say. How would you rate the believability of (read item) on this scale of 4 to 1?

Highly believable/Believable:			
Wall Street Journal	87%	"McNeil-Lehrer News Hour"	83%
CBS News	87	Associated Press	82
ABC News	87	*Reader's Digest*	81
NBC News	86	Nationally influential papers	78
Newsweek	86	"All Things Considered" (NPR)	75
Time	85	*USA Today*	73
Local TV News	85	*Parade*	53
Cable News Network (CNN)	84	*People*	43
Radio News	84	*Rolling Stone*	28
Local Daily Newspaper	84	*National Enquirer*	14

Table 3
PRESS KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEVABILITY

Those who consider the press "very believable":

	Most informed	**Least informed**
ABC	25%	39%
CBS	25	41
NBC	23	43

There is some bad news here for the press. People tend to give more grades of "three" than "four," and those who know more about the press are more skeptical. The most "press aware" run about ten points below the least aware on the believability measure, but their believability scores are still in the low eighties. Knowledge makes the biggest difference on the "very believable" measure (see table 3).

No Popularity Crisis

During the mid-summer surveys, 71 percent of those evaluating President Reagan gave him a "very favorable" or "mostly favorable" evaluation. But, throughout 1985, the news media did even better than the president (see table 4).

No demographic or political group gives poor scores to the press overall. But using an index that combines several major news sources, Gallup found that three groups are significantly more approving than the public at large: Jews, the group we called the "press unaware," and heavy news consumers. Those who are least impressed are: farmers, those who live in small media markets, light media consumers, and people who have worked in journalism.

Table 4
FAVORABILITY SCORES FOR INSTITUTIONS

Question: I'd like your opinion of some people and some organizations. As I read from a list, please tell me which category on this card best describes your *overall opinion* of who or what I name.

Very favorable/Mostly favorable:			
Radio news	90%	The military	81%
Network TV news	89	Nationally influential papers	81
Local TV news	88	Congress	72
Local daily newspapers	88	Ronald Reagan	71
News magazines	86	Business corporations	65

Table 5
CENSORSHIP VS. CONTROL

Question: In the U.S., the power to pre-censor news belongs to judges. Imagine that you are a federal judge deciding how to balance the rights of a free press against the rights of the government or private citizens. For each of the two cases I'm going to read you, please tell me whether you would block the story outright, OR allow the story to run and let those complaining make their case against the news organization after publication.

Case A (Pentagon Papers): During Vietnam, a newspaper obtains background documents about how the U.S. got involved in Vietnam. The newspaper thinks it is important to the public that the information be published. The government wants you, the judge, to block publication on the grounds that the documents were originally classified and that the information might be damaging to the reputations of the political leaders mentioned in the documents. As judge, do you decide to:

Block publication	21%
Allow the story to be published	66

Case B (nuclear weapon-building instructions): A magazine wants to publish an article based on publicly available information. The article describes some important points on how to build a nuclear weapon. The government argues that under the law it has the right to block through the courts any communication which contains information about nuclear weaponry which might harm the U.S. The magazine argues that all of the factual material has already appeared in published material, much of it in encyclopedias. As judge, do you decide to:

Block publication	52%
Allow the story to be published	35

Control, Not Censorship

The public may like the press, but it values its own freedoms more than those of the news media. When asked to weigh the rights of the press against the rights of individuals or the community, the public generally sides against the press. Only when the issues involve government censorship does the public seem willing to pay for press freedom.

Consider public attitudes toward libel law—a set of policies that weigh press rights against individual rights. Nine in ten think the press should face legal action if the facts in a critical story are false. One in six support legal action even when critical stories are true! All the questions show that "the person" ranks higher than "the press" when rights are in conflict.

So also with attitudes toward the rights of the community. In fact, nearly three times as many Americans define freedom of the press to mean the public's right to hear as opposed to the press's right to speak. And that also comes through in public attitudes about the networks' early calls on election night. Four times as many think it more important to protect late voters than broadcasters.

But the *Times Mirror* surveys also indicate that the public generally values press freedom more than government prerogatives. A slim majority of the American public would prefer that the government *not* get involved in requiring fairness in news coverage or in requiring equal access for political advertising.

Two-thirds of the public, when given the major facts and issues involved in the *Pentagon Papers* case, vote to publish the papers, rather than allow the government to censor them. More than a third vote to allow publication of news stories on how to build a nuclear weapon (see table 5). And by a ratio of two to one, Americans support the policy that makes prior restraint by the government implausible.

National security issues do cause the public to back off from its general support of press freedom from government control. Forty-four percent believe it is more important that the government be able to "censor news stories it feels threaten national security" compared to 38 percent who believe it is more important that "the news media be able to report stories they feel are in the national interest." But on many policy issues involving government versus the press, the public comes down on the side of the press. In the end, four times as many Americans believe that press criticism of political leaders helps more than it hurts the nation as a whole. The pattern is clear with respect to rights and freedoms: the public values itself most, the press second, and political leaders last.

Old-Fashioned Criticism

So this is the good news, and journalists are going to have to learn to accept it. For those who insist upon feeling beleaguered, though, there are signs that it's not quite safe to leave the news room yet.

Is the press too negative in its reporting? Sixty percent say it is. Too willing to invade people's privacy? Nearly three-quarters feel that way. Unwilling to admit its mistakes? Fifty-five percent say so. Unconcerned about the people it covers? A plurality believe that, too.

A majority (53 percent) also told us that news organizations "tend to favor one side" in covering social and political issues. And 45 percent complain that news organizations are politically biased, although it is not quite clear from their responses in which way.

The public offers a laundry list of complaints when asked about press "practices." And because press practices are tied to credibility, broadly defined, these performance criticisms must be worrisome to the press and its friends. Yet the complaints about practices are tempered by other public attitudes. First, inconsistency. While a majority believe press coverage of issues is unfair, nearly eight in ten say the press is fair to Reagan. People are more likely to see or read stories about Reagan than stories about issues, so this particular criticism may be less serious than it first appears.

Second, the public finds more to commend than criticize when it evaluates press performance. On open-ended questions about what the public likes most and least about the way the press "does its job," the ratio of positive to negative comments is five to three—not bad for a public institution (see table 6).

Table 6

TOTAL POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE COMMENTS ABOUT THE WAY NEWS ORGANIZATIONS DO THEIR JOB

Question: What do you like (most/least) about the way (read item) news organizations do their job?

	Positive	Negative
Network TV news	1,600	1,333
Local TV news	1,466	1,128
National newspapers	854	684
One's daily paper	1,429	1,039
News magazines	1,058	549
Radio news	1,127	692

Third, the public that sees failures in performance also believes the press is highly professional (72 percent) and cares about the quality of work it does (78 percent). Suspicions about bias and bad news apparently stem from something other than the press's bad character or incompetence. Allegations about leftist bias have yet to penetrate mass public opinion. These surveys indicate that only 22 percent of the national audience think news reporting is liberally biased. In fact, a curious 9 percent claim that today's news is slanted in favor of conservatism. The public at large just hasn't come to see the news media as ideologically biased in either direction.

Finally, with the glaring exception of the public's critique of the press's fairness in covering the issues, criticism is about the lesser evils, things like rudeness and negativity.

The Vocal Opposition

About 30 percent of the public can be classified, overall, as opponents of the press. And Gallup estimates that this 30 percent can be divided into three different clusters.

First, Gallup identified a group labeled the "Embittered Critics" (10 percent). Embittered Critics sound and look much like the old Wallace constituency. Blue-collar (often southern) Democrats, they dislike the press, dislike most of our national political institutions, and show no real appreciation of President Reagan.

Unlike the other groups, on some policy issues, Embittered Critics express liberal attitudes. But what differentiates the Embittered Critics most from the other groups is their unusually high level of political and social alienation. Their distaste for the media may represent a distaste for national institutions in general.

Second are "Main Streeters" (15 percent), who are mostly Republican, usually from the heartland, and whose criticism of the media reflects the kind of off-the-cuff remarks Reagan himself makes about the press.

Main Streeters see liberal bias, one-sidedness, and dependency in the press. But Main Street Critics, unlike the Embittered, do not necessarily consider the press harmful. On that fundamental issue they are evenly divided. Like Reagan, Main Street Critics are willing to believe that the free press has some benefits.

Last, Gallup uncovered a group of "Vociferous Critics," about 5 percent of the population. But what a 5 percent! In their attitudes toward the press, Vociferous Critics sound like the early Spiro Agnew. They regard the press as one-sided, liberally biased, aggressive, and a deleterious influence on American politics.

Vociferous Critics know more about the press than any other group, appear in the press more than any other group, and communicate more with the press than any other group. Vociferous Critics are more than twice as likely to write a letter to voice an opinion about the press as the rest of the nation. In fact the Vociferous help explain why the press senses more opposition than exists. Detractors generally, and the Vociferous particularly, voice their criticism more often than supporters express their approval.

Even the most critical groups tend to express overall favorable opinions about specific news organizations and newspeople. And, although more than half think the press is one-sided, eight in ten Americans still like the press. Even among the Vociferous Critics, 74 percent say that they have a favorable overall attitude toward network news.

How can the same public say that the press is unfair, then approve of the people and organizations committing the sins? Why is "press opinion" so ambivalent in America, even among the Vociferous Critics?

Gallup asked our respondents for an answer.

Using "double-back" interviews, Gallup developed a set of questions that would help solve the "two-mindedness" riddle. The answer seems to be that the public knows what it's saying. People detect performance failures in the press, but they also adopt attitudes that ameliorate their concerns about practices.

The first ameliorating attitude is appreciation of the news per se. The news as a product seems especially powerful in neutralizing criticism of press performance. During the TWA hostage crisis, when the press was beating its own breast about the irresponsible behavior of the news media, the public responded by expressing more favorable opinions about the press than usual (see table 7). Public support and approval were higher during the crisis than two months later, and higher during the crisis than in the Gallup surveys conducted earlier.

Table 7
ATTITUDES TOWARD THE MEDIA DURING THE TWA HOSTAGE CRISIS AND SIX WEEKS LATER

1985	June/July	August
Network news favorability	89%	82%
Press professionalism	72	65
Press standing up for America	52	45
Press independence	37	31

Why? The answer is "news." During the TWA hostage crisis, the public wanted more *news*, and during the crisis the media were delivering the product.

We asked people directly: why does the press fail in so many ways? Over two-thirds of the reasoning dealt with dependency—the need for a large audience, the influence of special interests, news management, or advertiser pressure. Less than one-fourth of the reasoning places the blame on internal failings—reporter bias or incompetence (see table 8). The single greatest explanation for performance failure is that "news organizations are so interested in attracting a big audience that they don't do a good job." Finally, double-back interviews indicate that news personalities help to neutralize performance criticisms. People who like *newspeople* tend to stay favorably inclined toward the press, performance criticisms notwithstanding.

Table 8

Question: We've talked about some things which news organizations do well and not so well. Here are some possible reasons why news organizations sometimes don't do as good a job as they should. Which of these reasons do you think best explains why news organizations sometimes don't do such a good job? Which one of these reasons is most important?

	Summary
News people lack the skills and background to do a good job	6%
Advertisers put pressure on news organizations that keeps them from doing a good job	8
News people can't keep their personal opinions from showing up in their reporting	17
News organizations don't want to spend the money to do things right	3
News organizations are so interested in attracting a big audience that they don't do a good job	23
Special interest groups put pressure on news organizations that keeps them from doing a good job	21
The government keeps news organizations from getting the real story	11

Note: Summary = Combination of reasons that "best explain" and are "most important."

Facing the Good News Bravely

All things considered, the press is in reasonably good shape, if not in the libel courts, then at least in the eye of the general public. The harshest allegations haven't taken hold. Only about one American in ten questions the morality of the news media; only one in five feels that the press spends too much time covering corruption in government; less than a third think that press criticism of the military is harmful to national defense.

There is a reservoir of support for the press, but it runs wide rather than deep. A few more Janet Cooke affairs might turn public opinion against the media, but I doubt it. The public isn't watching closely enough. More than 70 percent were unable to tell us in 1985 that it was CBS News that William Westmoreland tried to sue for libel. More than 80 percent were unable to tell us that it was CBS News that Jesse Helms tried to buy.

Journalists can take some comfort in all of this, but not too much. Although detractors are fewer in number than applauders, they are generally higher in caliber. Although few Americans want the government to censor the news, almost nobody supports a wide-open interpretation of the First Amendment. So the press can stop holding its breath, but shouldn't feel free yet to breathe easily.

Michael Robinson is director of the Los Angeles Times Mirror Foundation media project.

A Note on Methodology

The *Times Mirror* "People and Press" surveys were conducted throughout 1985. In April, Gallup conducted focus group sessions in Los Angeles, Chicago, and metropolitan New York.

In May, Gallup interviewed 250 people by phone, nationwide, in a pilot survey, testing the appropriateness of the questionnaire that evolved from the focus group research.

In June and July, Gallup interviewed 2,100 people, nationwide, in their homes; interviews lasted, on average, an hour and ten minutes. Because the June/July surveys were conducted, for the most part, during the TWA hostage crisis, Gallup and *Times Mirror* contacted a fresh sample of 1,100 people in August, using that new sample to test for a "hostage crisis" effect on attitudes toward the press.

Finally, in November and December, Gallup reinterviewed more than a thousand people from the June/July surveys, asking a new set of questions—questions Gallup felt might help explain apparent contradictions in public attitudes toward the press.